According to the Air Force, if sequestration goes into effect, it would have to make cuts in radar operations that would have the effect of “significantly impacting national missile defense, space situational awareness, and the intelligence community.”[1]  Specifically, radar operations at Cavalier Air Force Station in North Dakota and at Earecksen Air Station, Alaska and operation the Air Force Space Surveillance System (AFSSS) would be reduced from 24 to 8 hours per day.

Would such reductions actually seriously impact U.S. missile defenses?

Coverage of the Cobra Dane radar at Earecksen Air Station, Shemya Island, Alaska.  Figure from Union of Concerned Scientists, Technical Realities, p. 37.[2]

The large phased-array PARCS (Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System) radar at Cavalier, which was originally built part of the Safeguard Anti-ballistic Missile System, is now used for missile attack warning and space surveillance.  Earecksen Air Station on Shemya Island at the western end of the Aleutians is the home of the Cobra Dane, a large-phased array L-band radar originally built to gather intelligence on Soviet missile tests, but which is now also used for missile warning, missile  defense and space surveillance.  The AFSSS is a radar “fence” stretching across the southern United States that detects satellites as they pass over it, and is a dedicated component of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN).

In terms of missile defense, the impact of these temporary (presumably) cutbacks in radar operations seems pretty minimal.  PARCS is not part of the current GMD national missile defense system, and the AFSSS does not have (and cannot be given) any ballistic missile defense capabilities.  While Cobra Dane has been part of the GMD system since the GMD was first declared operational, because of its poor orientation it has never participated in an intercept test.  While Cobra Dane can potentially provide much higher resolution radar data than the Pave Paws radar in California, it can only do so within a narrow region within 22 degrees of its boresite, which a missile from North Korea towards the U.S. west coast would spend little if any of its trajectory within (as shown in figure above). Nor does removing these radars from the early warning network open up any gaps in the coverage provided by the five BMEWS and Pave Paws early warning radars.

The impact on space surveillance seems potentially much more significant.  Cobra Dane can detect and track smaller objects in low earth orbit than any of the SSN’s other sensors (down to as small as about 5 cm, although it only tracks a small fraction of such objects).  It has this small-object capability largely because it operates at a higher frequency (about 1.3 GHz) than other seven large phased-array radars in the SSN, all of which operate in the UHF band at about 440 MHz.  PARCS, although not ideally situated for space surveillance (it is in North Dakota, facing north) is, along with the FPS-85 radar in Florida, one of the two most powerful of the large UHF phased-array radars in the SSN.  The AFSSS, while it cannot detect objects much smaller than about 30 cm in diameter, nevertheless produces thousands of measurements every day on space objects that pass through its radar fence.

Integrated flight test FTI-01, conducted by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on October 25, 2012, involved the near-simultaneous interception of three ballistic missile and two cruise missile targets.  According to a MDA news release issued on the day of the test, four of the intercept attempts were successful.[1]  For the fifth intercept attempt, however, involving an Aegis Block IA interceptor against a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) target, it was reported that, although the interceptor appeared to fly out normally, “there was no indication of an intercept” of its target.  News reports have since described the intercept attempt as failure.[2] The BMDS section of  DOT&E’s 2012 Annual Report describes the engagement as unsuccessful.  And the MDA’s ongoing intercept test scorecard shows the intercept attempt as a failure, as shown below:

(From Missile Defense Agency, “Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Record,” Fact Sheet, February 13, 2013.)

However, in a February 22 2013 briefing, new MDA Director Vice Admiral James D. Syring presented a slide showing the outcome of the intercept as “Engaged: Intercept Not Confirmed” and scored with a yellow check mark.  The slide is below.

(From: VADM J. D. Syring (Director, Missile Defense Agency), “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,”  Briefing Slides, American Society of Naval Architects, February 22, 2013. 

What does this mean?  Does it indicate that, roughly three months after the intercept test, MDA still hasn’t determined if the target was successfully intercepted?  This immediately call to mind the situation with the FTG-02 NMD test, in which the fact that the “successful intercept” did not actually destroy the target was not publicly revealed until more than five years after the test.  However, even that test gets a green check mark in MDA’s intercept test scorecard:

So what does the yellow check mark mean?  If they don’t know what happened, why not a question mark?  Maybe as more information comes out, we’ll find out.

I have updated (now with 16 claims) my compilation of official claims about the effectiveness of the United States GMD national missile defense with White House Press Secretary Jay Carney’s comments from yesterday. At the daily White House press briefing, in response to a question. Mr. Carney stated that.

“I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack.  And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea.  But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat.”

For perspective, it should be noted that the “CE2 missile” interceptor cited by Mr. Carney has, in fact, failed in both its intercept tests.  The recent successful test of this interceptor raised by Mr. Carney, did not involve a target, much less an intercept attempt.  The test, labeled CTV-01 and conducted in January,  involved putting the kill vehicle through a series of maneuvers in order to determine if a vibration problem caused by firing its maneuvering thrusters has been solved (see graphic below — click on it for a larger image).  This test was reportedly successful and a third attempt to intercept a target with a CE-2 kill vehicle will likely occur in the next few months.

CTV-01 Test (Image source: VADM J. D. Syring (Director, Missile Defense Agency), “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,”  Briefing Slides, American Society of Naval Architects, February 22, 2013.

Earlier versions of the GBI interceptor have reportedly been successful on eight out of thirteen intercept attempts.   This includes three out of three for the operationally configured CE-1 version of the GBI (although as has been noted several times in this blog, in one reportedly successful test the interceptor did not achieve a “kill” of its warhead target), which was most recently intercept-tested in December 2008.

For the past year or so, DoD and MDA officials have been saying that the deployment of the high-speed SM-3 Block IIB interceptor, the key element of the planned Phase IV of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA,) would be delayed from its originally planned date of 2020 to at least 2021.

For example, below are two excerpts from a February 22, 2013 presentation by MDA Director Vice Admiral James D. Syring, showing that while Phase IV is still in the “2020 timeframe” the Block IIB missile is now scheduled for 2021.

Figure is two excerpts from: VADM J. D. Syring (Director, Missile Defense Agency), “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,”  Briefing Slides, American Society of Naval Architects, February 22, 2013. 

However, it now appears that the Block II interceptor has slipped to at least 2022. On March 12, at a Conference at the Atlantic Council, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller, in response to a question from Tom Collina of the Arms Control Association, stated that:

“The reality is that with the underfunding of our request from Congress for FY 12 and with the continuing resolution this year, our ability to deploy an SM-3 IIB has slipped at least two years to the right relative to what we had previously planned”

A video of Mr. Miller’s presentation (and the Q and A) at the conference on “The United States and Global Missile Defense” is available .

At the end of last week, the MDA removed its “Program Overview Briefing” slides (which dated from August 2012) from its “Downloadable Resources” on its website, replacing them with “Briefing slides coming soon.”  It will be interesting to see the year for Phase IV on these.

At a Pentagon press conference today, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the planned deployment of the high-speed SM-3 Block IIB interceptor to Poland (and the corresponding 4th phase of European Phased Adaptive Approach) has been cancelled. The transcript of Hagel’s prepared statement only states that the Block IIB programmed was being restructured, but the discussion in the following press conference makes it clear that the deployment plan has been cancelled:

In response to a question at the press conference, James Miller, the Undersecretary of Defense of Policy said (my transcription from C-SPAN video):
“The prior plan had four phases. The third phase involved the deployment of interceptors in Poland. And we will continue phases one through three. In the fourth phase in the previous plan we would have added some additional — an additional type of interceptors –the so called SM-3 IIB would have been added to the mix in Poland. We no longer intend to add them to the mix but will have the same number of deployed interceptors in Poland that will provide coverage for all of NATO Europe.”

In the prior plan, Block IIA interceptors would have been deployed in Poland as part of Phase III of the EPAA and then in Phase IV some or all of these would have been replaced by Block IIB interceptors. Whether the Block IIB development program is completely dead is unclear. This is a very significant development given that the Block IIB was the single greatest source of Russian objections to U.S. missile defense activities. Although there are certainly also good technical and economic reasons for cancelling the Block IIB, it will thus inevitably be portrayed as to be a major concession to Russia. Whether it will be actually be enough to satisfy the Russians remains to be seen, as many Russian statements have also objected to the unlimited deployment of the high-speed (although not as fast) Block IIA interceptor.

As was clearly the goal of the press conference, most media attention focused on the comparatively minor announcement that the number of deployed GBI interceptors in the U.S Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system covering the United States would be increased to 44 from the current 30. This involves deploying 14 additional GBI interceptors into 14 already existing silos (although in some cases, these silos need extensive refurbishing – see my post of March 28, 2012 for details) by the end of 2017. The planned number of interceptors was already at 44 when Obama took office, but his administration quickly cut this back to 30, citing a lack of a threat. Since then the possibility of restoring the number of interceptors to 44 has frequently been portrayed by the Administration as a possible hedge against future changes in the threat.

The other two items that Secretary Hagel announced were that a second TPY-2 X-band radar would be deployed to Japan and that the Department of Defense was conducting an Environmental Impact Study for an potential additional GBI interceptor site (in the eastern U.S.). However, as was acknowledged in the press conference, neither was a new development: Secretary Panetta had previously announced the radar to Japan and Congress had already mandated environmental impact studies be done for at least two east coast sites (the location of which have not yet been announced).

At last Friday’s Pentagon press conference announcing plans to deploy 14 additional Ground-Based  interceptors (GBIs) in existing silos as part the of current Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system, a revision to the GBI intercept testing program was also revealed.

A prototype version  of the EKV kill vehicle (Photograph: http://www.mda.mil/global/images/system/gmd/ift9-kv.jpg)

The new version of the GBI’s kill vehicle, the Capability Enhancement II (CE-II), failed to intercept its targets in its only two flight tests, both in 2010.  As a result, deliveries of new CE-II kill vehicles have been suspended (and the CE-I version can no longer be built). As of the end of 2012, the plan was that the next GBI flight test would be CTV-01, a non-intercept attempt flight with a modified CE-II kill vehicle.  If this test, scheduled for early 2013, succeeded, then an intercept test (FTG-06b) using a CE-II kill vehicle would be conducted this summer, and if this test succeeded, then deliveries of the CE-II kill vehicle could resume.

The non-intercept test CTV-01 was successfully conducted in January.  However, at the March 15 press conference, it was stated that the FTG-06b intercept test of the CE-II kill vehicle would be delayed until at least the fall, and that in its place a test using the earlier CE-I kill vehicle would be conducted this summer.  According to Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “We’re going to flight-test the CE-1 this summer, and we are going to hopefully flight-test the CE-2 after we build it this fall.”

When asked about the reason for the delay in the CE-II intercept test (which must be successfully completed before deliveries of new interceptors can resume), the Pentagon representatives said it was  because they had just started to build the CE-II kill vehicle, and that building it was a lengthy process.

In response to a question about where they were in the process of preparing for the test, Admiral Winnefeld stated that: “They’re — they’ve started assembling — you know, acquiring the components and assembling the additional EKV.  And that’s a — that’s a very technical piece of equipment; it takes a while to put together.”

Now if you have not been following the story of the CE-II closely, it might seem somewhat surprising that they have to wait many months until an entirely new CE-II kill vehicle is assembled from scratch.  After, all, there are already ten CE-IIs deployed in silos.  A brief review of the history of the CE-II can shed some light on what is going on.

The first GBIs deployed in 2004 and were equipped with the original CE-I kill vehicle (see the post of March 28 for a GBI deployment chronology).  Twenty four of these were ultimately deployed, the last in September 2007.  However, in the rush to deploy, these kill vehicles were built with parts that were not sustainable, and thus in 2005 the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) began develop a new version, the CE-II kill vehicle.  Although the primary reason for the developing the new kill vehicle was obsolescence of components, some improvements in capability were also made.  The first GBI with the new CE-II kill vehicle was deployed in October 2008.

The first flight and intercept test of a GBI with a CE-II kill vehicle was conducted in January 2010, and failed due to a quality control problem.  The second CE-II intercept test in December 2010 also failed, this time apparently due to a design flaw in a part new to the CE-II version, a fundamental and much more serious problem.  Following this failure, the MDA announced that all deliveries of CE-IIs would be suspended.

The plan the MDA ultimately announced to address the problem with the CE-II involved two flight tests.  The first test would be a flight test with no target.  This test would use a CE-II with the part that was believed to be defective, but with mitigations for the problems it was believed to be causing.  The kill vehicle would conduct maneuvers in space to confirm the cause of the problem, which was believed to be caused by high-frequency vibrations from the kill vehicle’s maneuvering rocket thrusters.  If this test was successful (and it was successfully carried out in January), a second test would be conducted using a new replacement part for the defective component.  If this second test, which would be an intercept test, was successful, then production and deliveries of new CE-II kill vehicles would resume.

The problem here is that the defective component that is being replaced is at the very core of the kill vehicle, and is one of the first parts required in the assembly process.  If the MDA waited until the January test successfully confirmed the nature of the problem before building new CE-II, as it appears they have done, then construction of a brand new CE-II for the next test would then have to start from the beginning, a process that apparently takes many months.  The testing delay in this case thus appears to be actually attributable to following a “fly before you buy” (or in this case “fly before you build)” process.  At the March 15 press conference, both Admiral Winnefeld and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller attributed the delay in testing to following a fly before you buy process.

Not so good from a “fly before you buy” perspective are the ten GBIs armed with CE-II kill vehicles with the defective part that are already deployed in silos in Alaska and California.  These kill vehicles will have to be pulled from the silos, almost completely disassembled, and then reassembled with the new part, at a cost that the GAO last year estimated as about $18 million each.[1]

At a March 15, 2013 press conference (transcript), U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced that U.S. would increase the number of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) deployed as part of its Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system from the current 30 to 44 by the end of 2017.  At the press conference, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller said that their estimate was this deployment would cost just under $1 billion.  Dr. Miller explained that this cost would include both the 14 additional interceptors and the cost of recommissioning Missile Field One at Fort Greely, Alaska.  Does this cost seem plausible?

The Missile Defense Complex at Fort Greely, Alaska.   The missile fields are at the left, with Missile Field 2 still under construction  (MF = missile field, MEB = missile electrical building).  Source:  http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/GMD_DSC_Focused_Transition_brief.pdf

The U.S. currently has thirty GBIs deployed.  Four are deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.  The other 26 are deployed at Fort Greely Alaska in Missile Field 3 (20 silos) and the more recent Missile Field 2 (14 silos).  The original Missile Field 1 (six silos) was shut down after the other missile fields became available.  The new plan would purchase fourteen additional GBIs and deploy them at Fort Greely by filling in the eight empty silos in Missile Fields 2 & 3 and by reactivating the six silos of Missile Field 1.

How Much To Recommission Missile Field 1?

The cost of recommissioning Missile Field 1 is greater than one might expect.  The six silos of of this missile field one were, like the GBI interceptors that were put in them, deployed very rapidly in order to meet President Bush’s goal of having an operational capability by the end of the 2004 fiscal year.  According to one source, the construction of the field was completed with “27 minutes to spare.”[1]

As might be expected, problems ensued both with the GBIs and the silos.  Some indication of the issues involved in recommissioning Missile Field 1 is given by the following written response (2010) by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Michael B. Mullen to a question from Alaska Senator Mark Begich:

“Once Missile Field 2 is fully operational, Missile Field 1 will be decommissioned since it was designed as a test bed only and is not hardened or sufficiently reliable for a long-term operational deployment.  Specifically, Missile Field 1 lacks backup power and has significant infrastructure reliability issues.  These reliability issues include extensive mold contamination in the Missile Field 1 utilidor, requiring personnel to suit up for a hazardous environment; inadequate valve connections in the chilled water system, resulting in leaks of glycol, and dust intrusion in Mechanical Electrical Building 1.  The Missile Field 2 design includes shielding and addresses the reliability concerns of Missile Field 1.”[2]

Some additional information relevant to the above statement may be useful.  First, at the time, as Gates and Mullen indicate, the plan was that Missile Field 1 would be “decommissioned.”  Decommissioning basically involves returning the site to its pre-construction state and would have been both costly and irreversible.  Under pressure from Congress, it was subsequently decided to place the missile field in storage instead, from which it could be returned to service in about two years.  Second, while a “dust intrusion” might not seem like a serious problem, the dust was apparently getting into electrical switchgear, with potentially “catastrophic impacts.”  Finally, a “utilidor” is a apparently a utility corridor.

The only cost estimate I have seen for re-commissioning the missile field is from 2010, when MDA Director Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly told Congress that the cost to reactivate the six silos of Missile Field 1 would be “on the order of $200 million”:

“So we would need to remediate that.  We’d need to actually remove almost all of the active components of that missile field and replace them with newer ones.  The time frame with that would be on the order of two years. The costs that we have looked at in the past when we looked at different options would be on the order of – and this has been done several years ago, sir, so the cost are somewhat approximate – would be on the order of $200 million.”[3]

How much for the Fourteen New GBI Interceptors?

If we assume $200 million for the missile field, this still leaves up to $800 million for the fourteen new GBI interceptors, or up to about $57 million per interceptor.  This seems quite low.

As discussed in my post of July 24, up through 2011, cost estimates for a new GBI interceptor were consistently about $70 million each.  As discussed in that post, the $70 million figure does not include the roughly $20 million per interceptor needed for repairs and retrofits.

Information that has subsequently become available indicates that current cost per interceptor may be significantly higher.  The September 2012 Report by the National Academy of Sciences (p. 255) included the following cost breakdown for each GBI in a buy of five interceptors (data provided by the MDA, in FY 2010 dollars):

GBI Cost Element                                          Unit Cost (million $)

EKV (kill vehicle)                                                             29.8

Booster stack                                                                     19.8

Booster avionics modules                                                6.5

Integration, assembly, test and checkout                     4.1

————————————————–          —————————————-

Total cost                                                                           70.2

Note that the single largest cost element is the kill vehicle, which at $29.8 million is about 42% of the total cost of a GBI.  The NAS Report does not indicate whether this cost was for the older CE-I version of the kill vehicle or the newer CE-II version (which will be the version deployed by 2017 on the fourteen new interceptors, assuming that it succeeds in its next test).  However, the NAS Report noted that 2011 MDA budget documents indicated that the next batch of seven of CE-II kill vehicles was expected to cost about $39 million each, an increase of over $9 million per kill vehicle. In addition, the MDA told the NAS Panel that it was budgeting $85 million for its next batch of five GBI interceptors.

The Bottom Line

Based on the above discussion, the available data suggest a cost of about $200 + 14($70-$85) million ≈ $1.2 – $1.4 billion for the deployment of the fourteen additional interceptors, 20-40% great than the cost of just under $1 billion provided at the press conference.

In light of recent developments involving North Korea, including its threat this week to attack Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, questions have been raised about how well the U.S. territory was defended against a ballistic missile attack.     Some in Guam have interpreted the statements made by Undersecretary  of Defense James Miller and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld at a March 15 press conference that the current U.S. Ground Based Midcourse (GND) system covers “all the United States” and “the entire United States” as indicating that the system covers Guam. The response by Undersecretary Miller is particularly significant as he was specifically asked about “American possessions in Western Pacific — Samoa, Guam, those areas.”  On Monday, Guam’s (non-voting) delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, Madeleine Z. Bordallo, explicitly stated in a letter that this was the case:  “Additionally, I am aware that DoD officials are confident that the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System will provide protection not only for the continental United States, but for Guam as well.

In fact, it is clear that this is not the case.  The figure below, from the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, shows the coverage of the GMD system against an ICBM from North Korea (I have added the arrow indicating Guam’s location).

Coverage of the U.S. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) against a North Korean ICBM.  The red arrow indicates Guam’s location. (Map from the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, p.15.)

As this figure shows, Guam lies more than 1,000 km beyond the perimeter that the GMD system is capable of covering.  This is hardly surprising as Guam is less than 3,500 km from North Korea, but about 7,500 km from the GMD interceptors in Alaska (the interceptors in California are even further away).

A seemingly more accurate description of the ability of U.S. missile defenses to cover Guam is this week’s response to a question from the Pacific News Center by the U.S. Joint Region Marianas:

“The Department of Defense fully intends to defend the United States and its territories from any ballistic missile attack.  The United States maintains a range of ballistic missile defense capabilities that could be deployed in Guam’s defense in times of crisis.”

That is, Guam is not defended against ballistic missile on a routine basis, but in “times of crisis” Patriot, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), or Aegis SM-3 missile defense systems could be forward-deployed to Guam or its vicinity.  This approach apparently assumes at least some advance notice of a potential attack.  However, Representative Bordallo’s letter also stated that “I look forward to a more permanent Aegis missile defense capability in the future.”  Guam has been cited as a possible future site for an Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system (such as those planned for Romania and Poland) by the system’s manufacturer (Lockheed Martin).  Back in 2009-10, plans to deploy both a THAAD and a Patriot battery to Guam were being discussed, but this never happened.

Raytheon announced last week that it had delivered the 8^th TPY-2 X-band radar to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.[1]  This radar is now being used by the 3^rd Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, which was activated late last year at Fort Bliss, Texas.[2]  The previous radar, #7, was delivered in 2010, however, funding issues subsequently led to an 18 month break in production.  A TPY-2 currently takes about 30 months to build.

In addition, Congressional appropriations conferees reportedly recently agreed on funding for an additional (second) TPY-2 in FY 2013.[3]

FTI-01, held on October 25 2012, involved two TPY-2 radars, one as a forward-based X-band radar and one as a THAAD fire control radar, located on different islands of the Kwajalein Atoll.  (Image source: Missile Defense Agency)

A TPY-2 radar can be configured either as a forward-based radar for detecting, tracking, and discriminating ballistic missile targets or as a fire control radar for a THAAD missile defense battery.   In principle, a radar can be switched between the two configurations in about eight hours.

Currently four TPY-2s are deployed as forward based radars, in northern Japan, Israel, Turkey and Qatar.  A fifth is planned for deployment in the near future to central Japan. The other three TPY-2s are deployed as THAAD radars at Fort Bliss, two with each of the first two THAAD batteries, which are operational, and one with the third battery, which is in training.

According to Raytheon, TPY-2s #9 and #10 are about halfway built and construction of TPY-2 #11 has just begun.[4]  These are intended for THAAD batteries four, five and six.

The FY 2012 MDA budget, released in February 2012, reduced the planned number of TPY-2 radars to eleven and the number of THAAD batteries to six, from fourteen and nine respectively.  Earlier, as many as many as eighteen TPY-2s and thirteen THAAD batteries had been planned.

The second TPY-2 radar for FY 2013 would thus be radar number twelve.  This purchase of this radar was described as necessary to prevent a temporary shutdown of the production line in FY 2014, despite foreign sales of four radars as part of THAAD batteries, two to the United Arab Emirates and two to Qatar.  It is unclear (to me) how this twelfth radar will be deployed.

The 2013 GAO annual “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” was posted today.[1]  It shows that the projected cost of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense program now exceeds $40 billion, at $40,926 billion.  This is an increase of about $1.76 billion over last year’s figure of $39,162 billion.  It includes costs from the program start in 1996 through FY 2017.   However, this $40+ billion cost estimate is as of August last year, and thus does not include the roughly $1 billion for 14 additional interceptors announced two weeks ago.  The current report says “GMD consists of of an interceptor with a three-stage booster and kill vehicle and a fire control system, which formulates battle plans and direct components that are integrated with BMDS radars,” which seems to imply that the radars  are not included in these cost figures.  However, reports from previous years indicate that radars costs such as those for the new Sea-Based X-band radar and upgrades to the Cobra Dane and other Early Warning Radars are included.

[1] Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs,” March 2013, p. 45.

Less than three weeks after Department of Defense officials incorrectly stated that Guam was covered by the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile system, the Department announced today that a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery would be deployed to Guam.  The U.S. currently has two deployable THAAD batteries with a third undergoing training, all at Fort Bliss, Texas, and currently plans to buy a total of six, although this number could increase.  Each battery consists of a TPY-2 X-band radar, up to six launchers (although the current batteries only have three each), each of which can carry as many as eight interceptor missiles, and a fire control system.

This would be the first operational deployment of a THAAD battery away from Fort Bliss.  In June 2009, in response to indications of North Korean plans to test a long-range missile, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that a THAAD battery had been deployed to Hawaii.[1]  However, this was only a temporary activation of THAAD components that happened to be in Hawaii at that time for testing purposes.[2]  As of late 2009, the U.S. Army planned to deploy both Patriot and THAAD batteries to Guam, but this never took place.

One interesting question that announcement raises is: Once the system is deployed in Guam, under what circumstances could it ever be removed?

In a recent post, I cited the GAO estimate that the total cost of  the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system, projected through FY 2017, was now $40.9 billion (in FY 2013 dollars).  I thought it would also be interesting to look back over previous GAO reports to see how the cost of the GMD system has increased over the last decade.

The $40.9 billion figure was reported in the GAO’s March 28, 2013 version of its report on Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   The GAO began releasing this annual report in 2003, although the GMD system was only included starting with the 2004 report.  Each report includes a “Latest” cost figure, which is total cost of the GMD system including future costs not yet incurred, projected several years ahead. 

The GMD costs appear to include the GBI interceptors and their fire control system, the Sea-Based X-Band radar, and the GMD upgrades to the Cobra Dane and early warning radars, but (probably) not the forward-based TPY-2 X-band radars.  It is unclear (to me) to what extent operations and sustainment costs are included (in at least one year they are explicitly excluded).   Figure 1 below shows the GMD costs for the ten years the GAO report has been released, starting with the 2004 report (click on the graph to get a larger image).

Figure 1: GAO Total Cumulative Cost for the GMD System, including some future projected costs.

On Figure 1, the x-axis is the date of the data used in the cost estimate.  For example, the first point, from the 2004 report, is based on data up to February, 2003 and is thus plotted as x = 2003.17.  The y-axis is GAO’s “Latest” cost projection, which is in dollars corresponding to the year of the report and includes costs projected several years ahead.[1]  For example, the $22.5 billion point for 2003 is in FY 2004 dollars for costs through FY 2009. The last point is from August, 2012 and is for costs through FY 2017.  However, costs associated with the March 15, 2013 announcement of plans to increase the number of deployed GBI interceptors from 30 to 44 are not included in that total.

There are several problems with Figure 1.  First, the numbers of years each annual estimate projects ahead varies from year to year.  Second, inflation is not taken into account.  Figure 2 below attempts to compensate for these two problems by subtracting out the projected funding and by then converting the remaining costs to FY 2013 dollars.[2]  Figure 2 is thus a plot of the amount spent on the GMD system through the date shown in constant FY 2013 dollars.

Figure 2: GMD actual costs (no future projections) in FY 2013 dollars.

If we assume the zero point for GMD costs is February 1996, which the GAO takes as the starting date for their cost estimates, then as Figure 3 below shows, the data fits surprisingly well to a linear increase over time.

Figure 3.  GMD actual costs fitted to linear plot with a February 1996 starting date.

Nevertheless, it is clear from looking at the ten plotted data points that the rate of GMD spending has slowed up somewhat in the last four or five years relative to the five previous years.  This is hardly surprising, since much of the system was deployed by 2010 (for example, the 30^th GBI interceptor was deployed in September 2010). 

As discussed in a recent post, as a result of sequestration, the Air Force had planned to reduce operations at several large radars used for space surveillance and ballistic missile defense.  One of the radars expected to have its operations cut back was Cobra Dane, a large phased-array radar on Shemya Island at the western end of the Aleutians.  According to General William Shelton, Commander of the Air Force Space Command, as a cost saving measure, the plan had been to cut the radar’s operation to one-quarter power for the rest of the year, which would save about $5 million.[1]  This reduction would likely be accomplished by reducing the radar’s duty cycle (the fraction of the time it emits radar energy) from 6% to 1.5%, as has been done previously

Cobra Dane, originally built to gather intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile tests, is now also part of the U.S Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which has 30 interceptors deployed in Alaska and Hawaii.  It is also an important part of the U.S. space surveillance system, as it can detect and track objects in low Earth orbit down to sizes of about 5 centimeters, significantly smaller than any other radar in the network.  Shelton stated that this cutback in power would have temporarily eliminated the radar’s space surveillance role, but that the U.S. had ways to compensate for this loss.  Prior to 2003, Cobra Dane had operated at one-quarter power (also for cost reasons), with the ability to return to full power in 30 seconds if a missile test occurred.  When full power operation was restored in March 2003, Cobra Dane was able to begin operating a high-elevation space surveillance “fence,” significantly  enhancing the space surveillance system’s capabilities.

However, as a result of the ongoing tensions with North Korea, this planned cutback in Cobra Dane’s operations has been cancelled.  This reversal is unlikely to affect the other two systems that had been scheduled to have their operations cut back, the large phased array radar at Cavalier Air Station in North Dakota and the Air Force Space Surveillance System at multiple sites in the southern United States, as neither is part of the current U.S. missile defense system.

The recently released FY 2014 Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget justification documentation provides some new details on the MDA’s plans for future tests of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system.  In particular, it raises the possibility of carrying out a second non-intercept flight test (CTV-02) before resuming intercept testing using the new CE-II version of the interceptor’s kill vehicle.

As discussed in my previous post on GMD testing, following the failure of the FTG-06a intercept test in December 2010, MDA removed the ten deployed Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) equipped with the CE-II version of the kill vehicle from operational status and suspended deliveries of new GBIs.  Deliveries of new GBIs and repairs to the deployed CE-II equipped GBIs were to begin following successful completion of a return-to-intercept (RTI) flight testing program.   The RTI program was to consist of a non-intercept flight test (CTV-01) which if successful would be flowed by an intercept test (FTG-06b).

The non-intercept test CTV-1 was conducted on January 26, 2013 and was described, based on preliminary information, as successful.  The FY-2014 budget justification states that “Initial results indicate very robust performance of the CE-II kill vehicle.”[1]

However, the budget justification also states that: “In implementing a less concurrent technical approach for the CE-II program, we plan to execute a CTV-02 non-intercept flight test in second quarter 2014 followed by FTG-09 CE-II intercept test in fourth quarter 2014.”[2]    On the other hand, the budget materials also indicated that if the success of CTV-01 was assessed to “conclusive,” then instead “we will eliminate CTV-02 in FY 2014 and instead fly the next CE-II intercept flight test (FTG-06b) in 1st quarter FY 2014, and plan to then conduct a second GBI intercept test  in late FY 2014.

Note that the CTV-01 test in January was with a CE-II kill vehicle that still contained the part believed to be defective but used mitigations for the problems resulting from the part.  Presumably, CTV-02, if it takes place, would use a kill vehicle with the new replacement part (as FTG-06b was planned to do).

At the Pentagon’s March 15 press conference, it was announced that an intercept test using an older CE-I kill vehicle would be conducted this summer.  The budget documents state add that this test will be conducted in “in third quarter 2013 to validate reliability improvements made to the CE-I fleet over the last several years. [3]  As discussed in a previous post on GBI cost, the GAO estimated that each of the original CE-I GBIs needed repairs and refurbishments that were estimated to cost between $14 and $24 million per interceptor.

Thus the GMD flight tests plans, as far as I have been able to reconstruct them (which may not be completely) now appears to be as follows (all are intercept tests except for CTV-02):

FY 2013, 4^th Q:  CE-I intercept test.

FY 2014, 1^st Q:  CTV-02 (non-intercept) or FTG-06b (intercept) test of CE-II GBI.

FY 2014, 4^th Q (or FY 2015, 1^st Q): FTG-09 CE-II intercept test.

FY 2015, 4^th Q: FTG-11, salvo (two interceptors) test against ICBM target.

FY 2016, 4^th Q: FTG-15:

FY 2017, 4^th Q: FTG-13: (possibly two stage booster?)

FY 2018, 4^th Q: FTO-03: Operational test with Aegis, THAAD and Patriot.

FY 2019, 4^th Q: FTG-17 (possibly two-stage booster?)

FY 2021, 4^th Q: FTG-12

FY 2022, 4^th Q: FTG-14

Below is table of Aegis SM-3 intercept tests since testing resumed in 2002.  Subsequent posts will discuss the Aegis system configurations and individual tests in more detail.  Click on either half of the table for a more readable version.

Key for targets: S = short-range (<1,000 km), M = medium range (1,000-3,000 km), IR = intermediate-range (3,000-5,500 km), U = Unitary (warhead does not separate from rocket booster), Sp = separating warhead.  For ships, (J) = Japanese destroyer (versions of Aegis BMD weapon may be somewhat different from equivalent US versions listed).   ? = don’t know/not sure.

Projected future intercept tests for Aegis SM-3 (with a few significant non-intercept tests).  Dates and descriptions are highly subject to change.  Most data from FY 2014 (April 2013) budget documentation.

Key for targets: S = short-range (<1,000 km), M = medium range (1,000-3,000 km), IR = intermediate-range (3,000-5,500 km), U = Unitary (warhead does not separate), Sp = separating warhead.  For Aegis BMD version, all or some 4.0.1 are now likely 4.0.2, CU = Capability Upgrade.   ? = don’t know/not sure.

Click on the table from a more readable version.

The SM-3 is the U.S Navy’s current exo-atmospheric (above-the-atmosphere) ballistic missile defense interceptor.  It is based on the airframe of the SM-2 Block IV extended-range air defense interceptor, including its two solid-fuel rocket stages.  However the SM-3 replaces this missile’s explosive warhead and radar seeker with an additional solid-fuel  third-stage motor and an infrared-homing, hit-to-kill kill vehicle.

SM-3 Block 0 was an initial version built only for testing.  It was similar to the subsequent Block I version but had specific features added for testing, such as pressure gauges in fuel tanks and rocket motors and an “independent flight termination system.”[1]  The Block 0 was used in the first five intercept tests (FM-2 through FM-6).

SM-3 Block I was a limited production version that provided the first operational Aegis BMD intercept capability aboard the USS Lake Erie in spring 2005.  Only eleven Block Is were built, and four of these were expended in tests (FTM-04-1, FTM-04-2, and Pacific Blitz (2)).

The SM-3 Block IA is the first production version of the SM-3 (the “tactical” missile).  It was first deployed on the USS Shiloh in spring 2006, as part of the initial Aegis BMD 3.6 deployment.

Relative to the Block I, the IA has greater processing capability for improved IR discrimination and eliminated some obsolescence issues and increased missile lifetime. 

The Block IA also has significantly greater divert capabilities.  Starting with the FM-5 intercept test (Block 0, 06/18/2003) an upgraded version of the kill vehicle’s solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS) was employed.  This version of the SDACS has an initial sustain pulse followed by two smaller pulses that provide additional divert capability.  The FM-5 intercept failure was due to a SDACS valve failure involving these two smaller pulses.  Although a repaired version of the valve was used in the pulsed SDACS for the Block I missiles, all of these missiles had the two subsequent pulses disabled.  These pulses were eventually restored in the Block 1A interceptors.

The SM-3 Block IA was first intercept-tested (successfully) in June 2006 and is the version of the SM-3 now deployed on U.S. and Japanese BMD-capable ships.  According to the Congressional Research Service, as of early 2012, a total of 125 SM-3 Block IAs were to be procured, with deliveries to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2014.[2]

Figure 1.  Aegis SM-3 Block IA and Block IB interceptors.  Image source: Laura DeSimone, “Aegis BMD; The Way Ahead,” MDA Briefing Slides, December 6, 2011 (available at: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011PEO/DeSimone.pdf )

The SM-3 Block IB interceptor uses essentially the same missile body as the Block IA, but adds an entirely new kill vehicle with an enhanced infrared seeker, faster processor and improved divert and attitude control system.  After an unsuccessful intercept test in September 2011 (FTM-16 E2), the SM-3 Block IB had is first successful intercept in May 2012 (FTM-16 E2a).  Under current plans, it would begin operational deployment in 2014 on ships equipped with the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 (or 4.0.2) system and in 2015 at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase II of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

The new Block IB kill vehicle will have a new two-color infrared sensor in its seeker (the sensor in the IA version used only a single color).  According to the MDA: “Two-color sensor technology in the SM-3 seeker provides the capability to sense infrared (IR) information in two distinct wavebands, improving the identification of multiple, closely spaced objects.”[3]   The new seeker also has improved sensitivity, giving it a greater detection range against longer range targets.   In addition, the Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, faster Advanced Signal Processor that “increases data processing capability to sort-out and analyze the information gathered by the upgraded seeker.”[4] 

The Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, “more flexible” throttleable divert and attitude control system (TDACS), which improves its divert capabilities.[5]  According to reports, the TDACS is able “to dynamically vary its thrust and operating time” and provides higher thrust levels using continuous thrust management to give a greater divert capability than does the pulsed SDACS in the Block IA.[6]

According to the Congressional Research Service, as of 2012, plans called for the procurement of a total of 472 Block IB missiles through fiscal year 2020 (which is the last year for which data is provided).[7]  In April 2013, the GAO reported that MDA was developing an upgraded “enhanced capability” SM-3 Block IB which could be fielded in the 2015 time frame “to counter advanced threats expected after 2015.”[8]

The SM-3 Block IIA will have entirely new second and third rocket stages giving it a much higher speed than the Block I missiles.  Although no official figures have been released, the Block IA and IB interceptors are typically described as having a burnout speed of about 3.0 km/second, and IIA interceptors about 4.0-4.5 km/second.  This higher speed would allow the Block IIB to cover a much larger geographical area than the Block I missiles and to engage some higher-speed intermediate range missiles.  The Block IIA will also have a new kill vehicle with increased seeker sensitivity, increased divert capability, and a longer operating time once released from its booster rocket.

The Block IIA interceptor is being jointly developed with Japan and is expected to have its first flight in 2015.   It is expected to be deployed operationally in about 2018 with Aegis BMD 5.1 on both ships and at the Polish Aegis Ashore site as part of the EPAA Phase III.

Figure 2.  Evolution of the SM-3 Interceptor.  (Image source: DeSimone)

The SM-3 Block IIB interceptor would have had an even higher speed booster than the Block IIA missile and have been equipped with a new lighter kill vehicle.  Its higher speed was intended to allow it to attempt to intercept potential future Iranian ICBMs from European launch sites.  Block IIB would have been initially deployed sometime after 2020 as part of the EPAA Phase IV.  In March 2013, the Department of Defense announced the cancellation of the Block IIB program.

The modified SM-2 Block IV is the Navy’s current terminal-phase ballistic missile defense interceptor.   The SM-2 Block IV is the Navy’s extended-range air defense interceptor and its airframe is the basis for both the SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors.   It operates within the atmosphere and uses semi-active radar homing and has a high-explosive fragmentation warhead.   A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs have been modified to give them the ability to attempt to intercept ballistic missiles (three of these have been expended in tests).[9]   The modifications involved changes to the missile’s fuze and autopilot and are less extensive than the changes that would have been made to produce the SM-2 Block IVA missile (which included, among other things, a new infrared seeker) that was cancelled as part of the Navy Area Defense program in December 2001.

The modified SM-2 Block IV was first intercept tested (successfully) against a ballistic missile target in May 2006 (Pacific Phoenix) and has had two other successful ballistic missile intercept tests since.  It began deployment on ships equipped with Aegis BMD 3.6.1 in 2008. The missile is viewed as a stopgap until the BMD version of the SM-6 missile becomes available (currently scheduled for 2015), and it is apparently not compatible with Aegis BMD 4.0.1.

Figure 3.  SM-6 compared to SM-2 Block IV.  (Image source: DeSimone)

The SM-6, currently undergoing development and testing, is the U.S. Navy’s new extended-range air defense interceptor.  It combines the airframe and propulsion system from the current SM-2 Block IV interceptor with the active radar seeker of the current Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) missile.  Like the SM-2 Block IV, it operates within the atmosphere and uses a high explosive warhead.  The Navy currently plans to buy 1,200 SM-6s.

The initial deployment version of the SM-6 may not have a capability against ballistic missiles.  It is to be given an anti-ballistic missile capability as part of the Sea based Terminal (SBT) Increment 1, which is expected to be deployed in 2015 in conjunction with the Aegis 5.0 CU weapons system.  This is to be followed in 2018 by SBT Increment 2 in which the SM-6 will be deployed in conjunction with Aegis BMD 5.1 weapons system.[10] 

This post briefly describes the various versions of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapon System.  See the post of May 2 for a description of the different versions of the Aegis BMD interceptor missiles.

Aegis BMD 3.0E: The first deployed Aegis BMD capability was the Aegis Long-Range Surveillance and Tracking (LRS&T) capability using the Aegis BMD 3.0E software.  Thus upgrade allowed forward-based Aegis ships to track long-range ballistic missiles and relay this information back for possible use by the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system.   Several Aegis BMD 3.0E destroyers were forward-deployed in the Pacific as part of the initial GMD Limited Operations Capability in September 2004.

Aegis BMD 3.0:  This version provided the first SM-3 engagement capability against ballistic missiles.  This “Preliminary Engagement Capability” was intended to provide an emergency capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles using the SM-3 Block I interceptor.   It also included the LRS&T capability.  The first intercept test (successful) using Aegis BMD 3.0 was in February 2005 (FTM-04-1).

Aegis BMD 3.0 was first operationally deployed in spring 2005.  This included the deployment of several SM-3 Block I interceptors (of which less than ten were then in existence) aboard the cruiser USS Lake Erie. One other cruiser, the Port Royal, was also upgraded to Aegis BMD 3.0.  A significant limitation of Aegis BMD 3.0 was that a ship equipped with it could only perform the BMD mission and not the air defense mission.

Aegis BMD 3.6:   Aegis 3.6 was intended to provide engagement capabilities against short-, medium and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles using the new SM-3 Block IA interceptor.  Unlike Aegis 3.0 ships, Aegis 3.6 ships were capable of all three missions: ballistic missile engagement, long-range surveillance and tracking, and air defense.   Aegis 3.6 was also intended to add a limited launch-on-remote capability using data from another Aegis ship.

Aegis 3.6 was first intercept tested (successfully) in June 2006 (FTM-10) on the Cruiser USS Shiloh, which became the first 3.6 equipped ship in the spring of 2006.  It was certified for tactical deployment by the U.S. Navy in September 2006.[1]  By the end of 2006, the first destroyer equipped with 3.6 was also operational. 

Aegis BMD 3.6.1:  Aegis 3.6.1 added a terminal, within-the-atmosphere (endo-atmospheric) ballistic missile defense capability to Aegis 3.6 using the SM-2 Block IV interceptor.  Aegis 3.6.1 was first intercept tested (with a SM-2 Block IV) in June 2008 in the successful FTM-14 test.

Aegis 3.6.1 increases the system’s launch-on-remote capabilities by enabling use of data from non-Aegis sensors such as TPY-2 X-band radars and Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites.

All U.S. BMD capable ships have now been upgraded to at least the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 capability.  The four current Japanese Aegis BMD destroyers are also equipped with Aegis 3.6.1 or a very similar capability.[2]

Aegis BMD 4.0.1:  Aegis 4.0.1 is often described as the “second generation” Aegis BMD system.   It is still under development, although the Aegis 4.0.1 computer program has already been installed on several ships.  It will add both a new Aegis BMD Signal Processor (BSP) and the new SM-3 Block IB interceptor.  

The Aegis BSP signal processor is intended to improve the discrimination capabilities of the Aegis system’s SPY-1 radar.  The BSP “enables tracking of individual objects and uses advanced algorithms to identify various objects.”[3]  “The Aegis BMD Signal Processor (BSP) provides a real-time identification capability through signal processing.  Such processing enables tracking of individual objects and identification though the use of advanced algorithms.”[4]

The Aegis 4.0.1 computer system, and in particular the new signal processor, had been used to observe a number of tests before it was used in an actual intercept attempt.[5]   The first intercept test for Aegis 4.0.1 was in September 2011 (FTM-16 E2), although the Block IB interceptor failed to hits is target due a malfunction in its third-stage motor. 

The MDA has stated that a 3.6.1 ship can be upgraded to the 4.0.1 system for $45 to $55 million.[6]

Aegis BMD 4.0.2: According to the MDA, this is the Aegis BMD version that was employed in the successful FTM-20 intercept test of February 12, 2013 (which is the only context in which I have seen this designation used).[7]  This is likely a new version of the 4.0.1 program to correct for the problem discovered in the FTM-16 E2 intercept test failure, which was due to a problem with the third stage rocket motor thrust pulses.  According to the GAO, “a new version of the second generation Aegis weapons system” was developed “to control the amount of time between the pulses,” and that this change “will have minimal consequences on missile performance and ship operations.”[8]

Aegis BMD 5.0.  Primarily not about adding new capabilities to the system, this version integrates the Aegis BMD 4.0 system into the Navy’s new Open Architecture  modernized version of the Aegis computer system (rather than have the BMD capability on separate adjunct computers as is done in earlier Aegis BMD version) with both anti-aircraft and ballistic missile defense capabilities.    The modernized Aegis computer system (Baseline 9) uses commercial-off-the shelf computer infrastructure to enable faster system upgrades and increased commonality, and to facilitate the addition of BMD capabilities to additional ships.  However, Aegis 5.0 will apparently not have the within-the-atmosphere terminal-phase BMD capability that Aegis 4.0 has.  Several ships have already been upgraded to the Aegis 5.0 BMD computer system.

Aegis BMD 5.0 CU (capability upgrade) is intended for deployment by 2015. This restores a terminal within-the-atmosphere BMD capability with the Sea-Based Terminal Increment 1 using SM-2 Block IV and modified SM-6 interceptors.[9]  It also expands and updates the Aegis Baseline 9 MRBM and IRBM threat set to include EPAA Phase II threats and increases the maximum number of SM-3 missiles that can be simultaneously in flight to be able to deal with larger attacks.  The Aegis Ashore system scheduled for Romania in 2015 will initially be deployed with Aegis BMD 5.0 CU (although apparently without the terminal interceptors).

Aegis BMD 5.1 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2018.  It will integrate the new high-speed SM-3 Block IIA interceptor onto U.S. and Japanese ships.  It will have improved data links to permit engage-on-remote operation and will be able to engage longer-range missiles, including all IRBMs.  It will improve terminal phase capabilities with addition of the Sea-Based Terminal Increment 2 (I don’t know how this differs from Increment 1) using modified SM-6 interceptors.  The Aegis Ashore site scheduled for Poland in 2018 will initially be deployed with Aegis 5.1.

A possible east coast site for interceptors for the current U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system was the subject of multiple questions at Thursday’s (May 9, 2013) hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.  Administration and military officials emphasized that the east coast of the United States was already protected by the current GMD system.  They also said that if a decision to deploy such an east coast interceptor site was made, it would take five to seven years to build and would also involve the deployment of a new X-band radar in the eastern United States.

 Senator Mark Udall began by asking Lt. General Richard Formica (Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, of the U.S. Strategic Command):  “Secretary of Defense Hagel, Admiral Winnefeld and General Jacoby have all said recently that the current ground- based midcourse defense system defends all of the U.S., including the East Coast, against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran. In your capacity as commander within Strategic Command, you represent the warfighter perspective on our missile defense capabilities and requirements. Do you have confidence in our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”

 General Formica replied: “Yes, Mr. Chairman.  Thank you for the question. We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future. “

 Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, added (referring to the additional fourteen interceptors in Alaska that the Administration announced in March): “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional fourteen provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.”

 In response to a question from Senator Deb Fischer, General Formica stated (referring to the required Environmental Impact Statement) that “depending on the assumptions and how fast the EIS goes, five to seven years” would be needed to deploy an east coast interceptor site, with eighteen to twenty four months of this time needed for the Environmental Impact Statement.   He also estimated that about 500 military and civilian personnel would be required to operate the site.

(A day earlier, in a House Armed Services Committee hearing, Representative Doug Lamborn urged Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Admiral James Syring to recommend that President Obama waive the requirement for an environmental impact statement in order to speed up the possible deployment of the east coast site.  Admiral Syring seemed to be unaware that this was possible (and I don’t know if it is either)).

 General Formica also indicated that such a deployment would involve a new X-band radar in the eastern United States:

Senator Fischer:  “OK.  And would such a site benefit from the deployment of an X-band radar on the East Coast?”

Claims by U.S. government officials about the effectiveness of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system. This iteration adds seven additional claims (some old, some new).  In order to facilitate future updates, they are now in chronological rather than reverse chronological order.

(1) September 1, 2000: “… I simply cannot conclude, with the information I have today, that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time.”  President Bill Clinton, at Georgetown University, September 1, 2000.

(2) March 18, 2003:  “Effectiveness is in the 90% range.”[1]   Edward Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

(3) March 23, 2003: “There are a lot of things that go into [determining] effectiveness.  Everybody can be right.” [2] MDA Director Ronald Kadish, in response to a question about Aldridge’s statement.

(4) March 14, 2006: “When the president declares limited defensive operational capability, we are prepared as the shooter, if you will, to execute the mission to defend our country.  And I’m very confident in the efficacy of that system.”[3]  Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command.

(5) June 2006: “(From) what I have seen and what I know about the system and its capabilities I am very confident.”[4]  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(6) July 6, 2006: “If it headed to the United States, we’ve got a missile defense system that will defend our country.” President George W. Bush in response to a question on Larry King Live about North Korea’s unsuccessful test of a long-range ballistic missile the day before.

(7) September 1, 2006: “I would say that if we had to use the system in an operational mode, it would be very capable.”[5] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(8) October 2, 2007: “ - does the system work? The answer to that is yes. Is it going to work against more complex threats in the future?  We believe it will.”  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.[6]

(9) November 2, 2008: “I have very high confidence we could defend the United States against that threat.”[7] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, about one or two missiles launched from North Korea.

(10) March 27, 2009: “And Senator, I’ll tell you, if we felt the North Koreans were going to shoot a ballistic missile at us today, I am comfortable that we would have an effective system able to meet that threat.”[8]  General Victor Renaurt, Commander U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command.

(11) June 9, 2009: “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”[9] And “I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.”  Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

(12) June 16, 2009: Confidence that a North Korean missile could be shot down is: “ninety percent plus.”[10]  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(13) June 18, 2009 (approximately):  “I’d believe we have a reasonable chance” of intercepting a North Korean missile.  Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Charles McQueary, in an interview on his last day in the job.[11]

(14) July 28, 2009: “Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea.”[12]  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(15) April 21, 2010: “It is the belief of the — of the leaders of this department that we have the capability to defend the United States against the — against an ICBM threat from a rogue nation such as Iran or North Korea.  We are confident in the system we have at this point.”[13]  Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary.

(16) December 1, 2010: “…the probability will be well in the high 90s today of the GMD system being able to intercept that today.” MDA Director Patrick O’Reilly in response to a question from Representative Trent Franks about countering “one ICBM coming from Tehran to New York.”[14]

(17) April 13, 2011: “The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures.”[15]  Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

(18) December 12, 2012: “I’m very confident that American defense capabilities are able, no problem, to block a rocket like this one.”  U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in response to a question from CNN on the capability of U.S missile defenses, December 12, 2012.[16]

(19) March 7, 2013: “I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack.  And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea.  But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat.”  White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, in response to a question at White House Daily Press Briefing, March 7, 2013.[17]

(20) March 15, 2013: “We have confidence in our system.  And we certainly will not go forward with the additional 14 interceptors until we are sure that we have the complete confidence that we will need.  But the American people should be assured that our interceptors are effective.”  Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in response to a question at a Pentagon press conference, March 15, 2013.

(21) April 9, 2013: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.  Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2013 in response to a question about intercepting North Korean missiles.[18]

(22) May 8, 2013: “We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall about the capability of “our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”[19]

(23) May 9, 2013: “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional ’14 provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.”  Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall (and referring to the recently announced plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska).[20]