An update on some recent developments on Aegis BMD as it moves towards the deployment of the Aegis Ashore site with SM-3 Block IB interceptors in Romania in 2015.

The first two Aegis Ashore intercept tests, planned for the end of 2014.  Image Source: MDA[1]

Block IB Intercept Tests

In September and October, MDA conducted two successful initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) intercept tests of the Block IB interceptor, FTM-21 on September 18 and FTM-22 on October 3.  These were the fourth and fifth consecutive successful intercept tests for the Block IB after its first intercept attempt failed in September 2011.  FTM-21 was a salvo test (two interceptors against one short-range missile target) with the first interceptor hitting the target warhead.  FTM-22 was the first tests of a Block IB interceptor against a medium-range target.  At the time it was conducted, FTM-22 was described by MDA as the highest altitude SM-3 intercept ever (with the previous high of about 247 km occurring in the 2008 satellite intercept).  However, MDA subsequently stated that the FTM-22 intercept occurred at a lower altitude than anticipated and thus was not the highest altitude intercept.[2] [Added January 22: Lockheed Spokesperson says that as a result of FTM-22 intercept being lower than expected, the previous test FTM-21 is highest intercept.  See: http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/aegis-bmd-passes-key-test-multiple-launches-targets-next/]

Next Block IB Tests and IB Production

Two more intercept tests of the Block IB interceptor (FTM-23, FTM-24) are planned for the first half of 2014.  Assuming these are successful, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation may then issue a final IOT&E report as early as July 2014.[3]  In a standard military procurement program, a positive IOT&E report is required before full-rate production of a system can begin.  However, MDA systems are exempt from the regulations, and so it is possible that a full-production decision for Block IB interceptors could be made sooner.  In his July 2013 written statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring stated that FTM-21 and FTM-22 “will support a full-rate production decision” on the SM-3 Block IB with 39 of the missiles to be delivered by the end of 2014.  (Current MDA plans call for buying 52 Block IBs in FY 2014, followed by 72 per year in FY 2015 through FY 2018.  Numbers for years after 2018 have not been released.)

First Aegis Destroyer to Spain Next Month

As part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), four U.S. Aegis BMD equipped destroyers are to be home ported at the Spanish port of Rota.  The first of these ships, the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) is now scheduled to arrive there in February.[4]  All four ships are to arrive in Rota before the end of 2015.

Ceremonies for Aegis Ashore in Romania

A ground-breaking ceremony for the planned Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania was held on October 28 2013.  The same month, a ceremony was held in Moorestown, New Jersey to mark the “light-off” – the beginning of testing — of the Aegis Ashore system destined for Romania.[5]  According to current plans, following testing in New Jersey, the Aegis equipment and the deckhouse housing both it and the radar hardware will be dismantled and shipped to Romania in time to be operational in 2015.

Aegis Ashore Testing

The “light off” ceremony for Aegis Ashore test system at the U.S. Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) test range on Hawaii was held in early December.[6]  As will be the case for the Romania site, the Aegis system was originally set up in and tested in New Jersey before being moved to Hawaii (although a new deckhouse was built in Hawaii instead of moving the one in new Jersey).  The first two Aegis Ashore intercept tests (AA FTM-01 and AA FTM-02, both using the Aegis BMD 5.0 system and SM-3 Block IB interceptors) are currently scheduled for the last quarter of 2014.

Flight tests of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system since
developmental testing resumed in 2005 and planned future tests.

FTT-01 (November 22, 2005:  First launch of an operationally-configured THAAD interceptor.[1]  The launch, conducted at the White Sands Test Range (WSMR), successfully demonstrated the operation of missile and kill vehicle, although no target was used and thus no intercept was attempted.  The THAAD TPY-2 radar does not appear to have participated in this test.

FTT-02 (May 11, 2006): Second flight test of operational THAAD interceptor.[2]  No actual target was used.  This was the first test to include all of the THAAD system components, including the TPY-2 radar.  The radar provided simulated target data to the THAAD fire control system.  Test was conducted at WSMR and was reported as successful.

FTT-03 (July 12, 2006):  First intercept attempt and first successful intercept using an operational interceptor.[3]  The target was a non-separating, short-range missile (a Hera missile) and the intercept took place in the high endoatmosphere.  It was an integrated system test in which the THAAD TPY-2 radar acquired and tracked the target and provided in-flight updates.  Test was conducted at WSMR.

FTT-04 (September 13, 2006): This was to be an intercept test against a short-range separating target, but the target failed and was destroyed about two minutes after launch.  The target failure occurred before the THAAD interceptor could be launched, and so no interceptor launch took place.[4]  This was the last THAAD test held at WSMR. 

FTT-06 (January 26, 2007): Successful intercept test of a non-separating short-range target.[5]  This was the first THAAD test conducted at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Hawaii.  The target was described as being a SCUD-Like missile and the intercept took place in the high-endoatmosphere.  This was the first test in which soldiers from a US Army unit that would eventually operate THAAD operated all of the THAAD equipment.

FTT-07 (April 5, 2007): THAAD successfully intercepted a short-range non-separating missile target at PMRF.[6]  The intercept took place at a mid-endoatmospheric altitude against a Scud-like target.  The intercept took place about two minutes after the interceptor was launched.

FTT-05 (June 26, 2007):  Non-intercept flight test at PMRF, and the lowest altitude test so far.[7]  The test was intended to test the performance of the missile and kill vehicle in the low endo-atmosphere, where greater (relative to earlier, higher-altitude tests) atmospheric dynamic pressure and heating occur.  There was no target present.   The test was reportedly successful.

FTT-08 (October 26, 2007):  A successful intercept test.[8]  This was the first exo-atmospheric intercept attempt using the operationally-configured THAAD interceptor.  The target was a short-range non-separating missile representing a Scud-like target.   The test was conducted at the PMRF in Hawaii.

FTT-09 (June 25, 2008): A successful intercept test at PMRF.[9]  The test target was a separating short-range missile launched from a C-17 aircraft.  This was the first successful intercept of a separating target.  According to the DOT&E, the target was a “simple, spin-stabilized, non-reorienting” reentry vehicle and the intercept took place in the low-endoatmosphere.[10]  (Another source describes the intercept  as taking place in the mid-endoatmosphere.[11])   The THAAD system was operated manually by soldiers using its semi-automatic mode.

FTT-10 (September 17, 2008): A planned salvo intercept of two THAAD interceptors against a single target did not take place when the target missile failed.[12]  The target missile failed before either THAAD interceptor could be launched.

FTT-10a (March 18, 2009): A successful salvo intercept attempt at PMRF.[13]  Two THAAD interceptors were fired at a short-range separating target missile, with the first interceptor hitting the target warhead in the mid-endoatmosphere.  This test was a combined operational (the first for THAAD) and developmental test, and also involved an Aegis ship providing cuing information to the THAAD system.[14]

FTT-11 (December 11, 2009):  Test did not occur due to the failure of the target missile motor to ignite after being dropped from a C-17 aircraft.[15]  This was to have been the first THAAD test against a “complex separating” short-range missile target.[16]  The target would have had “a relatively low infrared signature and radar cross section.”[17]  According to the DOT&E (2010 Annual Report) the objectives of this test were added to the future FTT-12 test.[18]  According to the GAO, this test’s objective of demonstrating the TPY-2 radar’s advanced discrimination capability was moved to FTT-12.[19]

FTT-14 (June 28, 2010):  Successful intercept of a short-range non-separating missile at PMRF.[20]  This test was moved forward (using a target planned for Airborne Laser testing) when target problems caused FTT-11 to fail and FTT-12 to be delayed.[21]   The intercept occurred in the low-endoatmosphere.  This was the lowest altitude intercept for THAAD so far.  According to the DOT&E, the intercept took place at “a high lead angle and in a high-dynamic-pressure environment.”[22]

FTT-12 (October 4, 2011): Two THAAD interceptors successfully intercepted two short-range missiles in “nearly simultaneous” engagements at PMRF.”[23]  This was the first operational test for THAAD.[24]  There does not appear to be any further information available on the nature of the target, but the transfer of objectives from FTT-11 suggests that at least one of the targets was a separating, complex target.

FTT-13 (Cancelled):  This test, which was scheduled for 2012, would have been the first intercept test against a medium-range target.  However, the test was cancelled “because of budgetary concerns and test efficiency.”[25]  The planned target was described as “a complex separating medium range target with associated objects.[26]”

Flight Test Integrated-01 (FTI-01 ), (October 25, 2012):[27]  This test involved Patriot, Aegis and THAAD intercept attempts against three ballistic missile and two cruise missile targets.  (Although the test was labeled as an integrated test, each of the defenses basically operated independently of each other.[28])  The test was conducted at the Kwajalein Atoll test site.  In the THAAD part of this test, THAAD successfully intercepted an Extended Long-Range Air Launch Target ((E-LRALT) medium-range missile.  This was the first intercept of a medium-range missile (1,000-3,000 km range) by THAAD.  The THAAD system was cued by a second TPY-2 radar operating in a forward-based mode. 

Flight Test Operational-01 (FTO-01), (September 10, 2013):[29]  An integrated, operational test involving THAAD and Aegis BMD intercepts of two medium-range missile targets.  One of the medium-range missile targets was successfully intercepted by a THAAD interceptor.  A second THAAD interceptor was salvo launched along with an Aegis SM-3 Block IA interceptor at the second medium-range target.  The Aegis interceptor was fired first and successfully destroyed the target.  Both engagements were cued by a TPY-2 radar operating in a forward-based mode.

Future tests

In April 2012, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation stated that for budgetary reasons, MDA had decided to slow the pace of THAAD testing to about one test every eighteen months.[30]  As a result, a number of planned THAAD tests were significantly delayed. According to DOT&E and Pentagon budgetary information, planned THAAD tests (as of about mid 2013) appear to be approximately as follows:[31]

FTT-11a (3Q FY 2015):  Exo-atmospheric intercept of complex short-range target.

FTO-02 (4Q, FY 2015): Intercept of medium-range target in combined operational test with Patriot, Aegis and Aegis Ashore.

FTT-15 (2Q, FY 2017): Endo-atmospheric intercept of a medium-range target using Aegis cuing.

FTO-03 (4Q, FY 2018): Combined operational test of THAAD with Patriot, Aegis (and likely Aegis Ashore), and Ground-Based Midcourse.

FTT-16 (after FY 2018): Endo-atmospheric intercept of a unitary short-range missile with high reentry heating.

FTT-17 (after FY 2018): Intercept of a target with a range near the maximum for medium range targets.

The FY 2013 Annual Report from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is now available. Its short (two pages) section on the Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system has already gained notice for its recommendation that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) should consider re-designing the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) of the GMD interceptor.[1]  Although this might seem like a harsh criticism, it is probably consistent with what the MDA was already planning to do anyway (more on this in a future post).

What most caught my attention about the GMD section of the report was, first, the claim that the GMD system had a demonstrated  capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, second, that the January 2013 CTV-01 GMD flight test might not be the complete success it has been portrayed as:

(1) The first bullet point in the GMD section of the 2013 Report states that the “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) has demonstrated a partial capability to defend the U.S. Homeland from small numbers of simple intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea or Iran.”

In standard usage, at least in a missile defense context, the word “demonstrated” means that a capability has been shown to work in an actual successful intercept test.  Indeed the word is used in precisely this way in several other parts of the GMD section of the 2013 DOT&E Report. 

However, as is well known, the operational GMD system has never been tested against an ICBM-range target, nor against more than one target at a time.  So how has the GMD system’s effectiveness been “demonstrated” against either ICBMs or against “small numbers” of missiles of any range?  (Unless one reads the word “partial” to mean not against ICBMs and not against more than one missile

Two years ago, the 2011 DOT&E Report contained the more specific assessment that “Ground test results suggest that the GMD system provides a limited capability for the defense of the U.S. Homeland against emerging intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missile threats.” 

Given that there has been no successful intercept test (only two failures) of the GMD system since that 2011 assessment, it is hard to see how the GMD system has progressed from a capability “suggested by ground tests” to a “demonstrated” capability.  This contradiction is highlighted by the second bullet point in the 2013 GMD section, which states that: “The performance of GMD during flight tests in FY13 prevented any improvement in the assessment of GMD capability.”

(2) The Report contains the first public indication (at least that I am aware of) that CTV-01 test of January 2013 was not an unqualified success.  CTV-01 test was a non-intercept test intended to show that the problem that caused the failure of the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle in the previous intercept test, FTG-06a in December 2010, had been correctly identified.  All previous public discussions of the test seemed to indicate that CTV-01 was complete success.  For example, in his prepared statement to the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 17, 2013, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring stated that: “The successful non-intercept controlled flight test of the next generation CE-II GBI earlier this year (CTV-01) gives us confidence and cautious optimism we have addressed the causes of the FTG-06a endgame failure in December 2010 and are on the right track for a successful return to intercept using the redesigned EKV.”

However the DOT&E Report’s description (six months after Syring’s statement above) of the outcome of this test was somewhat less glowing, saying that “The GBI boost vehicle and the CE-II EKV with the redesigned component performed adequately and mostly as expected.”  It went on to say that: “The MDA noted several unexpected results that did not negatively affect test execution or data collection.  The MDA is analyzing these unexpected results to determine if any of them pose a risk to GBI operational or test performance.”

According to a recent news report, the United States plans to spend nearly $1 billion dollars on a new missile defense radar in Alaska.[1]  This radar is intended to increase the discrimination capability of the current U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system.  Although no details on the radar have been publicly released, it will certainly be some sort of X-band phased-array radar (“X-band” indicates an operating frequency of about 10 GHz).  So how much X-band radar can you get for a billion dollars?  And does this price tell us anything about the likely nature of the radar?  As will be seen below, there are at least several possibilities

A TPY-2 X-band radar.

The U.S. currently has eight TPY-2 X-band radars, with four more under construction.  These air-transportable radars are relatively inexpensive, costing about $180-200 million each including supporting equipment. However, these radars are far too small (in terms of the power and antenna aperture) for the GMD discrimination mission.

A TPY-2 radar and supporting equipment.  (Image source: MDA)

A“Stacked” TPY-2 radar

A 2012 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report called for deploying five “stacked” TPY-2 radars at five sites (including one in Alaska) as GMD discrimination radars.    These radars would use two TPY-2 antennas, stacked one on top of the other on a turntable, giving an eight-fold increase in the radar’s power-aperture-gain (an appropriate figure of merit for a discrimination radar) relative to a TPY-2 radar.  According to the NAS Report, once developed, such a radar would cost about $320 million each to build in batch of five.[2]  The NAS puts the cost of developing the radar at $0.8-1.0 billion.  Thus the cost of developing and deploying just one stacked radar would be about $1.1-1.3 billion.  The Department of Defense’s estimated cost of a stacked TPY-2 is “at least $500 million (see next paragraph), so this option would seem to be possible for the “nearly $1 billion” figure cited for the proposed new radar.

However, the MDA does not seem to be favorably inclined to the stacked TPY-2 proposal.  A February 2013 Department of Defense report to Congress concludes that: “The cost to build a stacked AN/TPY-2 radar array would be at least $500 million.  Alternative concepts would provide a more robust capability for less cost.”[3]  Moreover, while the range of such a stacked radar would be much greater than that of a TPY-2 radar, it would be significantly less than other X-band radar options.

An Upgraded GBR-P

A third option would be to take the existing Ground-Based Radar – Prototype (GBR-P) X-band radar at the U.S. test range on Kwajalein Atoll and move it to Alaska, probably with some significant upgrades.  This radar is no longer being used for testing and the Congressional Budget Office has estimated the total cost of upgrading and moving the radar (to the U.S. East Coast) to be $510 million. (See my post of August 6, 2013).   The GBR-P was designed to be upgradeable, and under the George W. Bush Administration’s now-cancelled European Missile Defense plan, it would have been moved to the Czech Republic and renamed the European Midcourse Radar.  Depending on the extent of the upgrades (see my post of June 11, 2013), this radar could have a significantly greater range than a stacked TPY-2.  However, it would also have a very limited electronic field of view, which could limit its capability to deal with attacks by multiple missiles.  In addition, it is likely that the MDA will want to deploy at least one more large X-band radar (for example, on the East Coast) and there is only one GBR-P (although, as discussed next, the SBX could also be redeployed).

The GBR-P under construction (Image source: http://www.boeing.com/boeing/companyoffices/gallery/images/space/gmd/973897.page)

A Land-Based SBX

A fourth option would be to build another Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, but to place it on land rather than on a ship.  The SBX is generally described as costing about $0.9-1.0 billion.  However, roughly $250 million of this cost was for the modified ocean-going oil drilling platform it is deployed on.  Thus it seems at least possible that a land-based version of the SBX could be built for about $1 billion, even though the SBX was built for test purposes, and some additional costs would likely be involved in building it to operational standards of reliability and survivability.  This option would give greater range than any of the other options above, but like the upgraded GBR-P, it would have a limited electronic field of view.  Alternatively, the SBX itself could be removed from its ocean-going platform, upgraded, and redeployed on land.  (The NAS Report called for moving the SBX ashore, although it proposed placing the radar on Adak Island in the Aleutians rather than the new radar’s likely central Alaska location.)

The SBX radar under construction. (Image source: MDA)

Or Some Other Option

Other possibilities exist.  The new Cobra Judy radar ship has an X-band phased array radar with an aperture similar to that of the GBR-P.  However, no details about this radar’s other characteristics or cost appear to be publicly available.  Or MDA could choose an entirely new radar design, although this would seem likely to cost substantially more than $1 billion.

The new Cobra Judy radar ship, with its S-band and X-band radar antennas.  (Image source: http://www.riversideresearch.org/coe/radar)

As discussed in my post of December 24, 2012, the FY 2013 Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense (DoD)  to provide a report to Congress on testing of the Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system.  Specifically the report was to assess “the feasibility, advisability, and cost-effectiveness of accelerating the date for testing the GMD system against an ICBM-range target, and of conducting GMD flight tests at a pace of three tests every 2 years.”

Yesterday, Inside Defense SITREP reported that DoD’s response, which was delivered to Congress last fall but has not been publicly released, said that neither increase in the pace of testing was feasible.[1]  As I noted in my December 24 post, such a response was to be expected given previous statements by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). 

However, if anything, it now appears possible that the test against an ICBM target may actually be further delayed rather than accelerated.    For the last several years, MDA and DOT&E have been saying that the first GMD intercept of an ICBM target would take place in fiscal year 2015 (specifically in the 3^rd quarter of calendar year 2015).  Now, according to MDA spokesman Richard Lehner, the plan is for “a flight test against an ICBM target in the 2015-2016 time frame when an appropriate ICBM target becomes available.”[2]

The report to Congress also repeated MDA’s argument (again see my post of December 24, 2012) that a GMD test pace of more than one test per year was not feasible because of the complexity of the tests.  (In comparison, in 2013 the MDA conducted five successful intercept tests of exo-atmospheric SM-3 Aegis BMD interceptors in less than eight months – from February 12 to October 3.)

The full transcript of the House Armed Services Committee’s May 8, 2013 hearing on ballistic missile defenses was posted by the Government Printing Office this week.  The responses to written questions from the Committee members contain some interesting new (to me, at least) information:

(1) The distinction between a “hit” and a “kill” now seems to be classified, at least for the Ground-Based Midcourse System’s GBI hit-to-kill interceptors.  (For background on this point, including the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s assessment that he scored the successful FTG-02 intercept test as a ‘hit” but not a “kill”, see my post of October 18, 2012.)  From the transcript, here are questions to MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring:

Mr. COOPER. 16) In tests of the GBI, is a ‘‘hit’’ considered a ‘‘kill’’? Are there any successful intercept tests where a hit would have not equated to a kill of the target?  How do these assumptions impact the reliability of the GMD system?

 Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

(2) Some other things that are now apparently classified:

            (a) Whether or not Aegis SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors deployed on U.S. territory could intercept missiles from Iran. (p. 81) (Comment: MDA has not never stated (as far as I know) that the Block I interceptors were effective against ICBMs, although one has been used to shoot down a satellite.)

            (b) Whether or not Aegis ships or Aegis Ashore are being considered for defense of the U.S. East Coast. (pp. 83 and 84) (Comment: MDA has previously said that all options were under consideration.)

            (c) How the number (fourteen) of additional GBI interceptors to be deployed by 2017 was determined. (p. 83)  (Comment: Probably the fact that there were fourteen additional silos available had something to do with the decision.)

(3) The MDA is developing a new, upgraded version of the CE-II GBI, to be called the CE-II Block I GBI.  (Its full name is apparently “Common Booster Avionics and Obsolescence Design (CBAU/CE-II Block I”).  It is currently scheduled for a first intercept test in FY 2016 and the fourteen additional GBIs announced in March 2013 will be of this type. (p. 87).   (Correction, February 17: changed this point to reflect that the 14 new Block I GBIs will not be the ones deployed by FY 2017 but instead the ones purchased beginning in 2016, and removed point about “fly before you buy”)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

(4) The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) statement that: “We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles,” including North Korea and Iran, “would also develop various responses to U.S. theater and national defenses … by the time they flight test their missiles,” is also MDA’s current assessment of the missile threat. This was confirmed by Madelyn Creedon, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, by MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring, and by Michael Gilmore, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. (pp. 83-84, 85-86, 88)

RAND has just released a report on ballistic missile countermeasure technologies.  The Report: “Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses” by Richard H Speier, K. Scott McMahon, and George Macouziis is primarily about using the Missile Technology Control Regime to attempt to limit the spread of countermeasures technology, it also has a number of interesting figures illustrating countermeasures approaches. The Report is available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR378.html.

The United States has begun deployment of the its new SM-3 IB ballistic missile interceptor on U.S. Navy ships, according to an April 23 press release by Raytheon, the missile’s manufacturer.

The SM-3 Block IB interceptor uses the same propulsion system and missile airframe as the currently deployed Block IA version, but has a new kill vehicle with an enhanced infrared seeker, a faster processor and an improved divert and attitude control system. It has a two-color infrared sensor in its seeker (the sensor in the Block IA version uses only a single color) intended to provide increased discrimination capabilities. The new seeker also has improved sensitivity, giving it a greater detection range, and thus allowing engagement of longer-range targets.   In addition, the Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, faster Advanced Signal Processor that “increases data processing capability to sort-out and analyze the information gathered by the upgraded seeker.”[1]

The Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, “more flexible” throttleable divert and attitude control system (TDACS), which improves its divert capabilities.[2] According to reports, the TDACS is able “to dynamically vary its thrust and operating time” and provides higher thrust levels using continuous thrust management to give a greater divert capability than does Block IA kill vehicle.[3]

Although the Raytheon press release did not state which ship(s) the new interceptors were being deployed on, it did describe the deployment as “initiating the second phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach,” suggesting that at least some of them were on forward-deployed Aegis BMD ships in the Mediterranean or even on European-based ships. At present, the U.S Navy only has one Aegis BMD ship based in Europe, the destroyer Donald Cook, which is homeported at Rota, Spain. The number of U.S. Aegis BMD ships based at Rota is planned to increase to four by the end of 2015. (For comparison, there are already five U.S. Aegis BMD ships homeported at Yokusuka in Japan and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced earlier this month that this number would be increased to seven by the end of 2017.)

[1] MDA, “FTM-18 Fact Sheet” June 22, 2012. Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/Aegis_FTM-18_FactSheet.pdf

[2] MDA, “Second-Generation Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test,” News Release, May 9, 2012.

[3] Zachary M. Peterson, “Raytheon, ATK Hope To Start Advanced SDACS Flight Tests This Year,” Inside Missile Defense, August 30, 2006; “Raytheon and Aerojet demonstrate SM-3 Throttling Divert and Attitude Control System,” PR Newswire US, August 15, 2006.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) yesterday (April 30, 2014) released a Report assessing a Department of Defense (DoD) Report on options for the test program of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system. Specifically, the DoD Report, mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013, was required to:

(1) Explain GMD testing options if the forthcoming FTG-06b intercept test did not successfully demonstrate that the problem that caused the failure of the new CE-II kill vehicle in the FTG-06a test has been resolved; and

(2) Assess the feasibility, advisability, and cost effectiveness of accelerating the pace of GMD test flights.

The DoD Report was released to Congress on October 18, 2013, but does not yet appear to be publicly available (at least I haven’t seen it). Yesterday’s GAO Report is based on a briefing given by GAO to Congress on December 16, 2013.

Background

Before discussing the GAO’s findings, some background information:

The GMD interceptors, thirty which are based in silos in Alaska and California, use two different versions of the Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The original Capability Enhancement 1 (CE-I) version of the EKV was flight tested five times from 2005 to 2010, three of which were intercept tests, and all of these tests were reportedly successful. However, the CE-I EKV design was not sustainable, and thus the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) began in 2004-2005 to develop a new CE-II EKV.

CE-II interceptors began deployment in 2008, and currently make up about ten of the thirty deployed interceptors. However, the CE-II interceptor was not flight tested until 2010, when two intercept tests failed. The failure of first CE-II intercept test (FTG-06) in January 2010 was subsequently assessed as being due to a quality control failure in assembling the EKV, a relatively easily correctable problem. However, the second failure, FTG-06a in December 2010, posed a much more serious problem, since it was eventually determined to be due a design flaw in the kill vehicle. Specifically, the problem was attributed to excessive vibrations in the kill vehicle’s inertial measurement unit caused by the kill vehicle’s divert rocket motors, which are used to steer the kill vehicle towards its target.

As a result of the FTG-06a failure, deliveries of CE-II interceptors were suspended until a solution to this problem was demonstrated through a successful CE-II intercept test. In addition particular, deliveries of the fourteen additional interceptors announced in March 2013 cannot begin until after such a successful CE-II intercept test. Determining the cause of and developing a fix for the FTG-06a problem has been complex and difficult, and this problem has so far delayed successfully demonstrating a CE-II capability by more than three years and significantly increased the cost of doing so.[1] In January 2014, MDA conducted a successful flight (not intercept) test of CE-II interceptor with mitigations for the FTG-06a problem and could conduct a CE-II intercept test (FTG-06b) as early as the third quarter of FY 2014.

However, the CE-II testing situation is further complicated by the failure of the FTG-07 intercept test in July 2013. This test, using a CE-I interceptor, was intended to test the many changes that have been made to the CE-I kill vehicles since they have been deployed. Although the failure review for this test is still ongoing, the failure has been traced to the CE-I kill vehicle’s battery system.[2] Because the battery system is the same in both the CE-I and CE-II kill vehicles, it is possible that FTG-06b will be further delayed until this problem is fully resolved.

Overall, since MDA began flight testing operationally-configured GMD interceptors in 2005, it has conducted ten GMD flight tests, seven of which involved an intercept attempt. Thus the GMD system has been averaging about 1 GMD flight test per year but only about 0.7 intercept tests per year. Some in Congress have been urging MDA to increase this rate of testing, and, in particular, to increase to it to an average pace of 3 flight tests every two years. As discussed in my post of December 24, 2012, MDA has been opposed to increasing the pace of flight tests beyond the current average of one per year.

What did the GAO conclude?

(1) The GAO Report states that the DOD Report provides “limited insight on potential testing options” if the upcoming FTG-06b CE-II intercept test fails. The GAO Report noted that DoD Report presented only one alternative testing option – the development of new divert thrusters that produce less vibration. (By attempting to reduce the vibrations at their source, this approach is complimentary to the one being taken in the FTG-06b test, which instead attempts to isolate the inertial measurement unit from the vibrations). While the GAO characterizes this option as “reasonable,” it states the DoD Report provides few details on how or when such new divert thrusters could be developed and tested, on the cost, benefits and risks of this option, or of its impact on both currently deployed and future production interceptors.

The GAO also noted that prior to the failure of the FTG-07 CE-I test in July 2013, DoD also had testing options involving CE-I interceptors available to address the CE-II test failures. However, the GAO stated the FTG-07 failure precluded MDA from employing these options until the root cause of that failure is both identified and resolved.

(2) It has previously been reported that the DoD Report had concluded that an increase in GMD flight test pacing to three tests every two years was not feasible. (See my post of February 13, 2014.) The GAO Report provides more details on this issue. Specifically it states that the DoD Report says that “With additional funding, it should be possible to accelerate GMD’s testing pace to three flight tests every two years beginning in fiscal year 2018.” However, the GAO Report then goes on to state that it defines “feasibility” as “the extent to which something is both possible and likely to occur,” and that it judges that it is ”not likely” that the pace of testing could be accelerated. According the GAO, the DoD Report also provides no information on either the advisability or cost effectiveness of accelerating the testing pace. (However, it is clear from previous statements by MDA and DoD officials that they do not regard an acceleration of testing as either advisable or cost effective – see my post of December 24, 2012).

[1] The GAO Report states that the total cost of conducting a successful CE-II intercept test had now risen from $1.17 billion (as of August 2012) to $1.31 billion (as of June 2013), primarily due to increased failure review costs. Prior to the failure of FTG-06 in January 2010, this cost had been expected to be about $236 million.

[2] John Liang, “DoD: Faulty Battery Caused July 2013 GMD Intercept Failure,” Inside the Pentagon, April 3, 2014.

The Missile Defense Agency announced today that it had conducted its first test launch of an Aegis SM-3 missile defense interceptor from an Aegis Ashore facility similar to the one planned to be operational in Romania by the end of next year. The test, using an SM-3 Block IB version of the interceptor, was conducted at the newly completed Aegis Ashore test facility in Hawaii and was described as successful. No target missile was used, and thus there was no intercept attempt.

It appears that the next intercept test for the Ground-Based Midcourse national missile defense system is planned for Sunday, June 22 between 9:00 am and 1:00 pm U.S. east coast time. The target will be launched from Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands and the interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California

On Wednesday (June 4), Reuters cited two anonymous sources that the test, designated FTG-06b, would be held on June 22.[1]

However, today (June 6), the Pacific Islands News Association reported that, according to a warning issued by the U.S. Army, the planned test time was Monday June 23 between 4:00 am and 8:00 pm. The backup dates are June 24 and 25.

These two announced dates are not inconsistent because the of the 19 hour time difference between California and Kwajalein. Thus 4:00 am to 8:00 am on the 23^rd at Kwajalein corresponds to 9:00 am to 1:00 pm on the 22^nd in California. MDA usually specifies the date and time of a test using the time zone of the interceptor launch location. On the other hand, the U.S. Army warning was presumably intended for the local population near the target launch location, and thus likely uses Kwajalein time.

Thus from a U.S east coast perspective, the planned interceptor launch time is Sunday June 22 between 9:00 am and 1:00 pm.

This test is the third intercept test of the new CE-II version of the GBI interceptor’s kill vehicle. The previous two CE-II intercept tests failed, although a successful flight test not using a target was successfully conducted about a year ago.

If this upcoming test is successful, MDA will likely be able to almost immediately resume production of the 14 additional GBI interceptors it plans to deploy in Alaska by the end of 2017. A failure, depending on its cause, would likely impose significant delays on any future deployments of CE-II interceptors and may make the end of 2017 deadline impossible to achieve. It is now over 41 months since the most recent CE-II intercept test attempt, which failed.

[1] Andrea Shalal, “U.S. Missile Defense Test Could Shift Timing to Add Interceptors,” Reuters.Com, June 4, 2014

The Congressional Budget Office has just released a very short report on the Missile Defense Agency’s future spending plans for its Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system.[1] This Report, titled “Historical and Planned Future Budgets for the Missile Defense Agency’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Program” was released as a letter to Senator Jeff Sessions and is based on MDA’s budget request projections out through fiscal year 2019. It compares these GMD budget projections with actual GMD spending going back to FY 2008.

The main conclusions people seem likely to draw from the Report are that spending on the GMD system is expected to decline by more than a factor of two from its 2008 level and that by FY 2019 it will fall below $1 billion.[2] Specifically, the Report shows that GMD Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and GMD Procurement spending will total $789 million in FY 2019. Another $169 million for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) will bring the total FY 2019 GMD spending to $958 million. For comparison, the Report shows that in FY 2008 the total GMD spending was $2,093 million. (None of the $ figures in the Report have been adjusted for inflation.)

Several points should be made:

First the GMD budget falling below $1 billion is not a particularly significant benchmark (nor does the CBO Report say it is). According to the Report’s figures, actual FY 2013 spending on the GMD system was only $923 million.

Second, the actual planned spending on the GMD system will be significantly higher than shown in the CBO Report.[3] To illustrate this, I will focus on the planned GMD spending for FY 2019, the last year considered by the Report. As noted above, the Report says the currently planned GMD spending for FY 2019 is $958 million. However, if we look in more detail at the MDA’s planned budget we see that there are some significant omissions in what the CBO includes. For example, neither the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) Radar ($63.0 million in FY 2019) nor the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) ($189 million in FY 2019) is included.[4] The FY 2019 GMD Test line item (Project MT08) included in the CBO cost figure is only $61.6 million.[5] Since each GMD test now costs $200 million or more, this suggests that roughly another $100-150 million for GMD testing should be included in the CBO’s FY 2019 GMD cost estimate figure.[6] A number of other projects that are intended to at least partially to contribute to the GMD system, such as the Common Kill Vehicle Technology Project ($54.3 million in FY 2019) are also not accounted for in the CBO figures.  Taken together, these omissions suggest MDA’s total planned spending for FY 2019 is much closer to $1.5 billion than the $958 million in the CBO Report.

Third, the numbers in the CBO Report are based on MDA plans that do not include a third interceptor site in the eastern United States. If this third site is not built, then by FY 2019, if everything proceeds according to plan, the GMD system would be nearly complete. All 44 planned GBI interceptors would be deployed, the Clear and Cape Cod radars would have been upgraded and incorporated into the system, and the LRDR would be nearly complete (with about $910 million spent on it through FY 2019). While there would certainly be significant ongoing costs, such as for operations, for testing (including buying new interceptors for this purpose) and for technology development and upgrades, one would certainly expect the GMD annual funding to be significantly less that it was FY 2008, when the system was in the midst of being built.

On the other hand, if a decision was made to proceed with a third interceptor site, the future GMD spending situation could look quite different.  The environmental impact statement for the proposed third site location will assess the deployment of between twenty and sixty interceptors at potential sites. If each interceptor cost the same as a current GBI interceptor, about $75 million, then the total cost just for the additional interceptors would be about $1.5-4.5 billion, which would require a large increase in GMD funding over current plans.

[1] Congressional Budget Office, “Historical and Planned Future Budgets for the Missile Defense Agency’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Program, letter to Senator Jeff Sessions, July 12, 2014. Available at: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45546-GMD_Program.pdf.

[2] See for example, Jason Sherman, “CBO Traces Decline in GMD Spending From FY-08 To FY-19,” Inside Defense SITREP, July 23, 2014.

[3] The CBO Report (footnote a) states that the Report only includes funding in the Midcourse Defense program element and does not include “funding for other support activities that are contained in other program elements.”

[4] MDA’s planned budget can be found on pages 2a-xxi to 2a-xxiv of http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/2_RDTE_MasterJustificationBook_Missile_Defense_Agency_PB_2015_Vol_2.pdf.

[5] This is not just an FY 2019 budget anomaly, as the FY 2015-2019 five year average for the GMD Test line item is $67.4 million.

[6] Most of this other GMD testing funding is likely in the Ballistic Missile Defense Test ($413 million in FY 2019) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Targets ($429.8 in FY 2019) program elements, which are not included in the CBO GMD cost figures.

According to the Israeli Government, Iron Dome has been 85% effective (or perhaps a bit more) in destroying threatening rockets fired at its territory. However, each Iron Dome interceptor costs roughly $50,000-100,000, which adds up fast when there are a lot of rockets coming in. Moreover, a recent article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Theodore Postol challenges this claim, arguing that the evidence indicates that Iron Dome’s success rate in destroying the rockets is actually quite low.

On Sunday (July 20), another perspective on the threat posed by these rockets came out in the course of a hearing before the Israeli Supreme Court. The Court was ruling on a petition from several Bedouin and human rights organizations requesting that the Israeli government provide mobile bomb shelters to Bedouin villages in the Negev Desert. The court rejected the request, saying that the number of mobile bomb shelters was limited and that the government had prioritize where these were deployed.

A key argument made by the Israeli state attorney at the hearing was: “Bomb shelters are a last resort from a security perspective. Lying on the ground reduces danger by 80%.”

Imagine how effective an actual shelter would be.

(Actually, it is not clear how much either bomb shelters or lying down on the ground would actually help the Bedouins, since the warning sirens telling people to seek shelter apparently cannot be heard in many of the Bedouin villages.)

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has begun holding a series of required public meetings as part of the Environmental Impact Review process for the proposed eastern U.S. Ground Based Midcourse (GMD) defense system interceptor site. The first meeting was held on Tuesday (August 5) in Ravenna Ohio. Apparently it was sparsely attended. You can read a description of the meeting here.

A number of other meetings will be held through August. The full list is here.

The MDA has posted its informational handout from the meeting here,

Two points from the handout struck me as noteworthy. First as the slide below suggests, MDA apparently believes that a few 10,000 km ICBMs now exist in the third world.

Second, the sites are being sized for up to 60 interceptors per site (3 x 20 launch silos). Given calls for expanding missile field 1 at Fort Greely Alaska from six to twenty silos, (which would bring the total in Alaska and California to 58 launch silos silos), this could indicate that we are headed for a total deployment of roughly 120 GBI interceptors in the not-too-distant future.

An updated description of planned GMD flight tests (last update was post of April 17, 2013) as best as I can figure them out:

FY 2016: GM CTV-02+ (1Q FY 2016). This test replaces FTG-09, which was previously planned as an intercept test with a CE-II kill vehicle. The “+” indicates that the kill vehicle has the fix to the vibration problem that was demonstrated in the June 2014 FTG-06b test.[1] One purpose of the test is to “demonstrate the performance of alternate divert thrusters” that might be used in future kill vehicles.[2] One reason for developing the new thrusters is to reduce further the vibration problem involved in the failure of test FTG-06a in December 2010. The test is also intended to demonstrate “the end-to-end discrimination of a complex target scene including countermeasures.”[3] Although officially not an intercept test, the presence of a target raises the prospect that the interceptor might actually hit the target, as happened in FTG-02 in 2006, without running the risk of failing an intercept test.

FTG-15 (4Q FY 2016). This is to be the first GMD intercept test against an ICBM-range target (range greater than 5,500 km). It also will be the first flight and intercept test of the new production CE-II Block-I version of the Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). With one exception, all subsequent planned GMD intercept tests will be against ICBM range targets.[4]

FY 2017:

FTG-11 (4Q, FY 2017). This is to be the first salvo (multiple interceptors fired at a single target) test of the GMD system. In it, both a CE-I and CE-II equipped ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) will be fired at a single ICBM-range target. In its 2014 annual report, DOT&E noted that this test would be the first opportunity to implement its recommendation that the CE-I EKV be re-intercept tested following the failure of FTG-07 in July 2013.[5]

FY 2018:

GM CTV-03 (3Q, FY 2018). This will be a non-intercept test of a two-stage version of the currently three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor.[6] Although the MDA has previously (in 2010) flight tested a two-stage GBI, this test will be of a new two-stage booster design derived from an upgraded design (C2) of the three-stage GBI. MDA is considering the possibility of deploying this two-stage booster with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, potentially as early as 2020.

Designation unknown (FY 2018). Non-intercept flight test of the new Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV).[7] It is possible that this test could be combined with CTV-03. However, since MDA Director Admiral Syring has stated that in 2016 MDA will begin acquisition of two additional boosters for RKV testing, this seems likely to be a separate test.[8]

FY 2019:

FTG-17 (3Q, FY 2019). This is to be the first intercept test using the two-stage version of the GBI booster.[9]

Designation unknown (FY 2019). First intercept test of the new RKV.

FY 2020:

FTG-13 (3Q FY 2020). This will be the first GMD test against two near-simultaneous targets. In an operational test, two GBI interceptors (a CE-I and a CE-II) will attempt to intercept two targets with IRBM and ICBM ranges.[10] This test could be part of or coordinated with the BMDS Operational Test FTO-04 (which would likely involve a mix of Aegis, Aegis Ashore, THAAD and/or Patriot systems) which is also scheduled for 3Q FY 2020.

FY 2021:

FTG-12 (4Q, FY 2021). No additional information appears to be available about this test or the subsequent FTG-14. Both tests are listed in the DOT&E’s 2011 Annual Report.

FY 2022:

FTG-14 (4Q, 2022).

——————————————————-

[1] Amy Butler, “Pentagon Plans Three Ambitious GMD ‘Firsts’,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 18, 2014.

[2] Prepared Testimony of J. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2015.

[3] Gilmore, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2015.

[4] Prepared Testimony of J. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2014.

[5] DOT&E Annual Report 2014, p. 312.

[6] Scott Maocione, “MDA Puts $51 Million in Budget To Develop Two-stage Booster,” Inside Defense SITREP, March 12, 2015.

[7] Butler, “Pentagon Plans”

[8] Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services, March 25, 2015.

[9] Maocione, “MDA Puts $51 Million.”

[10] Butler, “Pentagon Plans;” Gilmore Prepared Testimony, 2014.

It appears likely that the Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) Defense’s new Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) will operate at S-band instead of at X-band. This raises the question of whether the better range resolution that would have been available at X-band is being sacrificed in order to keep the initial cost of the LRDR down to about $1 billion. Or is there some other reason?

Although the current Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system nominally provides coverage of all 50 states from limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack, it is well known that the system is severely lacking in its discrimination capabilities. In particular, the primary sensor infrastructure (aside from the infrared seekers on interceptor kill vehicles) for the GMD system consists of five radars — seven within a few years — in the United States, Greenland and Britain that were originally built for ballistic missile early warning purposes.[1] These radars date to the 1970s-1980s, but have subsequently received (or will soon receive) relatively minor upgrades that allow them to detect and track incoming missiles as part of the GMD system.[2] However, the relatively low operating frequency of these radars (about 440 MHz, corresponding to a wavelength of about 0.68 m) limits their bandwidth, resulting in a minimum range resolution of no less than about 5 meters.[3] This low resolution limits these radars to at best being able to only classify objects as potentially threatening (warheads, decoys, booster stages, etc…) or non-threatening (small pieces of debris).[4]

These large early warning radars are supported by forward-deployed TPY-2 X-band radars (in Japan and Turkey) and by S-Band Aegis radars on U.S. Navy ships, which have superior range resolution capabilities, but have limited range and can only observe a North Korean or Iranian missile in the early part of its trajectory.

The only very large radar in the GMD system capable of making high resolution measurements is the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar. This radar, with a 17.8 m diameter antenna, is capable of tracking missile targets at ranges of thousands of kilometers with a theoretical range resolution as low as 0.15 meters, although in actual practice this is probably more like 0.2-0.25 meters. However, the SBX was built primarily for testing purposes and as such has a number of limitations that severely impair its usefulness as an operational radar in the GMD system. Most importantly, it has a very limited electronic field of view (FOV). The electronic FOV is the range of angles over which the radar beam can be steered almost instantaneously, without having to move the radar antenna. A single radar face of a typical phased array radar, such as the U.S. early warning radars, has an electronic FOV of about 120 degrees, while the electronic FOV for the SBX is only about 25 degrees. The small electronic FOV seriously limits the capability of the SBX to deal with multiple targets that are separated by large angles. In addition, the SBX was not built to have the reliability that would be required of an operational system.   These deficiencies of the SBX are highlighted in a recent Los Angeles Times article.

In March 2014, at its FY 2015 budget release press conference, the MDA announced that was starting a program to design and deploy a new Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) for the GMD system.[5] Such a deployment was required by the FY 2014 Defense Authorization Bill of December 2013, which stated that: “The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall deploy a long-range discriminating radar against long-range ballistic missile threats from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Such radar shall be located at a location optimized to support the defense of the homeland of the United States.”[6] The MDA’s announcement was also consistent with repeated statements by the MDA that improving the discrimination capabilities of the GMD system was one of its top priorities. For example, in July 2013 when MDA Director Admiral Syring was asked in a congressional hearing where he would spend his “next dollars” in order to improve the GMD system, he stated that “I would spend our next dollar on discriminating sensors, meaning radars, big radars west and east, to give us the capability of where I see the threat going in the next five to ten years.”[7]

The LRDR is to be deployed in 2020 in Alaska and is expected to cost about one billion dollars. MDA plans to award a contract for the radar by the end of the current fiscal year. The LRDR will most likely be built at Clear Air Force Station in central Alaska (currently home to a PAVE PAWS early warning radar that is in the process of being incorporated into the GMD system) or at Eareckson Air Station on Shemya Island at the western end of the Aleutian island chain (currently home to the large Cobra Dane radar which has already been incorporated into the GMD system). Once the LRDR is operational, the SBX would most likely be moved to an East Coast location — where it would still suffer from the same limitations it has now.

MDA’s initial March 2014 LRDR Request for Information (RFI) to industry stated that it was not specifying the operating frequency band for the radar but rather was “looking for recommendations with rationale” based on tradeoffs necessary for the radar to perform its “precision tracking, discrimination and hit assessment” missions.[8] It also raised the possibility that the radar could have a limited field of view (LFOV) phased-array antenna instead of a full field of view (FFOV) antenna, and that in addition to its electronic-scanning capability, its antenna could be mechanically steered in azimuth or elevation or both (which would be necessary if a LFOV design was chosen — see below for a discussion of FFOV and LFOV radars). It also stated that MDA was interested in “software/hardware reuse and economy-of-scale benefits from existing programs leveraging the current and near-term production base.

An August 2014 update to the LRDR RFI provided additional insight into MDA’s plans for the radar.[9] It asked bidders for the LRDR to provide price estimates for three different LRDR configurations. Significantly, all three of these configurations would have the radar operating in the S-band of radar frequencies (2-4 GHz). One radar configuration would have a single antenna face. Another configuration would have two antenna faces. A third configuration would also have two antenna faces, but only one face would be populated with the modules that transmit and receive the radar energy (T/R modules). The second, inactive face could subsequently be populated with modules if such an upgrade was later determined to be needed. A subsequent RFI update stated that “Both radar faces will be designed to accommodate the same antenna hardware necessary to achieve the same future growth sensitivity.”[10]

Phased array radars typically are limited to maximum electronic scan angles of roughly ± 60 degrees because of losses associated with larger scan angles. Phased arrays with maximum scan angles of roughly ±60 degrees are referred to as full field-of-view (FFOV) radars. Such radars have antenna modules spacing of less than about 0.6 λ, where λ is the radar wavelength. For phased-array antennas with larger module spacings, another limitation on the maximum scan angle arises from the need to avoid grating lobes, which are essentially additional main radar beams. Phased array radars with significantly reduced scan angles due to wide module spacings are referred to as limited field of view (LFOV) radars.[11]

For radars which have modules arranged on a square array, such as the SBX, a module spacing of 0.536 λ or less is needed to obtain a ±60 degrees scan angle without producing grating lobes.[12] This corresponds to a maximum allowable antenna area of 0.287λ² per module. For an antenna with modules arranged on an equilateral triangular array, such as the U.S. early warning radars, this maximum permissible antenna area is 0.332λ².

For example, a PAVE PAWS early warning radar has 2677 elements arranged in equilateral triangular array with an area of 384 m². Of these elements, 1792 are actual transmit/receive modules, and the other 685 are dummy elements. The area per element is then 384/2677 = 0.143 m² = 0.310 λ² at a wavelength of λ= 0.68 m. This less than the maximum permitted area of 0.332λ² m² for a ± 60 degree scan, and thus the PAVE PAWS can achieve a full ±60 degrees scan angle, or even a little more, without producing grating lobes.

On the other hand, the SBX has 45,264 modules on a square array with an area 249 m².   This corresponds to an area per module of 55.0 cm² and a spacing between of modules of 7.42 cm = 2.35λ assuming a frequency of 9.5 GHz. For radars with widely spaced elements on a square array, the maximum scan angle θ_M is approximately given by sinθ_M = ±(0.5λ/d), where d is the module spacing.[13] With the SBX’s module spacing of d = 2.35λ, the maximum electronic scan angle is ±12.3 degrees. Thus the SBX is definitely a LFOV radar.

To get a FFOV of ±60 degrees on the same size antenna, the SBX would have required about (2.35/0.536)² = 19.2 times more modules, or a total of 45,264 x 19.2 = 869,000 modules. Not only would this have been prohibitively expensive, but it likely would have significantly delayed the deployment of the SBX by years unless costly new module production lines were opened. In addition, it would also have resulted in a radar with much greater capabilities than could ever be used in a missile defense role, given the curvature of the earth and the maximum altitude of ballistic missile trajectories. Alternatively, the SBX could have designed to use the same 45,264 modules but with a 0.536λ module spacing, resulting in an FFOV antenna, but with a diameter of only about 4.1 m. This would have reduced its tracking range, taken to be proportional to the 4^th root of the product of its power x aperture area x gain (P-A-G), by a factor of (1 x 19.2 x 19.2)^0.25 = 4.4.

For phased arrays using antennas populated with T/R modules, the modules are generally the biggest cost driver of the radar. The above paragraph illustrates how the SBX design, for a given number of modules, trades off its electronic field of view in order to get a larger antenna aperture. The larger antenna gives both a narrower beamwidth (which improves tracking accuracy) and a greater tracking range (or equivalently a higher signal-to noise ratio at a given range) at a price of a limited electronic FOV. This decreased electronic FOV may not be a serious problem for a radar intended for testing, but can be a serious liability for an operational missile defense radar.

Which brings us to the LRDR. I was initially quite surprised to see that the MDA was requesting LRDR price estimates only at S-band, since I was expecting it to be at X-band. Since range resolution is roughly inversely proportional to bandwidth and bandwidth is roughly proportional to frequency, it would be expected that an X-band radar (about 9-10 Ghz) would have a range resolution roughly three times better than an S-band radar (2-4 GHz). (Frequencies much higher than X-band are precluded by atmospheric effects). Thus while an X-band radar might achieve a range resolution of 15-25 cm, an S-band radar might achieve only 50-100 cm, depending on the choice of frequency with S-band. Moreover, the newer U.S. missile defense radars (the TPY-2 and the SBX) already operate at X-band.

However, if the LRDR is strongly cost-constrained, than a large FFOV X-band radar may not be achievable. An X-band FFOV radar with the same range (that is, with the same P-A-G) as the SBX would have roughly 237,000 modules on an antenna with a diameter of about 10.5 meters. (This assumes the X-band modules are arranged as the same triangular array as on a TPY-2 radar antenna and have an average power 60% greater than the modules on the SBX.) It is far from clear that such a radar could be built for one billion dollars. As a point of comparison, a current-production TPY-2 X-band radar, with 25,344 modules, costs about $180 million with the antenna equipment unit alone costing about $140 million. Moreover, to deploy such a radar by 2020 without completely disrupting TPY-2 production would likely require a new module production line. Thus unless the LRDR’s P-A-G is much less than that of the SBX, it may not be possible to build it for $1 billion at X-band if it is a FFOV radar.

In this context, it is useful to compare the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report’s proposed “stacked TPY-2” radar proposal. This radar, which the NAS Report refers to as a GBX, has an antenna consisting of two TPY-2 antennas stacked one on top of the other, with 50,688 X-band modules. While it would essentially be a FFOV radar, it would only have about 1% of the power-aperture-gain product of the SBX, although the NAS Panel argues that is sufficient for the discrimination mission. The NAS Report estimates that it would costs between $0.8 and $1.0 billion to develop the GBX, and another $1.6 billion to buy five GBXs. Thus the cost of buying a only single GBX would be somewhat over $1 billion. If the NAS cost estimates are correct, this would suggest that such a stacked TPY-2 would be about the largest FFOV X-band radar that could be bought for $1 billion. For comparison, the NAS estimated the cost of developing and the building SBX to be about $1.4 billion, with another $0.3 billion subsequently spent on radar enhancements. (However, note that the cost of buying and modifying the SBX ocean-going platform for the SBX was itself nearly $0.25 billion, which is included in the above figure.)

Thus if cost is a key driver of the radar’s performance, and a power-aperture-gain product greater than that of a stacked TPY-2 is desired, then it may be necessary to go to a lower frequency or a LFOV antenna, or both. Assume an S-band frequency one third that of X-Band (say 3.17 GHz vs 9.5 GHz) and a FFOV antenna. In this case, for a fixed number of modules, the S-band radar will have an aperture nine times larger than the X-band radar, with about the same gain and beamwidth. All else being equal, the S-band radar would have a tracking range about 9^0.25 = 1.73 times greater than the X-band radar, or equivalently it would obtain a signal-to-noise ratio nine times greater at a given range. The actual advantage of the S-band radar might be considerably greater than this since the S-band modules are likely to have higher average powers than X-band modules available at the same time, and because the overall radar cross sections of warhead-shaped targets tend to decrease with increasing frequency. These advantages seem likely to overwhelm the additional cost due to the larger S-band antenna size, at least for a fixed, land-based radar.

A choice of S-band could also be consistent with the LRDR RFI’s stated interest in “leveraging the current and near-term production base.” With a 2020 deployment time frame, the LRDR could potentially use the same S-band modules planned for the missile defense antenna of the Navy’s new Aegis Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The first AMDR-equipped Aegis destroyer is scheduled to be procured in FY 2016 for deployment in about 2023. The S-band part of the AMDR will use new GaN modules that give greater power with less heat dissipation than current GaAs modules.  The timing of LRDR and AMDR radars would be consistent with the first batch of the new S-band modules going to the LRDR (and possibly the Space Fence).

To get a sense of the range of possibilities, it is interesting to look at some possible S-band radar configurations if the LRDR was required to have the same P-A-G as the SBX. If we assume the S-band modules have twice the average power of the current X-band modules (a complete guess) and a FFOV design with modules arranged on an equilateral triangular array with the same d/λ ratio as the X-Band TPY-2 antenna, then the required antenna would have about 90,500 modules on a diameter of about 19.4 m. (Compare to the 45,264 modules on a 17.8 m diameter for the SBX.)

The LRDR RFI’s explicit mention of a possible LFOV design for the LRDR raises the possibility that the number of modules could be reduced further, although presumably such an LRDR’s electronic FOV would be much wider than that of the SBX. Consider a design with a ± 30 degrees electronic FOV (with the modules on a square array). To have the same P-A-G as the SBX, such a radar would have about 46,200 S-Band modules on a diameter of 23 m. If the design included a second initially unpopulated face, the angular coverage could subsequently be doubled while keeping the initial cost down.

All of the above designs seem likely to exceed $1 billion in cost, suggesting that the LRDR might be built with a P-A-G significantly less than the SBX. Since there is roughly a factor of 100 difference in P-A-G between the SBX and NAS Report’s proposed stacked TPY-2, there is a lot of room for intermediate-sized designs.

While the discussion above is largely speculative, the seeming choice of S-band for the LRDR indicates that achieving the best possible range resolution is not the top priority for the LRDR design. Perhaps the MDA has decided that the range resolution achievable at S-band is adequate for discrimination given the perceived threat. Such a conclusion might be based in part on observations of tests. This would be a surprising conclusion, given that recent Defense Science Board and National Academy of Sciences reports have concluded that discrimination is still an unsolved problem, the same conclusion reached by outside analysts since at least the 1960s, and that it is unlikely that tests have been conducted against anything resembling the full range of possible countermeasures.

Perhaps there is some other reason for preferring S-band over X-band. However, if it a matter of a perceived need to hold the cost of the radar that is driving the frequency choice for the radar, the MDA may be settling for a less-than-optimal discrimination radar.

[1] The exception being the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, which was primarily built for gathering intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile tests.

[2] The radar in Clear, Alaska was not completed until about 2000. However, this radar was built by disassembling a PAVE PAWS radar in Texas that had been deactivated in the 1980s and the reconstructing it in Alaska.

[3] As originally built, these radars had tracking bandwidths of between 1 and 10 MHz (see my post of April 12, 2012) which would correspond to range resolutions of between 15 and 150 meters. It seems likely that these bandwidths were increased as part of the upgrades involved in incorporating them into the GMD system. However, this increase is limited by the total span of frequencies that the radars can operate over, which is 30 MHz (this span was not changed by the GMD upgrades). This would limit their maximum bandwidth to 30 MHz, corresponding to a range resolution of 5 m.

[4] The Cobra Dane radar is an exception to the above discussion. It operates at a higher frequency (about 1.3 GHz) than the other radars and has a minimum range resolution of about 1.14 m. (see this post of April 12, 2012 ) However, this high resolution is obtained only within 22.5 degrees of the antenna’s boresite. As noted in the text, Cobra Dane is poorly oriented for observing North Korean missiles, and a missile launched from North Korea towards the U.S. West Coast will never enter the radar’s high resolution part of its field of view.

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, “Missile Defense Agency Officials Hold a News Briefing on the Missile Defense Agency’s FY 2015 Budget,” March 4, 2014.

[6] U.S. Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 3304, Public Law 113-66, Section 235, December 2013.

[7] Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, July 17, 2013.

[8] Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Agency Long Range Discrimination Radar Request for Information,” SN HQ0147-14-R-0002, March 14, 2014. See https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=42f1a95465dac067ca3ee0a665adf7f7&tab=core&_cview=1

[9] See the first letter under DRFP Documents, August 8, 2014 at the URL in note 4.

[10] See round 10 questions and answers at the URL in note 4.

[11] For the discussion in this paragraph, see section 3.3 of G. Richard Curry, Radar System Performance Modeling, 2nd ed. (Boston, Mass.: Artech House, 2005).

[12] Theodore C. Cheston and Joe Frank, “Phased Array Radar Antennas,” in Merrill Skolnik, ed., Radar Handbook, 2^nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 7.21.

[13] Curry, page 33. Curry refers to this as the “acceptable element spacing.”

There have been at least as many acronyms and designations assigned to current, past and future kill vehicles of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system as there have been successful intercept tests of such kill vehicles.  Below I summarize the most important of these kill vehicle designations.

EKV CE-0: This designation covers the kill vehicles used in the first seven GMD intercept tests, from 1999 to 2002, as well as the IFT-1a and IFT-2 fly-by tests in 1998-99.  The first, and so far only, place I have seen this designation is on the slides used by MDA Director Admiral Syring during his August 13 presentation at the 2014 Space and Missile Defense Conference.  (These slides were obtained via FOIA by Laura Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists.)  These kill vehicles are sometimes referred to as “prototypes” although this term is sometimes also used for the later CE-I and CE-II kill vehicles as well.  The “CE” stands for Capability Enhancement, so the CE-0 designation seems to be both a retroactive designation as well as a catch-all for all the early GMD kill vehicles, as indicated by its use for both the fly-by tests, which used two completely different competing kill vehicle designs.

EKV CE-0+:  This designation was also used by Admiral Syring in his SMDC presentation.  It is not clear (at least to me) how this version of the kill vehicle differed from its CE-0 predecessor.  In any event, this version of the EKV has never left Earth’s atmosphere.  It was only used in two intercept tests (IFT-13c in 2004 and IFT-14 in 2005) and in both of these tests the interceptor failed to launch.

EKV CE-1:   The Capability Enhancement – 1 (CE-I) was the initial production version of the EKV.  CE-I EKVs were first delivered and deployed in 2004, and deliveries and deployments continued until September 2007.  The number of deployed CE-1 GBIs peaked at twenty four in September 2007, although some of these deployed CE-Is have since been replaced by newer CE-II equipped GBIs.  A total of 33 CE-I equipped GBIs were produced, with six of these expended in flight or intercept tests so far.  The CE-I differs from the last CE-0s in at least some connector upgrades that were made to address obsolescence problems.  Other changes were made to the CE-I EKV as problems with it were identified through testing.  A 2014 DoD Inspector General Report notes that there are “subconfigurations” within the basic CE-I design as a result of these changes.

The CE-I has been flight tested six times, with four of these being intercept tests. The MDA classifies the first three intercept tests, conducted in 2006-2008, as successful intercepts, although in the first only “a glancing blow” was struck to the target.  The fourth intercept test, FTG-7 in July 2014, was in part intended to demonstrate roughly twenty five upgrades made to the CE-I EKV.  However, the intercept attempt failed due to a problem with a battery.  The FY 2013 Annual Report by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation recommended that MDA “Conduct a redo of the FTG-07 test with a GBI equipped with a CE-I EKV…”  However, no such retest has occurred so far.  The next scheduled intercept test for a CE-I-equipped GBI appears to be as part of FTG-11 in 2017, a salvo test involving both CE-I and a CE-II GBIs.

EKV CE-II:  Facing obsolescence issues with some components of the CE-I, in 2005 MDA began design of a new Capability Enhancement-2 (CE-II) version of the EKV.  Deployment of CE-II-equipped GBIs began in October 2008.  A total of ten were deployed before the failure of December 2010 FTG-06a intercept test led to a halt in their deployment.  MDA has procured a total of twenty four CE-II equipped GBIs.  Sixteen of these had been delivered by September 2014; the remaining eight are to be delivered in 2015.

Although the CE-II program was initiated primarily to address obsolescence issues (in particular in its computer processor), it also provided some improved kill vehicle capabilities (see my post of April 3, 2012).  Relative to the CE-I, the CE-II has a more sensitive infrared seeker, and the new processor is said to provide improved onboard discrimination capabilities.  Specifically, the CE-II upgrade increased the number of objects the kill vehicle could track, and had some “minor” algorithm performance improvements.[1] As with the CE-I, there are subconfigurations within the basic CE-II design.

The CE-II EKV has been flight-tested four times, three of which involved intercept attempts.  The first two intercept flight tests, FTG-06 and FTG-06a, both failed in 2010.  A successful non-intercept flight test (CTV-01) in January 2013 and a successful intercept test in June 2014 permitted deployment of CE-IIs to begin again.

EKV CE-II Block 1: The CE-II Block I is an improved version of the CE-II EKV.  It will at least incorporate new components to address the guidance failure in FTG-06a and the battery-related failure in FTG-07.  No other improvements have been publicly disclosed, but the Block 1 is intended to have increased reliability relative to the previous CE-II EKVs.

The first flight test of the Block 1 is currently planned to be the FTG-15 intercept test in late 2016. This will also be the first test of an operationally-configured GBI against an ICBM-range target.  If this test is successful, ten CE-II Block 1 interceptors will be delivered and deployed in 2017, bringing the total number of deployed to the MDA’s goal of 44.

RKV:  The Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) is new kill vehicle that will incorporate largely existing kill vehicle components and subassemblies into a new modular design. It has also been referred to as the “EKV CE-III.”[2] According to MDA Director Admiral Syring: “The new EKV will improve reliability and be more producible, testable, reliable and cost effective and eventually will replace the kill vehicle on our current GBI.”[3]  In addition, the RKV will also have improved target acquisition and discrimination capabilities and provide for on-demand communications between the RKV and the GMD fire control system.  MDA requested $229 million for RKV development in FY 2016, with total development spending planned as $658 million through FY 2020.

MDA plans to design the RKV itself using the best elements of proposals from Raytheon, Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, with a production award contest in 2018.  Under current plans the RKV will have a first flight test in 2018 followed by an intercept test in 2019.  If these tests are successful, deployment of the RKV on Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) would begin in 2020, likely replacing already deployed EKV-equipped GBIs.

CKV: There is no kill vehicle known as a Common Kill Vehicle (CKV).  Rather, the Common Kill Vehicle Program is a two-phase effort aimed at developing strategies and technologies for “the next generation of our exo-atmospheric kill vehicles.”[4]  MDA requested $47 million for the CKV program in FY 2016 and plans to spend $380 million on the program through FY 2020.

In the first phase of the CKV Program, begun in 2014, concepts and requirements were developed for the RKV.

The second phase, to begin in FY 2016, will involve both developing concepts for Multi-Object Kill Vehicles (MOKVs – see below)).  It will also involve developing strategies and technologies, such communication architectures, guidance technologies, and command and control strategies that might be used in a future MOKV program.

MKV: The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV – sometimes Miniature Kill Vehicle) program was started by MDA in 2004.  Its objective was to produce a kill vehicle small enough that several or many MKVs could be placed on a single interceptor, with each MKV able to intercepting a separate target.  This program aimed to reduce the problem of discrimination by allowing every credible object in a threat cloud to be attacked.  The MDA announced the termination of the MKV program in 2009, saying it would instead “invest in technologies that would defeat threat missiles in their ascent phase before deployment of countermeasures,” an approach that was abandoned several years later.  Prior to abandoning it, MDA spent nearly $700 million on the MKV program.

MOKV: The Multiple-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) is a revival of the MKV concept.  Current plans call for work on the MOKV to begin in FY 2016 under the Common Kill Vehicle program with MDA awarding several contracts to industry to develop MOKV concepts.  In parallel, MDA will invest in developing several key MOKV technologies.  According to MDA Director Admiral Syring in 2015 congressional testimony: “Ultimately, these Multi-Object Kill Vehicles will revolutionize our missile defense architecture, substantially reducing the interceptor inventory required to defeat an evolving and more capable threat to the Homeland.”[5]  However, even if the MOKV program is successful, MOKVs may not be deployed until 2030.[6]

[1] Admiral Syring’s 2014 SMDC Conference presentation slides.

[2] Amy Butler, “Reprieve and Refocus,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 1, 2014, pp. 21-22.

[3] Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring to the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 11, 2014.

[4] Admiral J.D. Syring prepared statement to the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Appropriations Committee, March 18, 2015.

[5] Syring prepared statement.

[6] Lee Hudson, “MDA Continues Balancing Congress, Budget While Achieving Homeland Defense Initiatives,” Inside Defense SITREP, December 16, 2014.

Everyone seems to agree that “fly before you buy,” is a good idea, particularly for complex military systems.  The failure to follow such an approach by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is now widely acknowledged as a primary cause of the many problems that have befallen its Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) program.  Nevertheless, as a recent GAO Report shows, MDA appears determined to continue to with its “buy before you fly” approach for the GMD system.

Some claims on “fly before you buy.”

The current MDA Director, Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, told Congress in March 2015 that for the GMD system, “We will adhere to our “fly before you buy” approach…”[1]   Similarly, during the February 2, 2015 press conference on the release of the MDA FY 2016 budget, he stated that for the GMD system “So the way I have structured the test program is to fly before you buy…”[2] (I’ll give you the rest of these two sentences below.)

Such claims are not new for MDA. In April 2010, Syring’s predecessor as MDA Director, Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “We have submitted a comprehensive integrated master test plan — signed by Dr. Gilmore, the services’ operational test agencies and the commander of U.S. Strategic Command — to ensure we fly our missiles before we buy them.”[3] (Somewhat amazingly, at the time O’Reilly made this statement, MDA was deploying GBIs equipped with the new CE-II kill vehicle, which had failed its only flight and intercept test.)

In 2008, Gen. O’Reilly’s predecessor at MDA, Lt. General Henry Obering III, told Congress that: “Our capability-based acquisition model actually follows a “fly-before-you-buy” construct.”[4]  However, he practically contradicted himself with his next sentence: “We have in place a disciplined process to deliver early, partial, and full capabilities, with significant developmental and operational testing events throughout.”

At least Gen. Obering’s predecessor at MDA, Lt. General Ronald Kadish, seemed to get a correct description of MDA’s GBI acquisition process when in March 2004 he told Congress that: “The idea of fly before you buy is very difficult for this system.” Instead, he described the GBI procurement process as: “Fly as we buy is basically the way we have done that.”

Fly Before You Buy and the CE-II Block I interceptor

There are two versions of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) currently deployed on GBIs, the CE-I and CE-II. (CE stands for “Capability Enhancement.”)  Both of these began deployment years before they were successfully intercept-tested.[5]  See my post of April 26, 2015 for a description of the various versions of the EKV.  The buy before you fly approach used for the CE-I and CE-II is widely acknowledged to be a major reason for the problems these weapons have caused the GMD system, in particular the more than six year delay and more than $1.7 billion cost overrun in demonstrating a successful CE-II intercept.[6]

The next version of the EKV is the CE-II Block 1.  The Block 1 is intended to be an improved version of the CE-II, with greater reliability.  It will include the fixes for the problems encountered in the failed FTG-06a and FTG-07 intercept tests, as well as the alternate divert thrusters to be tested in CTV-02+ in late 2015.  The CE-II Block 1 GBI will also include the new C2 upgraded booster, which has avionics upgrades and is also intended to increase reliability.

Currently the MDA plans to conduct intercept FTG-15 in fourth quarter of FY 2016.  This test will be the first flight test and intercept test for both the CE-II Block 1 EKV and the C2 booster. Following this test (assuming it is successful), MDA plans to deploy ten CE-II Block 1 GBIs by the end of calendar year 2017.  The rapid deployment of these CE-II Block 1 GBIs is necessary if MDA is to meet the politically-established deadline of deploying 44 operational GBIs by the end of 2017.

While the process of testing and deploying the CE-II Block I GBIs might appear to be a fly before you buy approach, since the intercept test precedes the first deployment, in fact this deployment plan requires buying the CE-II Block 1 GBIs long before they are tested.

A 2014 GAO Report states that GBI production “must begin at least 2 years before delivery” and a 2015 report by the same agency says that MDA “planned to start production of CE-II Block I interceptors for operational use almost two years before it conducts Flight Test GMD (FTG)-15.”[7]

In fact, production of these GBIs started much earlier.  MDA budget documents show that acquisition of the eleven Block 1 interceptors began in fiscal year 2012.[8]  Specifically, acquisition of GBIs 48-52 began in FY 2012 and acquisition of GBIs 53-58 began in FY 2013, with GBIs 48-57 designated for deployment as CE-II Block 1s and with GBI 58 specifically designated for the CE-II Block 1 intercept test.[9]  Some of the components for these GBIs were purchased even earlier.  The topline budget numbers for the midcourse defense segment of MDA’s RDT&E budget show a very similar picture, with five GBIs being bought in FY 2012, five in FY 2013, one in FY 2014, and none in the following years.  (MDA will start acquiring 2 GBIs per year in its procurement budget starting in FY 2018 and is separately developing the new Redesigned Kill Vehicle under the Improved Homeland Defense Interceptors budget item.)

From the FY 2014 budget materials.

Moreover, MDA has stated that by the time the FTG-15 test takes place, production and assembly of two of the CE-II Block 1 GBIs intended for deployment will have been be completed.[10]  If the test is delayed, as often happens with GMD tests, than it is likely that even more of the Block 1 GBIs will be completed before the test occurs.  MDA argues that waiting until after FTG-15 to complete the manufacturing and assembling of these GBIs would “unacceptably increase the risk to reaching the Secretary of Defense Mandate to reach 44 emplaced interceptors by the end of CY 2017.”[11]  However, MDA argues that it can “ensure a sound acquisition approach” simply by not putting these interceptors into their silos until after a successful FTG-15 test.[12]

Fly Before You Deploy

Here are the full quotes from Admiral Syring that are given partially at the beginning of this post:

“We will adhere to our “fly before you buy” approach, testing elements of the system to demonstrate they work before we commit to their fielding in order to ensure the warfighter will have cost-effective and reliable weapon systems.”

and:

“So the way I have structured the test program is to fly before you buy, and each test has a purpose, and there is development that needs to go on so you can’t just rush to it test to test; that in our constrained resources and everything else we’re constrained by, I think it’s important the structure of the program on this pace to inform fielding for a — with successful intercept test.”

Both of these quotes make it clear that the current MDA commitment is only not to deploy (“field’) new types of GBIs until after a successful intercept test.  But such a commitment has little meaning if it only limits the last step in deploying the interceptors – lowering them into their silos.  The discussion above shows CE-II Block 1 interceptors have already been bought and MDA will be deep into their production and assembly process by the currently planned time of the FTG-15 intercept test.  This is far from a knowledge-based process advocated by the GAO in which “testing is conducted before production.”[13]

When the GAO sent the draft of their May 2015 report to MDA for review in March 2015, it recommended that MDA “delay production of CE-II Block I interceptors intended for operational use until the program has successfully conducted an intercept flight test with the CE-II Block I interceptor.”[14] While the MDA labeled its response as “partially concur,” it said that it would continue to produce and assemble the CE-II Block 1 GBIs before conducting FTG-15 (MDA also argued that it had or would test some Block 1 components on earlier flights), leading the GAO to simply repeat its recommendation in its final report.[15]

However, it’s already too late. The CE-II Block 1 GBIs are already under production and MDA cannot stop this process without endangering its mandate to deploy 44 GBIs by the end of 2017.

[1] Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, Director, Missile Defense Agency, House Armed Service Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 19, 2015. http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_syring_031915_hasc.pdf.

[2] “Department of Defense Briefing by Vice Adm. Syring on the Fiscal Year 2016 Missile Defense Agency Budget request in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” February 2, 2015. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5584.

[3] Senate Armed Services Committee, April 10, 2010.  Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_sasc042010trans.pdf.

[4] Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III. Director, Missile Defense Agency, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, April 30, 2008.­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

[5] The first CE-I equipped GBI was deployed in July 2004.  However, the first flight test for a CE-I was more than a year later, in December 2005 (FT-1) and the first intercept test was more than two years after deployment began.  (In the wacky world of missile defense test scoring, MDA claims this intercept test, FTG-02 in September 2006, as a successful intercept even though it says hitting the target was not an objective of the test and DOT&E says that while the kill vehicle may have hit the target, it did not “kill” it.  See my post of October 18, 2012.)  The first CE-I intercept test that actually scored a kill was FTG-03a in September. For CE-II, deployment see the next footnote.

[6] According to the GAO, the first intercept test of the CE-II, FTG-06, was originally scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2007.  This test was eventually conducted in January 2010 and the intercept attempt failed.  The GAO estimated that FTG-06 cost $0.236 billion.  A successful CE-II intercept was finally achieved in FTG-06b in June 2014.  The GAO estimated that the additional cost (beyond that of conducting the original FTG-06 test) of demonstrating a successful CE-II intercept was $1.745 billion, a figure it believes may continue to increase.  Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve Reporting on System Capabilities,” GAO-15-345, May 2015, p. 63.

[7] GAO-15-345, p. 22; Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: MDA Report Provides Limited Insight on Improvements to Homeland Missile Defense and Acquisition Plans,” GAO-14-626R, July 17, 2014, p. 4.

[8] By budgetary materials, I mean the annual MDA RDT&E Budget Justification Books available on the Department of Defense’s Comptroller’s website.  For example, the FY 2016 materials are at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/MDA_RDTE_MasterJustificationBook_Missile_Defense_Agency_PB_2016_1.pdf.

[9] The FY 2014 budget materials list under FY 2012 accomplishments: “Initiated acquisition of 5 Interceptors (GBIs 48-52) that are supported by the completion of the booster and EKV component purchases.” It also states that acquisition of GBIs 53-57 is to be initiated in FY 2013 and the “Addition of 1 GBI (58) for testing of Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) Block I GBI per Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP).”  The FY 2015 budget materials confirm that acquisition of GBIs 53-58 began in FY 2013.  The FY 2016 budget materials confirm that these GBIs are the CE-II Block 1 interceptors, listing as an FY 2014 accomplishment: “Continued acquisition of CE-II Configuration 2 (C2) integrated boost vehicle with Consolidated Booster Avionics Upgrade (CBAU) and CE-II Block I Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKV)) GBIs 48-58 to support both operations and testing, including a flight test to demonstrate the capability of the CE-II Block 1 EKV with C2 CBAU booster GBIs.”

[10] GAO-15-345, p.35.

[11] GAO-15-345, p.35.

[12] GAO-15-345, p.35.

[13] GAO-15-345, Highlight Page.

[14] GAO-15-345, p. 29.

[15] GAO-15-345, pp. 30, 35.

In looking back at a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from last July, I was struck by its statement that, as part of its Ground Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) planned “to deliver a robust defense capability in 2019.”[1]  I hadn’t noticed such a statement before, and it immediately raised two questions: In the context of the GMD system, what does a “robust defense capability” mean?  And what happens in 2019 to mark the “delivery” of this robust capability?  As discussed below, I have been unable to uncover an answer to either question, so if anyone knows the answers, I would be interested in hearing from them.

The GAO Report itself does not answer these questions.  All it says is that in order to reach 44 operationally deployed interceptors by 2017 and to deliver this robust capability by 2019, “many concurrent efforts must be completed including successful testing, restarting CE-II production, and developing and acquiring interceptors with new components.”  However, all of these steps are necessary to achieve the 44 deployed interceptors by 2017 alone.

The word “robust” is often used in discussions of missile defenses, frequently in the context of steps that are said to make defenses “more robust.”  It is much rarer to see the word used to denote a specific capability of a defense system, and in particular when that system is the GMD system.  But I have found two examples, both from 2011.

In March 2011, then MDA Director Lt. General O’Reilly, speaking in the context of both the GMD systems and regional defenses, told Congress that: “Our objective is to a field a robust missile defense by providing at least two intercept opportunities, by two or more different interceptor systems, against every threat missile in flight by the end of this decade.”[2]

The MDA’s 2011 Program Update, in a section headlined Developing the BMDS Over the Next Decade: Robust Homeland Defense Against Limited Attack, similarly stated that: “By the end of the decade, we will have in place a two-layered ICBM defense consisting of the GMD system. BMDS sensor network, and the Aegis system with the SM-3 IIB to provide multiple intercept opportunities of potential ICBMs targeting the United States by current regional threats.”

These two statements seem to be clearly defining a robust defense as one that provides multiple intercept opportunties by at least two different types of interceptors, specifically the GMD system’s GBI interceptors and the Eurpean Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)’s SM-3 IIB interceptors.  The apparent idea here is that not only does having two different types of interceptors in two different locations provide more possible intercept opportunities, thus reducing the risk of a failure due to reliability issues, but also that the different nature of the two interceptors (and the different parts of the target’s trajectory at which they attempt to intercept) might allow one type of interceptor to succeed even if the other type failed (for example, due to an unexpected countermeasure).  The latter argument does not seem very convincing in this case, as both types of interceptors work in basically the same way.  In any event, the SM-3 IIB was cancelled in 2013.  While GMD system can still make multiple intercept attempts, they would all use GBIs with very similar kill vehicles (and all the intercept attempts would occur in roughly the second half of the target’s trajectory).

More recently, in his presentation to the 2014 Space and Missile Defense Conference, MDA Director Admiral J.D. Syring showed a slide with the title: Robust Homeland Defense (2020-2025 Timeframe).  This slide shows a number of planned GMD improvements that are planned for 2016 onwards.  Thus this slide appears to be arguing that the GMD system will gradually become more robust as capability enhancements are made rather than indicating that a specific defined “robust defense capability” will be achieved at some point between 2020 and 2025.

Is there anything planned for 2019 that could significantly enhance the GMD’s systems capabilities?  The slide “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Fielding” also shown by Admiral Syring at the 2014 SMDC Conference, does not show any new GMD capability being deployed in 2019.

As far as I can tell, the most significant events currently planned for the GMD system in 2019 are two tests:

— The first intercept test for the new Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV).

— The first intercept test using the two-stage GBI booster.

The year 2020 could see a number of new capabilities added to the GMD system, such as the deployment of the Long-Range Discrimination Radar, and the possible first deployment of both the RKV and the two-stage version of the GBI.  However, there does not seem to be anything happening in, or even by, 2019 that would justify labeling the GMD system’s capability as robust.

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[1] Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: MDA Report Provides Limited Insight on Improvements to Homeland Missile Defense and Acquisition Plans,” GAO-14-626R, July 17, 2014, p. 4.

[2] Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, March 31, 2011.

The most interesting information to come out of a Congressional Hearing sometimes is contained in the responses to written questions submitted by members of the Congressional Committee.  Usually you have to wait until the full hearing is printed up by the Government Printing Office to see these questions and answers but frequently the answers are worth waiting for.  Here’s one example from the March 25, 2014 House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Ballistic Missile Defense, in which Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chair Representative Mike Rogers asks three witnesses whether or not the U.S. national missile defense system could defend the United States against a (accidental or unauthorized) Chinese ballistic missile attack.  To summarize their responses: (1) It’s classified; (2) It’s complicated (and classified); and (3) No, it’s not technically financially feasible to defeat a full-scale Chinese attack, but the defense would be employed to defend against a limited attack from China (or from anywhere else).

The three witnesses were Vice Admiral James Syring, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General David L. Mann, Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Elaine M. Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

Representative Rogers asked Admiral Syring and General Mann, “The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999 requires that we deploy national missile defenses capable of defending the United States from ‘‘accidental or unauthorized’’ ballistic missile attack, among other attacks. Can you please tell me, are we protected from an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack from a Chinese ballistic missile submarine, which, as you know, the Chinese are now deploying? If not, when will we?” (Another way to view these questions is: “When will be able to defend ourselves against the most survivable portion of China’s nuclear deterrent?)

Admiral Syring’s response is printed as: “The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.”

General Mann’s response is somewhat more expansive, but still ultimately relies on classification: “It is difficult to provide a specific assessment. The Ballistic Missile Defense System is not designed to counter peer or near-peer ballistic missile threats. The level of residual capability to defend against such an incident would be influenced by the degree of indications and warnings, the location of the launch and target impact area, and the accessibility of sensors and interceptors. Upon request, further details could be provided via a classified session or paper.”

Representative Rogers asked Secretary Bunn a somewhat different question: “From a policy perspective, can you please help me understand why we deploy missile defenses to protect our aircraft carriers from Chinese ballistic missiles but we do not deploy missile defenses to protect our cities from Chinese nuclear missiles?”

Her response: “We have the capability to protect our aircraft carriers from ballistic missiles in order to ensure freedom of action and the ability to project power around the globe to protect U.S. interests. The DOD is committed to ensuring defense of the U.S. homeland against limited long-range missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. With regard to China and Russia, our homeland missile defenses are not designed to counter their advanced long-range missile capabilities because defending against the quantity and quality of their ICBMs would be technologically impractical and cost prohibitive. We remain confident that Chinese and Russian ballistic missile attacks on the U.S. homeland are deterred by other means. Despite not being capable of coping with large-scale Chinese or Russian missile attacks, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches from any source.”