Saudi Arabia is claiming that it used two Patriot missiles to shoot down a Scud ballistic missile launched from Yemen early in the morning of June 6. The Patriot battery was likely located at the King Khalid Air Force Base, which is about 100 km from the nearest point in Yemen. It seems likely that either the Airbase or the nearby city of Khamis Mushait was target of the attack. If this report is correct (and this seems like a very big if), I believe this would make Saudi Arabia only the second or third country to claim to have shot down a ballistic missile with a range as long as a Scud (a baseline Scud has a range of about 300 km) in an actual attack, and possibly the only one to actually successfully do so.

To expand a bit on the last point: As far as I know the only use of a ballistic missile defense against missiles with Scud-class range or longer was in the 1991 Gulf War.  Although missile defenses were also used in the 2003 Gulf War, the targets were apparently shorter-range missiles.  Similarly with Israel’s experience with Iron Dome, which has only involved much shorter range rockets.

In the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. and Israeli Patriot batteries engaged (attempted to intercept) 44 extended-range (600 km) Scuds fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel (there was also a battery from the Netherlands deployed in Israel, but it did attempt an intercept).  Although the U.S. Army initially claimed success rates as high as 96%, in face of criticism it eventually retreated to a claim of 61% success, which, as far as I know, is still its current claim.  However, publicly available data conclusively showed that Patriot’s actual success rate in destroying the Scuds was much lower, and quite possibly was zero.

This is an updated list (previous version was January 16, 2014) of claims by U.S. government officials about the effectiveness of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system. It adds four additional claims (#29, #30, #31, and #32).

(1) September 1, 2000: “… I simply cannot conclude, with the information I have today, that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time.” President Bill Clinton, at Georgetown University, September 1, 2000.

(2) March 18, 2003: “Effectiveness is in the 90% range.”[1]   Edward Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

(3) March 23, 2003: “There are a lot of things that go into [determining] effectiveness. Everybody can be right.” [2] MDA Director Ronald Kadish, in response to a question about Aldridge’s statement.

(4) July 21, 2005: “We have a better than zero chance of intercepting, I believe, an inbound warhead.” That confidence will improve with time.” MDA Director Lt. General Henry Obering.[3]

(5) March 14, 2006: “When the president declares limited defensive operational capability, we are prepared as the shooter, if you will, to execute the mission to defend our country. And I’m very confident in the efficacy of that system.”[4] Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command.

(6) June 2006: “(From) what I have seen and what I know about the system and its capabilities I am very confident.”[5] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(7) July 6, 2006: “If it headed to the United States, we’ve got a missile defense system that will defend our country.” President George W. Bush in response to a question on Larry King Live about North Korea’s unsuccessful test of a long-range ballistic missile the day before.

(8) September 1, 2006: “I would say that if we had to use the system in an operational mode, it would be very capable.”[6] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(9) January 29, 2007: “We are Confident The Ballistic Missile Defense System Would Have Operated As Designed Had The Taepo Dong-2 Threatened The U.S.,” MDA Deputy Director Brigadier General Patrick O’Reilly.[7]

(10) October 2, 2007: “ – does the system work? The answer to that is yes. Is it going to work against more complex threats in the future? We believe it will.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.[8]

(11) November 2, 2008: “I have very high confidence we could defend the United States against that threat.”[9] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, about one or two missiles launched from North Korea.

(12) March 27, 2009: “And Senator, I’ll tell you, if we felt the North Koreans were going to shoot a ballistic missile at us today, I am comfortable that we would have an effective system able to meet that threat.”[10] General Victor Renaurt, Commander U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command.

(13) June 9, 2009: “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”[11] And “I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

(14) June 16, 2009: Confidence that a North Korean missile could be shot down is: “ninety percent plus.”[12] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(15) June 18, 2009 (approximately): “I’d believe we have a reasonable chance” of intercepting a North Korean missile. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Charles McQueary, in an interview on his last day in the job.[13]

(16) July 28, 2009: “Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea.”[14] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(17) April 21, 2010: “It is the belief of the — of the leaders of this department that we have the capability to defend the United States against the — against an ICBM threat from a rogue nation such as Iran or North Korea. We are confident in the system we have at this point.”[15] Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary.

(18) December 1, 2010: “…the probability will be well in the high 90s today of the GMD system being able to intercept that today.” MDA Director Patrick O’Reilly in response to a question from Representative Trent Franks about countering “one ICBM coming from Tehran to New York.”[16]

(19) April 13, 2011: “The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures.”[17] Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

(20) December 12, 2012: “I’m very confident that American defense capabilities are able, no problem, to block a rocket like this one.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in response to a question from CNN on the capability of U.S missile defenses, December 12, 2012.[18]

(21) March 7, 2013: “I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack. And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea. But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat.” White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, in response to a question at White House Daily Press Briefing, March 7, 2013.[19]

(22) March 15, 2013: “We have confidence in our system. And we certainly will not go forward with the additional 14 interceptors until we are sure that we have the complete confidence that we will need. But the American people should be assured that our interceptors are effective.” Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in response to a question at a Pentagon press conference, March 15, 2013.

(23) April 9, 2013: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies. Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2013 in response to a question about intercepting North Korean missiles.[20]

(24) May 9, 2013: “We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall about the capability of “our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”[21]

(25) May 9, 2013: “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional ’14 provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.”  Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall (and referring to the recently announced plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska).[22]

(26) July 2013: “I stand by my response in the testimony I provided on May 9.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, when asked about the effectiveness of the GMD System shortly after failure of FTG-07 on July 5, 2013.[23]

(27) July 10, 2013: “But we maintain that we have a robust missile defense system in place to defend the United States and our allies from a range of threats.”   “We have a range of assets that can support American missile defense, and we are confident that we can defend this country from the missile threat.” Pentagon Press Secretary George Little , July 9 2013 (four days after the failed FTG-07 intercept test of the GMD system).[24]

(28) Sometime before August 21, 2013: “Of course you’re protected. Yes, you’re protected. We’re proud to protect you.” MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring, in response to the question “Am I protected where I live?” asked by a person sitting next to him on an airplane.[25]

(29) March 25, 2014: Regarding the GMD system: “We have confidence in the current capability. Do we need to do more? Do we need to continue to do the necessary testing? Yes. But we have confidence in the operational employment, the rules of engagement that we would use that would address maybe some reliability or some uncertainty associated with the system.” Lieutenant General David L. Mann, Commanding General U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense.[26]

(30) March 25, 2014: “As a policy official who is often briefed by those who develop and operate the system, I am confident that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system can defend the United States against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack.” Elaine M. Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.[27]

(31) March 19, 2015: Regarding the GMD system: “We have high confidence in the ability of this system to defeat an ICBM strike against the United States from an enemy with limited ICBM capabilities.” Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander North American Aerospace Command and U.S. Northern Command.[28]

(32) March 25, 2015: Regarding the GMD system: “As the Secretary of Defense and various Combatant Commanders have previously testified, the Warfighter remains confident in our ability to protect the Nation against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack, even in the face of the changing fiscal environment.” Lieutenant General David L. Mann, Commanding General U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense.[29]

Bonus Quote on Defending Guam from a North Korean Missile Attack:

(33) April 5, 2013: THAAD together with other systems such as Aegis and Patriot could take out a missile launched by North Korea at Guam “fairly quickly.” “We are very confident of that.” Major General Dana J. H. Pittard (Commander of Fort Bliss, home base for THAAD).[30]

——————————————————————————————

[1] BAYH: Let me withdraw the question and move on. I think you see where I was heading. Let me ask you Mr. — Secretary Aldridge, about the effectiveness of the system that’s to be deployed in 2004 and 2005 in protecting against this developing North Korean threat — the 10 land-based missiles proposed for the end of fiscal year 2004 — how effective would they be against the North Korean missile if it were, in fact, launched against our country? ALDRIDGE: Well, we think that it would be effective. Probably shouldn’t go into a lot of details of… BAYH: Well, how do you define effective — 90 percent success rate — 75 — 50? ALDRIDGE: Yes, sir — you would — and you — the way you could achieve these rates is you don’t have to fire just one interceptor per target, you could fire two, as we do in PAC-3. BAYH: Of course. ALDRIDGE: And so the effectiveness is in the 90 percent range. Of course, we want the effectiveness to be high enough that we never have to use these things. I mean, that’s the ultimate effectiveness is that they’re never used. BAYH: There are — there are — there are — there are 10 going online in 2004 — 10 in 2005. The radar is not going to be available — when will that go into place — 2006? ALDRIDGE: Well, General Kadish has probably got the specific dates for all of those. Let him… KADISH: We’ll have radars online to handle the early warning and usefulness of the system in ’04, when we put the missiles on alert if everything works out all right. We’ll add the sea-based X-band (ph) if it proves out by — the following year — it’s currently scheduled by September of ’05. BAYH: So, Secretary Aldridge, your testimony is that with the 10 interceptors going in at the end of fiscal year ’04 and the radar that will be online at that time, we would have a 90 percent effectiveness in shooting down a NATO (ph) Dong II? ALDRIDGE: Well, it depends on — a lot depends on the continuation of the — of the test and the effective — this precise effectiveness numbers. But I would put — you know, as of today, the projected effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2003.

[2] Randy Barrett. “Lawmakers Question Effectiveness of Missile Defense System.” Space News, March 24, 2003, p. 6.

[3] Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Missile Defense Being Expanded, General Says,” The Washington Post, p. A10, July 22, 2005.

[4] Jason Sherman, “Experts Question U.S. System’s Ability To Intercept North Korean Missile,” Inside Missile Defense, June 21, 2006.

[5] Robert Burns, “Missile Defense Chief Confident in Ability To Hit Missile,” The Associated Press State and Local Wire, June 23, 2006.

[6] Pentagon Briefing, September 1, 2006.

[7] “Missile Defense Program Overview For The Washington Roundtable On Science And Public Policy,” MDA Briefing Slides, Januaary 29, 2007.

[8] “DoD News Briefing with Gen. Renuart and Lt. Gen. Obering from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.”, October 2, 2007.

[9] “Obama To Be Told U.S. Missile Defense Capable, General Says,” CNN.com, November 2, 2008.

[10] Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2009.

[11] “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”

“I was just in Fort Greely last week, and its an immensly capable system.” And one of the things that I think is important to remember is, it is still a developmental system. It has real capabilities, and I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.”

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 9, 2009.

[12] SEN Bayh: I’ve bumped up against my time limits here, but there was one final question. You’re briefing the President of the United States. He asks you based on — you know, he’s got to take into consideration what you’re doing in terms of facing these threats. He asks you if there is a rogue launch, what are the percentages that we’re going to be able to hit it and bring it down, what would you tell him?

GEN. O’Reilly: Ninety percent plus.

SEN. Bayh: Ninety percent plus confidence that we could — if there’s a rogue launch from North Korea, let’s say, we could intercept that target and bring it down?

Gen. O’Reilly: Yes. Sir.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009.

[13] Viola Gienger, “Gates: Take Defense Steps,” The Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 2009.

[14] Gen O’ Reilly: ‘Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea. The testing we have done to date, we have a lot of testing still to do against all our capability in all scenarios, but in the scenarios out of North Korea, we have intercepted three times out of Fort Greely, Alaska. The missiles, we actually test them out of Vandenberg, but they’re up at Fort Greely. And then for Hawaii, we have multiple systems (inaudible). A theater high-altitude-area defense system, its an Army mobile system, and then we have the Navy Aegis system. And we also have the…”   Margaret Brennan, “US Missile Defense Director Patrick O’Reilly on Bloomberg TV,” Bloomberg TV, July 28, 2009.

[15] “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), April 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4612.   Morrell is the Pentagon Press Secretary.

[16] Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, December 1, 2010.

[17] “Now what does that mean? The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures. And against this threat, we have the current posture of 30 GBIs and the expected enhancements to come in the defense of the homeland with the future deployment in 2020 time frame of SM-3 2B.” Opening statement of Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2011.

[18] Bradley Clapper, “U.S. Hesitant in Condemning North Korean Launch,” The Associated Press, December 13, 2012.

[19]The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” March 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-372013

[20] SEN. MCCAIN: Do you believe that we have the ability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch a missile, as is widely reported they would do in coming days.

ADM. LOCKLEAR: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the Homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.

SEN. MCCAIN: Do we have the capability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch within the next several days?

ADM. LOCKLEAR: We do.

[21] Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

[22] Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

[23] Jason Sherman, “Top Army General Still Confident ib=n GMD System Despite Intercept Test Failure,” Inside Defense SITREP, July 10, 2013.

[24] U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense News Briefing with George Little,” News Transcript, July 9, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5269.

[25] Amy Guckeen Tolson, “MDA Director Gives Update on Missile Defense,” www.theredstonerocket.com, August 21, 2013.

[26] Lieutenant General David L. Mann, prepared statement, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2014.

[27] Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2014.

[28] Admiral Bill Gortney, prepared statement for FY 2016 Missile Defense Hearing, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2015.

[29] Lieutenant General David L. Mann, prepared statement, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2015.

[30] Donna Miles, “Missile Defenders Trained, Ready for Deployment, General Says,” American Forces Press Service, April 5, 2013.

[31] “US to Test Anti-ICBM System in 2015 – Missile Defense Agency,” RIA Novosti, December 15, 2014.

[32] “U.S. missile Defense system capable of defending against North Korean missile attack, says official,” Postmedia Breaking News, December 16, 2014.

On Friday (June 26) it was reported that MDA had aborted an intercept test of the Aegis Ashore system following a failure of the target missile.  Although not stated by MDA, the aborted test was apparently the one designated FTO-02 Event 1 (FTO-02 E1). According to the March 2015 prepared statement by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J. Michael Gilmore, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, FTO-02 E1 was to “…provide critical data needed for my assessment of Aegis Ashore’s capability to defend Europe as part of the President’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

FTO-02 E1 Mission Patch. Available at http://missile.bigcartel.com/product/fto-02-e1-patch, but it’s sold out.

Background on Aegis Ashore Testing

Under President Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach, Aegis Ashore sites were to become operational in Romania in 2015 and in Poland In 2018. The initial plan (2010) was that these two European deployments would be supported by a series of seven Aegis Ashore flight tests, including five intercept tests, conducted at the Aegis Ashore Test facility in Kauai Hawaii. According to that plan, shown schematically in the GAO figure below, all of these tests would have been completed by the end of 2015, paving the way for the activation of the Romanian Aegis Ashore site that same year.

Source: Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability” GAO-11-372, March 2011, p. 65.

As the GAO figure above shows, by the next year (2011) that plan had already been reduced to a total of only four test flights, only two of which were intercept tests. However, at least all of these tests would have been completed by 2014, a year before the planned operational capability of the Romanian Aegis Ashore site.

However, this plan was subsequently reduced to only three tests flights, only two of which would have been intercept tests.[1] Further, only one of these two intercept tests would have been completed before the end of 2015. The first of these two intercept tests is intended to support the EPAA Phase 2 deployment in Romania and the second the EPAA Phase 3 deployment in Poland.[2]

The Aegis Ashore Tests

The first of these three Aegis Ashore flight tests was AA CTV-01, conducted on May 20 (local time) 2014. This non-intercept test involved the first launch of an SM-3 interceptor from an Aegis Ashore system. The test was described by MDA as successful, although it was subsequently revealed that “there was an issue with how the system steered the interceptor, that potentially resulted from differences between the sea-based and ashore versions of the system.”[3]

The second of these tests, now named FTO-02 E1, is apparently the test that was aborted yesterday. This test was intended to demonstrate an intercept by an SM-3 Block IB interceptor of an intermediate-range ballistic missile in support of the planned 2015 Aegis Ashore operational capability in Romania. A failure of the intermediate-range missile target apparently occurred before the interceptor could be launched.

[The FTO-02 E1 designation of the test indicates that this test was originally planned to be part of Flight Test Operational-02, which was to be an integrated operational test involving multiple types of missile defenses. As the figure below shows, the FTO-02 originally (as of 2011) included intercepts by Patriot, THAAD, Aegis (ship), Aegis Ashore, and the Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system in a test to be conducted in the third quarter of 2015. Several of the individual tests, including yesterday’s Aegis Ashore test, have apparently since been stripped out of the main event to be conducted separately. For example, the GMD test originally planned for FTO-02 is now FTG-11, a salvo test scheduled for 2017.]

MDA planned testing as of 2011, showing planned FT0-02 test in 4^th quarter of FY 2015. It also shows earlier planned Aegis Ashore tests that never took place. Image source: August 2011 briefing by MDA Director LTG Patrick O’Reilly.

Will the Test Delay Affect the Planned 2015 Operational Capability of the Romanian Aegis Ashore Site?

As noted above, the aborted test was intended to support the EPAA Phase II Aegis Ashore deployment at Deveselu, Romania, which was planned to be operational by the end of 2015. It seems likely that the test will be repeated, and if a suitable target is available, that this could be completed before the end of 2015. If this test was successful, it would allow the MDA to continue to maintain the illusion that it is sticking to a “fly before you buy” policy. As noted in a previous post, as with the GMD system, this process is actually at best a “fly before you declare operational” approach, since the Romania site will be fully paid for and nearly complete before a successful intercept test can occur.

If the test cannot be repeated by the end of 2015 (or if the repeat test fails) will the Romanian site still be declared operational during 2015?   The MDA deployed the GMD system years before a successful intercept of an operational interceptor, so there is a certainly a precedent for doing so. But doing so would certainly seem to contradict the MDA’s recent stated emphasis on sticking to a “fly before you buy” policy.

——————————————————-

[1] Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve Reporting on System Capabilities, GAO-15-345, May 2015, p.44.

[2] GAO-15-345, p. 43.

[3] GAO-15-345, p. 43.

The U.S. Army has announced plans to make the deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Guam permanent. This would be the first permanent deployment of a THAAD battery outside the continental United States.  The Army has released a fact sheet and draft environmental assessment about the proposed permanent basing and has already held two public meetings in Guam about it.

The THAAD battery was first deployed to Guam on an “expeditionary” basis in April 2013, following North Korean threats to the Island.  The Google Earth image below shows the initial deployment of the THAAD battery’s TPY-2 radar and other equipment. (A THAAD battery consists of a TPY-2 X-band radar and associated equipment, a command and communications unit, and a number of truck-mounted launchers (typically as many as six) each of which can carry eight THAAD interceptors.)

The picture above, from February 2014, shows the original (“expeditionary”) deployment of the THAAD TPY-2 radar on Guam.  The radar equipment is at the top of the image, just left of center.  The antenna unit is the thinner object at the top.  Immediately behind it is the electronic equipment unit.  Perpendicular to and to the right of the electronic equipment unit is the cooling unit.  Perpendicular to and to the right of the cooling units are two electrical power units.  One or more of the three objects behind the power units may be additional THAAD equipment (truck-mounted missile launchers or the command and communications unit). Google Earth image, February 4, 2014.

The picture below, taken about six months later, shows that the entire radar unit has been moved about 200 meters south, onto a newly built concrete pad at the bottom of the picture.  You can still see the “footprints” of the old site at the top of the picture.  Under the newly announced plans, this will be the permanent location of the radar.

Google Earth image, August 3, 2014. The coordinates are 13.624 degrees north, 144.867 degrees east.

As shown in the slide below from an April 2015 briefing by MDA Deputy Director Brigadier General Kenneth Todorov, the U.S plans to have seven operational THAAD batteries by 2019, with three of these batteries forward deployed under regional combat commanders. Three batteries would be in the U.S. (likely at Fort Bliss, Texas) as a rotation/sustainment force, with the seventh battery available as “global response force.”

If, as now seems likely, the United States deploys a THAAD battery in South Korea, this would leave one battery available for permanent forward deployment elsewhere in the world.

In a comment to my post of July 16 about the THAAD deployment in Guam being made permanent, a question was raised about why THAAD was proposed for South Korea and Aegis Ashore for Romania and Poland (and why not vice versa).

There are two main technical issues that almost certainly drove the decision of which system went where:

(1) Europe can be almost completely covered by two Aegis Ashore sites but achieving similar coverage with THAAD would require a prohibitive number of THAAD batteries.  On the other hand, S. Korea is small enough to be covered by one or two THAAD batteries.

A single Aegis Ashore site (with the Block IIA interceptor) can cover a much larger geographical area than a single THAAD deployment.  The Block IIA interceptor is scheduled to begin deployment in 2018.  This larger coverage area occurs because the Aegis Block II interceptor has a much higher burnout speed (likely about 4.5 km/s) than a THAAD interceptor (likely about 2.6-2.8 km/s) and thus can reach out to make intercepts at much greater ranges.

This is illustrated in two 2007 Missile Defense Agency Briefing slides.  The yellow “footprints” in Figure 1 below shows the area that could be covered by three THAAD batteries in eastern Turkey against Iranian ballistic missiles.  For THAAD, this situation — in which the attacking missiles are launched from a country bordering the country targeted – is closely analogous to the North Korea-South Korea situation.  However, the three THAAD batteries together cover only a small fraction of Turkey.

Figure 1.  Coverage of Europe against Iranian ballistic missile by THAAD, Aegis (Block IB), and two-stage GBI interceptors.  Slides from MDA Executive Director Patricia Sanders, “Missile Defense Program Overview For The 4^th International Conference On Missile Defense,” June 26, 2007.  Available at: https://mostlymissiledefense.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/bmd-overview-sanders-june2007.pdf

What Figure 1 makes clear is that attempting to cover all of Europe using THAAD would require a prohibitive number of THAAD batteries, far more than the U.S. plans to buy.[1]  Current U.S. plans are to buy seven batteries, although there is a stated requirement for nine batteries.

On the other hand, the green shaded area in Figure 1 shows the footprints for Aegis Block IB interceptors deployed on four ships in the Mediterranean Sea (including the Adriatic Sea) and Black Sea.[2]  This slide, which assumes the launch of the interceptors is supported by external radars such TPY-2 X-band radars, shows that four ships can cover a significant fraction of Europe.

The much faster Aegis Block IIA interceptors scheduled to begin deployment in 2018, would allow all of Europe (except eastern Turkey, for reasons discussed below) to be defended from only two interceptor launch sites as shown in Figure 2 below.  Note that both Figures 1 and 2 predate the decision to deploy the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) system with its land-based Aegis Ashore sites.[3]  Figure 2 also assumes that the Aegis interceptors are supported by external radars.

Figure 2.  Slide from MDA Deputy Director Major General Patrick O’Reilly, “Missile Defense Program Update For The National Defense University “Road To Bucharest” Conference, February 20, 2008.  (link coming soon.)

Thus is it possible to attempt to defend almost all of Europe (the NATO portion of it, at least) from Iranian missiles using a few Aegis sites, but similar coverage cannot be achieved using any plausible number of THAAD batteries.  (The development of a faster, extended-range version of the THAAD interceptor could change this situation.  Such an extended-range version of the THAAD interceptor is under consideration as part of a THAAD follow-on concept development and risk reduction program that MDA initiated in FY 2016.)

On the other hand, South Korea is small enough that covering it with THAAD is feasible.

Each of the three THAAD batteries’ footprints in Figure 1 are roughly 430 km long (east-west in this geometry) by 340 km wide.  This is larger than the dimensions of mainland (leaving out the island of Cheju) South Korea – which is about 370 km north-south and 270 km east-west.  Thus it should be possible to cover South Korea with no more than one or two THAAD batteries.  This is consistent with defended footprints, reportedly provided by THAAD manufacturer Lockheed-Martin, published in a South Korean newspaper last month.  These footprints are shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Coverage of South Korea by one (left figure) or two THAAD batteries.   The coverage is said to be for missiles with ranges between 300 and 1,000 km. Image Source: “Simulation Shows How THAAD Would Defend S. Korea, The Chosunilbo (English Edition), June 15, 2015. Available at: http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/03/25/2015032500896.html.

(The distinction between the green and blue coverage areas was not specified. One possibility is that green area is against missiles with ranges close to the lower limit of the 300-1,000 km attacking missile range band, while the larger blue area is for coverage against longer-range missiles for which a longer interceptor flyout time is available.)

(2) Due to the short distances involved, Aegis BMD cannot defend South Korea against short range ballistic missile attack. This problem arises because the Aegis SM-3 interceptor (all versions) can only intercept above the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric). While the precise lower altitude limit for the SM-3 interceptor is not publicly available, it is generally taken to be at about 100 km or higher.

Since no part of mainland South Korea is more than about 380 km from North Korea, most of South Korea can be targeted by 300 km Scud-class missiles and all of it can be targeted by 600 km extended-range Scuds. The Scud missiles never rise as high as the SM-3 interceptor’s lower altitude limit and thus cannot be engaged by Aegis BMD. An extended-range Scud might be high enough to be engagable over part of its trajectory, but the possibility of engaging such a missile can be reduced or eliminated by flying it on a lower-altitude depressed trajectory.

On the other hand, THAAD could attempt to intercept missiles with ranges as short as a Scud, since it is able to conduct intercepts in the upper layers of the atmospheres, as well as above it. The lower altitude limit of THAAD is also not publicly available, but is generally taken to be about 40 km, well below much of the trajectory of a Scud.

This capability to intercept at lower altitudes is the main technical reason that THAAD is more appropriate than Aegis BMD for defending South Korea against North Korean ballistic missiles. This is the same reason why Figure 1 includes THAAD batteries covering eastern Turkey, since eastern Turkey could be targeted by shorter-range Iranian missiles that Aegis SM-3 interceptors cannot operate low enough to engage.

GUAM

The decision to base THAAD on Guam, however, was not determined by these two technical issues. From a technical perspective, Guam could have been covered by either a THAAD battery or an Aegis Ashore facility. Thus other issues such as cost and availability likely determined this decision. In particular, the original deployment to Guam in 2013 was made in response to North Korean threats and subsequent questions about whether or not the GMD national missile defense system could cover Guam (It can’t). It was possible to deploy a THAAD battery to Guam within days, since a THAAD battery’s equipment is air-transportable and can be operational with four hours of arrival. Building an Aegis Ashore facility there would likely have taken a year or more, particularly if this was to be done without disrupting the schedule of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. An Aegis BMD-equipped ship could have been deployed there much more quickly than an Aegis Ashore, but the cost (both financial and in terms of the limited numbers of Aegis BMD ships) of maintaining an Aegis ship permanently off Guam would have been much greater than that of maintaining a THAAD battery there.

—————————————————————

[1] THAAD batteries deployed further from Iran could attempt to defend somewhat larger areas, particularly if supported by external radars, but such larger areas would not change the conclusion that the required number of batteries would much greater than the total the U.S plans to procure.

[2] The blue-shaded area shows the coverage of the now-cancelled plan to deploy two-stage versions of the U.S. national missile defense Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland.

[3] Although Figure 2 shows northern Scandinavia uncovered, this area would be covered by the planned Aegis Ashore site in Poland.

–The PAVE PAWS radars in AK and MA are not yet part of the GMD system.

–Because of its location and orientation, Cobra Dane has never participated in a GMD intercept test.

–The BMEWS radars in Greenland and Britain are unable to observe GMD intercept tests.

Y = Transmitted data in real time to system.

F = Same as Y, but sensor experienced a failure.

O = Observed some part of test off-line. In the case of the Beale PAVE PAWS, participation may be limited to only observing part of the interceptor flyout.

N = Not used to observe test.

This post updates my post of June 3, 2013 by adding FTG-07 and FTG-06b.  The table shows that MDA has still not conducted a GMD intercept test in which the target was not illuminated by the Sun.

Location Key:  VN = Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

KD = Kodiak, Alaska

KW = Kwajalein Atoll.

All times are local (either standard or daylight savings, whichever is in effect).

Kodiak is four hours behind east coast time.

Kwajalein does not use daylight saving time and is 17 hours ahead of EST and 16 ahead of EDT.

The table shows the launch locations and times (extracted from MDA press releases and news reports) for the seventeen intercept tests of both prototype and operationally-configured GMD ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs).    Data for intercepts claimed as successful are in black and data in red is for failed intercept attempts.  As the table shows, the latest interceptor launch time for a successful intercept is 3:19 pm local time (IFT-7).  Taking into account the relative time and location of the target and interceptor launches, it is clear that all the successful intercept attempts took place with the target directly illuminated by the Sun.

There is one intercept attempt that clearly took place at night (IFT-10), in which the interceptor was launched at about 8:45 pm local time and in a direction generally heading away from the Sun.  However, the intercept attempt failed when the kill vehicle failed to separate from the final booster stage.

Two other intercept attempts were conducted in which the interceptor launch would have occurred shortly before local sunset, IFT-13c and IFT-14.  However, in both these cases, the interceptor failed to launch.  Without knowing where the intercepts were planned to take place (and I haven’t tried to find out),one cannot be certain if the targets would have been sunlit, but give the targets’ launch locations (Kodiak) and typical intercept altitudes (250 km) in earlier tests, it seem likely they would have been.

For another project, I was interested in how many SM-3 Block IIA interceptors and ships capable of launching them the United States would have in the future.  This post is the result of attempting to estimate how many Aegis BMD ships the United States would have by about 2040.  In the next post, I’ll look at the numbers of interceptors.

How Many Aegis BMD Ships Today?

The U.S. Navy currently has 22 Aegis cruisers and 62 Aegis destroyers.  Five of the cruisers (CGs 61, 67, 70, 72 and 73) have a BMD capability.  Of the destroyers, all of the Flight I and Flight II ships (28 ships, DDG 51 through DDG 78) have a BMD capability.  None of the 34 Flight IIA destroyers (though DDG 112) have yet been given a BMD capability.  Thus the United States currently has 33 BMD capable ships.  These numbers are reflected in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Planned (the chart was made in 2013) deployments of BMD capable ships as of 2015. Chart from:  https://www.navalengineers.org/ProceedingsDocs/ASNEDay2014/Day1/AEGIS_CS2.pdf.

Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced BMD Capability Ships

Of the 33 current BMD capable ships, only a few have what the Navy refers to as the “advanced” Aegis BMD capability – including the capability to perform both anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile missions simultaneously.  Ships with this advanced capability operate with an Aegis BMD 5.0 or higher system and with a version of the Baseline 9 computer system.  Currently only about 3 destroyers out of the 33 BMD capable ships are equipped with the 5.0 (or 5.0 CU) Aegis BMD system and Baseline 9, however, this number will soon begin to rise rapidly.  Ships without this advanced capability can be configured to perform either the anti-air or the anti-ballistic missile mission, but not both simultaneously.  These ships include both cruisers and destroyers with the basic (3.6.x) and Intermediate (4.x) BMD capabilities.

Requirements and Requests

According to the Navy, its requirement for ships with advanced BMD capability is 40: four for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) system, nine for forward deployment in Japan and 27 for carrier battlegroups.[1]  The Navy estimates that under its current plans, this requirement for 40 advanced capability BMD ships will not be met until 2026.  The number of Aegis BMD ships requested by the regional combatant commanders is even higher, having grown from 42 in FY 2014 to 77 in FY 2016.

MDA “Realigns” its Projected BMD Ships Numbers

In September, the U.S. Naval Institute reported the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had reduced its projected numbers of BMD capable ships so that its projections now matched those of the U.S. Navy through 2020.[2]  Although the MDA’s current figure of 33 BMD capable ships remained unchanged, it now projects that it will have 39 BMD capable ships by 2020, down from the previous figure of 48.  The new projection removes from the count newly BMD equipped destroyers whose crews did not have at least six months of required training and cruisers that would lose their BMD capability as a result of a modernization (see below).  The new MDA projections are shown as the red “X”s on Figure 2 below.

Growth in Number of Aegis BMD Ships

Figure 2.  Projection of the number of BMD capable ships out to 2040.  The blue circles show the total number of BMD capable ships.  The blue squares show the number of ships with the “advanced” BMD capability, able to perform air defense and ballistic missile defense simultaneously (ships with Aegis BMD 5.x and some version of the Baseline 9 computer system).  The red Xs show MDA’s current projections through 2020 and the red diamond shows the Navy’s projection that it will reach it requirement of 40 advanced capability ships by 2026.  The numbers are broken down in more detail in Table 1 at the end of this post.  Beyond 2040 the growth in the number of BMD ships flattens out as Block IIA retirements are almost matched by the deployment of new ships.

Figure 2 above shows my attempt to project the number of Aegis capable ships out to 2040.  There are several factors that determine how the number of both Aegis BMD capable ships and those with the advanced BMD capability will increase over the next twenty five years:

 (1) Upgrades to Aegis Flight I and Flight II destroyers.  As recently as a few years ago, the Navy planned to upgrade all 62 of its existing Aegis destroyers to the advanced BMD capability.  However, due to budget pressures in the last few years, these plans have been significantly scaled back.  In 2014, it was announced that only seven of the 28 Flight I and Flight II destroyers would be upgraded to the advanced capability.[3]  The first of these conversions was completed in 2014 and the seventh will be completed in 2018 (all years in this post are fiscal years).    The remaining 28 Flight 1 and 2 ships will only be upgraded to the intermediate capability (4.1.x).

A note on how I am counting dates for upgrades:  I am taking the date an upgrade is completed as the date the hardware installation was completed plus six months for training.  The date of hardware completion is taking from Figure 3 below.  For example, the first upgrade to the advanced capability (as signified by the orange band in the upper right quadrant and the green check mark) was to DDG-53, and was completed in September 2013.  Adding six months for training, I then count this ship as upgraded as of FY 2014.

Figure 3.  U.S. Navy FY 2016 fielding profile for Aegis destroyers showing recent and planned BMD upgrades.  Slide available at: http://i1.wp.com/news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Screen-Shot-2015-04-21-at-3.24.53-PM.png.

 (2) Upgrades to Flight IIA destroyers.  Until recently, the Navy planned to upgrade all of its 34 Flight IIA destroyers, none of which currently have a BMD capability, to the advanced BMD capability.  However, it was recently revealed that five of these ships (DDGs 83, 85, 89, 90 and 96) will not undergo this upgrade, and thus will be left without a BMD capability.[4]  It is possible that these ships will eventually get upgraded, however, for the purposes of this projection I assume they will not.  I assume that the 29 other Flight IIA ships will be upgraded to the advanced capability: the first 17 using the dates in Figure 3, and the other twelve at a rate of two per year thereafter.

(3) Retirement of destroyers.  Aegis Flight I and Flight II destroyers have a 35 year lifespan and the modernizations and upgrades they are receiving does not affect this lifespan.  Thus I assume that each of these ships is retired is retired 35 years after its commissioning.  For example, the first Aegis destroyer, DDG-51, was commissioned in 1991, and so I remove it from my count in 2027.  The last three Flight II ships were commissioned in 1999 and so are removed from my count in 2035.

The first Flight IIA destroyer was commissioned in 2000.  Since these ships have a 40 year life span, none are retired on the time scale of my projection.

(4) New destroyer production.  The last of the current Flight IIA Aegis destroyers (DDG-112) was procured in in 2005 and commissioned in 2012.  In 2010, procurement of ten additional Flight IIA destroyers began, and the first of these ships will enter service in 2016.  Also in 2016, procurement of Flight III ships, with the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), will begin.  Together, these new production destroyers will be delivered at rate of about two per year. [5]  All of these ships will be delivered with the advanced BMD capability installed.  Although the first of these new ships will be commissioned in FY 2016, allowing six additional months for training, I start adding them to the projection at the rate of two per year starting in FY 2017.

(5) Cruiser modernization.  Currently five of the 22 U.S. Aegis cruisers have either the basic or intermediate BMD capability; the others have no BMD capability.  The U.S. Navy has developed plans for a program to modernize and extend the life of the last 11 of its 22 Aegis cruisers. The first of these ships (CG-63, no BMD capability) entered the modernization program in September 2015, and will have its life extended from 35 to 44 years.[6]  To reduce costs, the four BMD capable Aegis cruisers scheduled for this modification program would lose their BMD capability.  However, Congress is currently blocking the Navy from removing the BMD capability from these ships and it is unclear how this situation will be resolved.  For the purposes of this projection, I am assuming the modernization program goes ahead with eliminating the BMD capability with two ships per year in order of their commissioning date starting in 2015.[7]  This results in the loss of one BMD capable ship each tear from 2017 to 2020.  The fifth BMD capable Aegis cruiser (CG-61) is not included in the modernization program and is removed from the projection after its 35 year life in 2025.

Conclusions

The projection shown in Figure 2 shows the total number of BMD capable ships reaching 77 in 2040, all of which have the advanced BMD capability (or some future more capable version).  This number is broken down in more detail in Table 1 below.  Beyond 2040, the number of BMD capable ships would level off or even decrease as the deployment of new BMD capable ships is approximately offset by retirements of Flight IIA destroyers.

It is possible this 2040 number could be even higher.  For example, if the Navy subsequently decides to upgrade the five Flight IIA destroyers that I excluded from the projection, the 2040 number would be 82.  However, it seems much more likely that the actual 2040 number will be lower than the projection in this post.  As discussed above, in just the last few years there have been several decisions based on financial considerations that have significantly reduced the rate at which ships will be given BMD capabilities and the advanced Aegis BMD capability in particular.  While the requests for Aegis BMD ships from the Combatant Commanders (currently 77) are likely to remain high, in many cases these requests could likely be met more cost efficiently by deploying additional Aegis Ashore facilities, particularly if these are equipped with SM-3 Block IIA or faster interceptors.  Thus the 2040 number projected here may not actually be achieved until well after 2040.

Table 1.  Projected number of BMD capable Aegis ships through 2040.  Ships with the advanced capability are shown in the last column.

[1] Number in this paragraph are from Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report 33745, November 10, 2015, pp. 14-15.  Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf.

[2] Sam LaGrone, “MDA Quietly Revises Projected Ballistic Missile Defense Ship Totals Down from FY 2016 Budget Request,” USNI News, September 2, 2015.  Available at: http://news.usni.org/2015/09/01/mda-quietly-revises-projected-ballistic-missile-defense-ship-totals-down-from-fy-2016-budget-request. The MDA projections only extend through 2020.

[3] Sam LaGrone, “Navy Altered Destroyer Upgrades Due to Budget Pressure, Demand for Ships,” USNI News, June 3, 2014.  Available at: http://news.usni.org/2014/06/03/navy-altered-destroyer-upgrade-plan-due-budget-pressure-demand-ships. In addition to the six ships shown in Figure 1 as being upgraded to Aegis BMD 5.0, DDG-61 Ramage will also be upgraded.

[4] Sam LaGrone, “Navy Again Reduces Scope of Destroyer Modernization, 5 Ships Won’t Receive Any Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrades,” USNI News, March 3, 2015.  Available at: http://news.usni.org/2015/03/03/navy-again-reduces-scope-of-destroyer-modernization-5-ships-wont-receive-any-ballistic-missile-defense-upgrades.

[5] See Table 3 of Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report RL 32665, November 4, 2015.  This table shows the U.S. Navy plans to procure two destroyers per year from FY 2016 through FY 2038.  Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf.

[6] Phil Ladouceur, “USS Cowpens Holds Cruiser Modification Induction, Change of Command,” September 25, 2015.  Available at: http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cg63/Pages/USS-Cowpens-Holds-Cruiser-Modernization-Induction-Change-of-Command.aspx#.Vm3bDI-cGM8.

[7] The program is limited to beginning the modernization of at most two ships per year.

In a previous post, I projected the number of Aegis BMD ships, and in particular the number of ships with the “advanced” BMD capability, though 2045. I did this primarily because I was interested in the question of how many SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, which have a potentially significant capability to intercept intercontinental-range missiles, are likely to be deployed.  In this post, I turn to the question of projecting how many Aegis SM-3 block IIA interceptors the United States might eventually deploy on its ships and at its Aegis Ashore sites.

(1) Projection based on past and planned procurements.

Figure 1 shows the number of SM-3 Block IA, Block IB and Block IIA missiles in inventory based on past procurements and planned future procurements.

Figure 1.  Number of SM-3 interceptors in inventory.  Diamonds are Block I/IAs, squares are Block IBs, and circles are Block IIAs.  Numbers do not include missiles expended in tests or retired because of reaching the end of their service lives.

The numbers in Figure 1 are based on Table 2 of Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program,” November 10, 2015, and the corresponding tables in earlier versions of this report dating back to 2011.[1]  Future deliveries of Block IB and Block IIA missiles beyond 2020 are based on FY 2016 MDA budget documents.[2]  Projections beyond 2020 assume an expenditure of one Block IB and one Block IIA per year in tests.  Block IA figures for 2009-2010 and Block IB figures for 2011-2013 assume the actual number of interceptors expended in tests in each of those years.

The numbers of Block IA interceptors (and earlier Block I interceptors) are shown by the diamond symbols in Table 1.[3]  The spike in the number in FY 2014 is due to an additional order of 23 Block IAs that was placed following delays in the Block IB program.  Beyond 2014, the number of Block IAs begins to decline as the missiles reach their service lifetimes of about ten years.  It is clear that by the early-to-mid 2020s all of the Block IAs will be out of service.

The blue squares in Figure 1 are for Block IB interceptors.   Current plans call for buying a total of 52 Block IBs per year for the next several years.   In September 2015, it was reported that the Department of Defense’s planned to buy a total of 396 Block IBs.[4]  Figure 1 shows that at the current rate of deliveries, this total number of Block IBs would be reached in 2023 (at that time, the total number of Block IBs delivered is greater than the number in inventory by about 20).

The red circles in Figure 1 show the projected numbers of Block IIA interceptors in inventory through 2023, the last year I could find any data for.  Since, as noted in the preceding paragraph, deliveries of the Block IB missiles could end after 2023, additional resources could become available for producing greater numbers of Block IIA interceptors.  We can project the number of Block IIA interceptors forward in time by making various assumptions.  (All the projections here assume that the Block IIA is not superseded by a more capable missile on time scale considered here.)

As a low estimate, assume that Block IIA deliveries remain at the same rate of 24 per year as currently planned for 2023.  This gives a total inventory of about 220 missiles in 2030, assuming a twelve year service life and one missile expended in tests per year.[5]  Assuming SM-3 Block IIAs continue in production beyond 2030, the Block IIA equilibrium inventory (in which new deployments are balanced by retirements) will reach a level of about 275 missiles by the mid 2030s.  This is shown by the red diamonds in Figure 2 below.

The low estimate above seems highly improbable, as the mid 2030s equilibrium number of Block IIAs is less than half of the number of total number of SM-3 missiles of all types that would be in inventory in 2030.  A more reasonable assumption is that total spending on SM-3 missile procurement of all types stays constant.   Assuming Block IB deliveries end in 2023, and that a Block IIA interceptors costs twice as much as Block IBs (and not attempting to account for inflation), and using 2022 as the baseline year for the total cost, then the Block IIA inventory would reach about 365 in 2030 with an equilibrium level of about 530 missiles in the mid 2030s.[6]  This is shown by the red circles in Figure 2.

A higher equilibrium figure of about 610 Block IIA interceptors, shown with red squares in Figure 2, is achieved if one instead assumes that beyond 2023 Block IIA interceptors are delivered at the same rate (52 per year) planned for Block IB Interceptors in the early 2020s.

Figure 2.  Projected numbers of SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (red symbols) under low, medium and high assumptions and number of Block IB interceptors assuming a total buy of 396 and a fifteen year service life.

Figure 2 also shows (with blue squares) the projected number of Block IB interceptors assuming a fifteen year service life with deliveries ending in 2023.[7]  The numbers of Block IIA interceptors would likely be lower if deliveries of Block IB missiles continue beyond 2023 (or if their service life is significantly greater than fifteen years).  Because of the lower cost of the IBs, it may be desirable to keep a mixed force of IBs and IIAs, however, as will be discussed in the next post in this series, there are strong reasons  why the Navy may choose to procure more IIAs over any additional IBs.

(2)  Projecting by Deployments

One data point that we have is that the United States plans to buy 182 Block IIA interceptors solely for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).[8]  These missiles, to be deployed at the Polish and Romanian Aegis Ashore sites (up to 24 each) and on the four U.S. Navy destroyers now based in Spain, would support the EPAA though 2040. With a Block IIA lifetime of twelve years, not all of these would be deployed simultaneously, with the total deployed at any one time likely between 96 and 144.

It seems likely that a similar or even larger number of Block IIA interceptors will eventually be forward deployed in Japan.  Currently eleven U.S.  Aegis Ships are forward deployed at Yokosuka, Japan, seven of which are BMD capable.[9]  In addition, it can be expected that Japan, which is co-producing the Block IIA, will deploy a substantial number of them on its eight planned Aegis BMD capable ships, although I do not include these in my count here.[10]

As noted in my previous post, the current Navy requirement (which will not be met until about 2026) is for 40 BMD “advanced” capability Aegis ships (capable of conducting air defense and ballistic missile defense simultaneously)  – four of which are for the EPAA and nine of which are for forward deployment in Japan.  Including the 21 Aegis Flight I and Flight II destroyers with a basic or intermediate BMD capability gives a total of 61 BMD capable ships in 2026. (No cruisers are included in this count be it is unclear/unlikely if any BMD capable cruisers will be in service in 2026)

If we then  make a seemingly very conservative assumption that the remaining 48 of the 61 BMD capable ships will eventually deploy as many Block IIAs as the thirteen  forward deployed BMD ships (plus the two Aegis Ashore sites), we get a total of 4*(96-144) =  384 – 576 deployed Block IIAs.

The point of this very rough projection by deployments is simply to show that medium and even the high projection in Figure 2 are more than plausible and that the United States is ultimately likely to deploy as many as 500 or even many more Block IIA interceptors.  If the lifetime of the Block IIA interceptors is extended beyond twelve years, these projected numbers could be much higher.  For example, if the Block IIA’s service life was extended from the presently planned twelve years to the twenty years intended for the now cancelled Block IIB missile, the medium equilibrium level in Figure 2 would increase from about 520 missiles to about 870.[11]  My next post in this series will consider some of the implications of deployments of such large numbers of strategic-capable interceptors.

[1] Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report 33745, November 10, 2015, pp. 14-15.  Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf.

[2] Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Defense Agency, Procurement, Vol 2b, February 2015, p. 2b-14.  Available at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/02_Procurement/MDA_PROCUREMENT_MasterJustificationBook_Missile_Defense_Agency_PB_2016_1.pdf.

[3] A totals of eleven Block I missiles were built.  Two were expended in intercept tests in 2005.  The others had reached the end their service lives by 2009, although two were expended in intercept tests in 2011 (one of which failed).

[4] Jason Sherman, “DOD Reinstates Plan To Buy Nearly 400 SM-3 Block IB Interceptors,” Inside Defense SITREP, September 10, 2015.

[5] Twelve year service life from: Justin Doubleday, “Pentagon Will Buy Extra Block IIA Interceptors for European Missile Shield, Inside Defense SITREP, August 4, 2015

[6] In 2022, deliveries are projected to be 52 Block IBs and 19 Block IIAs, so the constant cost assumption gives a total of 26 + 19 = 45 Block IIAs per year.  Assuming one missile expended in test per year and a twelve year service life, the equilibrium number is then 12 x 44 = 528.  Block IB interceptors cost about $10-11 million each, while Block IIA interceptors are usually described as costing $20-25 million each.

[7] I have not seen a published figure for the Block IB service life, but it is likely to be significantly longer than the roughly ten year life for the Block IB.  The projection does not include any Block IBs expended in testing beyond 2023.

[8] Doubleday, “Pentagon Will Buy Extra Block IIA Interceptors.”

[9] Ships at Yokusuka from “Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet” at: http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/PacificTheaterShips.aspx#.VqFISI-cGM8, plus the Barry which replaced the Lassen in early 2016.  The BMD capable ships are the Shiloh, Barry (which is an advanced BMD capability, Baseline 9 ship), Wilbur, McCain, Fitzgerald, Stethem and Benfold.

[10] Japan currently plans to have eight BMD capable ships and has also expressed interest in deploying one or more Aegis Ashore sites. (http://news.usni.org/2015/05/18/house-paves-the-way-for-japan-to-buy-aegis-ashore-adds-anti-air-warfare-to-european-sites.)

[11] Prior to the cancellation of the Block IIB, the United States intended to buy only 50 Block IIAs for the EPAA.  The increase to 182 Block IIAs after the cancellation suggests that prior the Block IIB cancellation, the plan was that relatively few Block IIAs would be built compared to the number of Block IIBs which would eventually replace them.  In this situation the relatively short service life of the Block IIA may not have been a serious limitation on the number of Block II missiles the Navy could deploy.  But unless a successor missile to the Block IIA is eventually built, a longer lifetime version of the IIA could be highly desirable.

One thing that was surprising (to me, at least) about Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Admiral James Syring’s January 19 2016 presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies was his description of the MDA’s planned two-stage version of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI).[1]

The MDA has long had plans to eventually incorporate a two-stage version of the three-stage GBI currently deployed in Alaska and California into its Ground Based Midcourse GMD) national missile defense system.

The idea of using a two-stage version of the GBI first came to public attention in 2006 when the George W. Bush Administration announced plans to deploy two-stage GBIs in Europe to provide an extra layer of defense of U.S. territory against Iranian ICBMs.  Although an agreement was reached in 2008 to deploy ten of the two-stage GBIs on Polish territory, in 2009 President Obama cancelled these plans in order to proceed with his European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).  However, the possibility of deploying two-stage GBIs – this time on U.S. territory — was retained was retained as part of the GMD “hedge” strategy.[2]

As part of the GMD hedge, a two stage GBI would increase the GMD system’s battle space by allowing later intercept attempts.  The EKV kill vehicle cannot separate from its booster rocket and begin homing in on its target until after the booster burns out, and a two-stage version of the GBI would burn out about seventy seconds earlier than the three-stage version of the GBI.

In June 2010, MDA conducted BVT-01, a non-intercept test of a two-stage version of the GBI (with a CE-I kill vehicle) and classified it as a success.  Although the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation subsequently stated that : “A malfunction of the kill vehicle, unrelated to problems associated with FTG-06 above, may have degraded the quality of data collected,” he also stated that: “Data from BVT-01 suggest that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) two-stage interceptor could prove a viable boost vehicle in addition to the currently deployed three-stage interceptor.”[3]

A two-stage version of the GBI could be deployed beginning in about 2020 as part of a new C3 booster configuration that would include an option for a two-stage version.  As of early 2015, plans called for a non-intercept test of the two-stage booster in the third quarter of FY 2018 with an intercept test following in the third quarter of FY 2019.[4]

So what was surprising about Admiral’s Syring description of the two-stage GBI?  Previous public analyses of the two-stage GBI (in the context of the proposed European Deployment) had assumed that it would be produced by physically removing the third, smallest stage of the GBI booster, so that only the first two stages remained.  This approach would be consistent with the fact that the two-stage GBI was to have exactly the same length as the three-stage GBI, since the three-stage missile shroud (nose cone) covered both the kill vehicle and the entire third stage so that removing the third stage while retaining the original shroud would not change the missile’s length.

However, Admiral Syring’s presentation made it clear that the two-stage GBI would in fact be a three-stage missile in which one of the stages simply would not be used.  According to my transcription of the video of part of his talk, Admiral Syring stated that the two-stage GBI is:

“…not a different design from a booster standpoint.  It’s going to be done through software and the warfighter will be able to choose between a two-stage and a three-stage in terms of does it – does it – fly the two-stage or does it – second stage – or does it just drop.”

Thus all of the GBIs deployed in silos will actually have three stages, but at least some of the future ones will be configured so that the GMD command system has an option not to ignite one of the stages, instead simply dropping it off.   Moreover, the quote also suggests that the unused stage might be the second rather than the third stage (although that might be reading too much into a verbal quote).

Further, one of Admiral Syring’s slides (Figure 1 below) shows that a planned 2020 GMD intercept test will use a “2/3 Stage Selectable GBI.”

Figure 1. Screen capture from the CSIS video of Admiral Syring’s presentation.  (The CSPAN video has the full caption under each image, but the images are lower resolution.)

This approach to achieving a two-stage booster by simply not firing one stage of a three-stage booster results in an interceptor burnout speed that is significantly lower than that would be obtained if the unused booster stage was physically removed from the interceptor before it was deployed because the unused stage is now simply dead weight.  However, in the late-intercept, battle space-extending role the two-stage GBI is intended for, the burnout speed is less important than the boost time.    Thus this seeming wasteful (of a missile stage) approach might be attractive if it reduced costs by minimizing the design and testing work relative to producing a true two-stage interceptor, and it would also avoid having to decide how to allocate future deployments of GBI’s between the two and three-stage versions.

One issue this approach to producing a two-stage interceptor capability might resolve is whether or not the proposed but now cancelled two-stage interceptors in Poland would have been physically capable of intercepting any Russian ICBMs.  Outside analysts consistently assumed that two-stage GBIs would be produced by removing the third stages, and found that the resulting missiles would fast enough to catch up with at least some Russian ICBMs fired at U.S. territory.[5]   On the other hand, the MDA insisted, as shown in Figure 2 below, that the two-stage interceptors were too slow to even come close to catching up with any Russian ICBMs.

Figure 2.  MDA slide from 2007 showing that the proposed two-stage GBI interceptors in Poland cannot catch up with Russian ICBMs fired at the U.S. East Coast.[6]

Going back through the debate on this issue, I can’t find any statement from MDA regarding how the two-stage booster was to be configured.  If, however, the two-stage booster for the proposed European Defense was to have been produced in the same way as those proposed for deployment beginning in 2020, that is by simply not igniting one of stages of a three stage GBI, than the resulting missile would be much slower than the outside analysts calculated, possibly explaining the discrepancy between their and MDA’s results.  Slide 3 below, from 2008, may hint at this possibility, saying that the outside analysts had “optimistic assumptions in mass properties and propulsion” and that their models’ results “exceeds the thermal and structural limitations of the GBI.”  (Removing the third stage would lead to significantly higher accelerations, particularly during the second-stage burn.)  If this was the case, one can see why MDA may not have wanted to clarify the issue, since the Russians would almost certainly be even unhappier with the proposed deployment in Poland if it turned out the two-stage interceptors actually had three stages.

Figure 3: MDA slide with arguments about why the two-stage GBI is Poland could not intercept Russian ICBMs.[7]

———————————————————————-

[1] Vice Admiral James D. Syring, “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,” Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 19, 2016.  Video of the presentation are available at http://csis.org/event/ballistic-missile-defense-system-update-0 and http://www.c-span.org/video/?403405-1/discussion-ballistic-missile-defense. (The two videos differ somewhat in their coverage of the Admiral’s slides.)

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, February 2010, p. 17.  Available at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/BMDR/BMDR_as_of_26JAN10_0630_for_web.pdf.

[3] Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD” in 2010 Annual Report, pp. 233-234.  Available at: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2010/pdf/bmds/2010gmd.pdf.

[4] Scott Maucione, “MDA Puts $51 Million Into Budget To Develop Two-Stage GBI Booster,” Inside Missile Defense, March 18, 2015.

[5] Theodore A. Postol, “Why US National Intelligence Estimates Predict that the European Missile Defense System Will Fail: Technological Issues Relevant to Policy,” Slides from lecture to German Physical Society, Berlin, February 29, 2008.  Available at: http://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files_legacy_files/20080430_Postol.pdf;  U.S. Congressional Budget Office. “Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe,” February 2009.  Available at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/02-27-missiledefense.pdf.  The CBO study was based only on publicly available information.  While Figure 3-11 of the CBO report appears to show that the two-stage GBIs in Poland cannot cover any U.S. territory from Russian ICBMs, that Figure assumes a 3.0 km/s minimum collision speed difference at the intercept.  As shown in Figure 3-12, if this requirement is instead set at 1 km/s (2,200 mph), then the entire eastern half of the United States can be covered.

[6] Slide from MDA Executive Director Patricia Sanders, “Missile Defense Program Overview For The 4^th International Conference on Missile Defense,” June 26, 2007.  Available at: https://mostlymissiledefense.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/bmd-overview-sanders-june2007.pdf.

[7] Slide from: MDA Director Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, “Ballistic Missile Defense Program Overview For The National Defense Industrial Association,” May 8, 2008. Available at:  https://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/MissileDefense/Documents/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/Missile_Defense/NDIA.pdf.

This is an updated list (previous version was June 16, 2015) of claims by U.S. government officials about the effectiveness of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system.  It adds four additional claims (#33, #34, #35 and #36).

(1) September 1, 2000: “… I simply cannot conclude, with the information I have today, that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time.”  President Bill Clinton, at Georgetown University, September 1, 2000.

(2) March 18, 2003:  “Effectiveness is in the 90% range.”[1]   Edward Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

(3) March 23, 2003: “There are a lot of things that go into [determining] effectiveness.  Everybody can be right.” [2] MDA Director Ronald Kadish, in response to a question about Aldridge’s statement.

(4) July 21, 2005: “We have a better than zero chance of intercepting, I believe, an inbound warhead.”  That confidence will improve with time.”  MDA Director Lt. General Henry Obering.[3]

(5) March 14, 2006: “When the president declares limited defensive operational capability, we are prepared as the shooter, if you will, to execute the mission to defend our country.  And I’m very confident in the efficacy of that system.”[4]  Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command.

(6) June 2006: “(From) what I have seen and what I know about the system and its capabilities I am very confident.”[5]  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(7) July 6, 2006: “If it headed to the United States, we’ve got a missile defense system that will defend our country.” President George W. Bush in response to a question on Larry King Live about North Korea’s unsuccessful test of a long-range ballistic missile the day before.

(8) September 1, 2006: “I would say that if we had to use the system in an operational mode, it would be very capable.”[6] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(9) January 29, 2007: “We are Confident The Ballistic Missile Defense System Would Have Operated As Designed Had The Taepo Dong-2 Threatened The U.S.,” MDA Deputy Director Brigadier General Patrick O’Reilly.[7]

(10) October 2, 2007: “ – does the system work? The answer to that is yes. Is it going to work against more complex threats in the future?  We believe it will.”  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.[8]

(11) November 2, 2008: “I have very high confidence we could defend the United States against that threat.”[9] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, about one or two missiles launched from North Korea.

(12) March 27, 2009: “And Senator, I’ll tell you, if we felt the North Koreans were going to shoot a ballistic missile at us today, I am comfortable that we would have an effective system able to meet that threat.”[10]  General Victor Renaurt, Commander U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command.

(13) June 9, 2009: “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”[11] And “I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.”  Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

(14) June 16, 2009: Confidence that a North Korean missile could be shot down is: “ninety percent plus.”[12]  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(15) June 18, 2009 (approximately):  “I’d believe we have a reasonable chance” of intercepting a North Korean missile.  Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Charles McQueary, in an interview on his last day in the job.[13]

(16) July 28, 2009: “Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea.”[14]  MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(17) April 21, 2010: “It is the belief of the — of the leaders of this department that we have the capability to defend the United States against the — against an ICBM threat from a rogue nation such as Iran or North Korea.  We are confident in the system we have at this point.”[15]  Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary.

(18) December 1, 2010: “…the probability will be well in the high 90s today of the GMD system being able to intercept that today.” MDA Director Patrick O’Reilly in response to a question from Representative Trent Franks about countering “one ICBM coming from Tehran to New York.”[16]

(19) April 13, 2011: “The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures.”[17]  Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

(20) December 12, 2012: “I’m very confident that American defense capabilities are able, no problem, to block a rocket like this one.”  U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in response to a question from CNN on the capability of U.S missile defenses, December 12, 2012.[18]

(21) March 7, 2013: “I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack.  And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea.  But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat.”  White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, in response to a question at White House Daily Press Briefing, March 7, 2013.[19]

(22) March 15, 2013: “We have confidence in our system.  And we certainly will not go forward with the additional 14 interceptors until we are sure that we have the complete confidence that we will need.  But the American people should be assured that our interceptors are effective.”  Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in response to a question at a Pentagon press conference, March 15, 2013.

(23) April 9, 2013: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.  Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2013 in response to a question about intercepting North Korean missiles.[20]

(24) May 9, 2013: “We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall about the capability of “our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”[21]

(25) May 9, 2013: “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional ’14 provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.” Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall (and referring to the recently announced plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska).[22]

(26) July 2013: “I stand by my response in the testimony I provided on May 9.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, when asked about the effectiveness of the GMD System shortly after failure of FTG-07 on July 5, 2013.[23]

(27) July 10, 2013: “But we maintain that we have a robust missile defense system in place to defend the United States and our allies from a range of threats.”   “We have a range of assets that can support American missile defense, and we are confident that we can defend this country from the missile threat.” Pentagon Press Secretary George Little , July 9 2013 (four days after the failed FTG-07 intercept test of the GMD system).[24]

(28) Sometime before August 21, 2013:  “Of course you’re protected. Yes, you’re protected.  We’re proud to protect you.”  MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring, in response to the question “Am I protected where I live?” asked by a person sitting next to him on an airplane.[25]

(29) March 25, 2014: Regarding the GMD system: “We have confidence in the current capability.  Do we need to do more?  Do we need to continue to do the necessary testing?  Yes. But we have confidence in the operational employment, the rules of engagement that we would use that would address maybe some reliability or some uncertainty associated with the system.” Lieutenant General David L. Mann, Commanding General U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense.[26]

(30) March 25, 2014: “As a policy official who is often briefed by those who develop and operate the system, I am confident that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system can defend the United States against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack.”  Elaine M. Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.[27]

(31) March 19, 2015: Regarding the GMD system: “We have high confidence in the ability of this system to defeat an ICBM strike against the United States from an enemy with limited ICBM capabilities.”  Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander North American Aerospace Command and U.S. Northern Command.[28]

(32) March 25, 2015: Regarding the GMD system: “As the Secretary of Defense and various Combatant Commanders have previously testified, the Warfighter remains confident in our ability to protect the Nation against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack, even in the face of the changing fiscal environment.” Lieutenant General David L. Mann, Commanding General U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense.[29]

(33) October 7, 2015: Speaking about the North Korean ICBM threat to the U.S. homeland: “We’re ready for him, and we’re ready 24 hours a day if he should be dumb enough to shoot something at us.” Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, at an Atlantic Council event, October 7, 2015.[30]

(34) April 13, 2016: In response to a question about missile defense coverage of Hawaii: “The people of Hawaii are protected today from the North Korean threat.” MDA Director Vice Admiral James D. Syring.[31]

(35) April 13, 2016: “The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential ICBM attacks from States like North Korea and Iran if it was to develop an ICBM in the future.” Brian P. McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.[32]

(36) April 14, 2016: In response to a question about the GMD system’s coverage of Hawaii: “We’re prepared to engage and protect Hawaii, Alaska and the rest of the states with the existing system and have high confidence in its success.” Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command.[33]

Bonus Quote on Defending Guam from a North Korean Missile Attack:

 April 5, 2013: THAAD together with other systems such as Aegis and Patriot could take out a missile launched by North Korea at Guam “fairly quickly.” “We are very confident of that.”  Major General Dana J. H. Pittard (Commander of Fort Bliss, home base for THAAD).[34]

———————————————–

[1] BAYH: Let me withdraw the question and move on. I think you see where I was heading. Let me ask you Mr. — Secretary Aldridge, about the effectiveness of the system that’s to be deployed in 2004 and 2005 in protecting against this developing North Korean threat — the 10 land-based missiles proposed for the end of fiscal year 2004 — how effective would they be against the North Korean missile if it were, in fact, launched against our country? ALDRIDGE: Well, we think that it would be effective. Probably shouldn’t go into a lot of details of… BAYH: Well, how do you define effective — 90 percent success rate — 75 — 50? ALDRIDGE: Yes, sir — you would — and you — the way you could achieve these rates is you don’t have to fire just one interceptor per target, you could fire two, as we do in PAC-3. BAYH: Of course. ALDRIDGE: And so the effectiveness is in the 90 percent range. Of course, we want the effectiveness to be high enough that we never have to use these things. I mean, that’s the ultimate effectiveness is that they’re never used. BAYH: There are — there are — there are — there are 10 going online in 2004 — 10 in 2005. The radar is not going to be available — when will that go into place — 2006? ALDRIDGE: Well, General Kadish has probably got the specific dates for all of those. Let him… KADISH: We’ll have radars online to handle the early warning and usefulness of the system in ’04, when we put the missiles on alert if everything works out all right. We’ll add the sea-based X-band (ph) if it proves out by — the following year — it’s currently scheduled by September of ’05. BAYH: So, Secretary Aldridge, your testimony is that with the 10 interceptors going in at the end of fiscal year ’04 and the radar that will be online at that time, we would have a 90 percent effectiveness in shooting down a NATO (ph) Dong II? ALDRIDGE: Well, it depends on — a lot depends on the continuation of the — of the test and the effective — this precise effectiveness numbers. But I would put — you know, as of today, the projected effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2003.

[2] Randy Barrett. “Lawmakers Question Effectiveness of Missile Defense System.” Space News, March 24, 2003, p. 6.

[3] Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Missile Defense Being Expanded, General Says,” The Washington Post, p. A10, July 22, 2005.

[4] Jason Sherman, “Experts Question U.S. System’s Ability To Intercept North Korean Missile,” Inside Missile Defense, June 21, 2006.

[5] Robert Burns, “Missile Defense Chief Confident in Ability To Hit Missile,” The Associated Press State and Local Wire, June 23, 2006.

[6] Pentagon Briefing, September 1, 2006.

[7] “Missile Defense Program Overview For The Washington Roundtable On Science And Public Policy,” MDA Briefing Slides, Januaary 29, 2007.

[8] “DoD News Briefing with Gen. Renuart and Lt. Gen. Obering from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.”, October 2, 2007.

[9] “Obama To Be Told U.S. Missile Defense Capable, General Says,” CNN.com, November 2, 2008.

[10] Senate Armed Services Committee,  March 17, 2009.

[11] “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”

“I was just in Fort Greely last week, and its an immensly capable system.”  And one of the things that I think is important to remember is, it is still a developmental system.  It has real capabilities, and I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.”

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 9, 2009.

[12] SEN Bayh: I’ve bumped up against my time limits here, but there was one final question.  You’re briefing the President of the United States.  He asks you based on — you know,  he’s got to take into consideration what you’re doing in terms of facing these threats.  He asks you if there is a rogue launch, what are the percentages that we’re going to be able to hit it and bring it down, what would you tell him?

GEN. O’Reilly: Ninety percent plus.

SEN. Bayh: Ninety percent plus confidence that we could  — if there’s a rogue launch from North Korea, let’s say, we could intercept that target and bring it down?

Gen. O’Reilly: Yes. Sir.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009.

[13] Viola Gienger, “Gates: Take Defense Steps,” The Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 2009.

[14] Gen O’ Reilly: ‘Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea.  The testing we have done to date, we have a lot of testing still to do against all our capability in all scenarios, but in the scenarios out of North Korea, we have intercepted three times out of Fort Greely, Alaska.  The missiles, we actually test them out of Vandenberg, but they’re up at Fort Greely. And then for Hawaii, we have multiple systems (inaudible).  A theater high-altitude-area defense system, its an Army mobile system, and then we have the Navy Aegis system.  And we also have the…”    Margaret Brennan, “US Missile Defense Director Patrick O’Reilly on Bloomberg TV,” Bloomberg TV, July 28, 2009.

[15] “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), April 21, 2010.  Available at:  http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4612.   Morrell is the Pentagon Press Secretary.

[16] Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, December 1, 2010.

[17] “Now what does that mean?  The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures.  And against this threat, we have the current posture of 30 GBIs and the expected enhancements to come in the defense of the homeland with the future deployment in 2020 time frame of SM-3 2B.”  Opening statement of Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2011.

[18] Bradley Clapper, “U.S. Hesitant in Condemning North Korean Launch,” The Associated Press, December 13, 2012.

[19]The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” March 7, 2013.  Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-372013

[20] SEN. MCCAIN: Do you believe that we have the ability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch a missile, as is widely reported they would do in coming days.

ADM. LOCKLEAR: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the Homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.

SEN. MCCAIN: Do we have the capability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch within the next several days?

ADM. LOCKLEAR: We do.

[21] Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

[22] Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

[23] Jason Sherman, “Top Army General Still Confident ib=n GMD System Despite Intercept Test Failure,” Inside Defense SITREP, July 10, 2013.

[24] U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense News Briefing with George Little,” News Transcript, July 9, 2013.  Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5269.

[25] Amy Guckeen Tolson, “MDA Director Gives Update on Missile Defense,” www.theredstonerocket.com, August 21, 2013.

[26] Lieutenant General David L. Mann, prepared statement, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2014.  He repeated this statement in his April 2016 testimony.

[27] Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2014.

[28] Admiral Bill Gortney, prepared statement for FY 2016 Missile Defense Hearing, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2015.

[29] Lieutenant General David L. Mann, prepared statement, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2015.

[30] Andrea Shalal, “U.S. Says Ready to Defend Against North Korean Nuclear Threat,” Reuters, October 7, 2015.

[31] Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Appropriations Committee, April 13, 2016.  Video available at: http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-on-the-fy2017-missile-defense-agency-budget-request.

[32] Written statement, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2016.  Available at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McKeon_04-13-16.pdf.

[33] Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2016.  Video available at: https://armedservices.house.gov/legislation/hearings/missile-defeat-posture-and-strategy-united-states-fy17-presidents-budget-0.

[34] Donna Miles, “Missile Defenders Trained, Ready for Deployment, General Says,” American Forces Press Service, April 5, 2013.

An updated description of planned GMD flight tests (last update was my post of April 12, 2015) as best I can reconstruct them.  Between now and mid-2021, it appears that MDA plans five intercept and one non-intercept test of the GMD system.

FY 2017:

FTG-15 (1Q FY 2017).  This is scheduled to be the first intercept test since FTG-06b in July 2014.  It will be the first GMD intercept test against an ICBM-range target (range greater than 5,500 km).  The target will include countermeasures.  FTG-15 will  also will be the first flight and intercept test of the new production CE-II Block-I version of the Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) and the first flight test of the upgraded C2 booster.   According to Admiral Syring, in this test “…we’re getting now out to the long-range and closing velocities that certainly would be applicable from a North Korean or Iran type of scenario.” [1]

FTG-15 (Image source: MDA)

FY 2018:

FTG-11 (1Q, FY 2018).[2] This is to be the first salvo (multiple interceptors fired at a single target) test of the GMD system.  In it, both a CE-I and CE-II equipped Ground-Based Interceptor (GBs) will be fired at a single ICBM-range target. The test is described as an “operational” one.[3]   In its 2015 annual report, DOT&E noted that this test would implement its previous year’s recommendation that the CE-I EKV be re-intercept tested following the failure of FTG-07 in July 2013.[4]

FTG-11 (Image source: MDA).  Date has slipped from that on image.

GM CTV-03 (3Q, FY 2018).  First flight test of the new Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV).  It is not an intercept test.  If this test is successful, the MDA will proceed to build eight further RKVs for developmental purposes.[5]

This test will also likely be the first flight test of the new 2/3 stage selectable GBI booster.  (For discussion of 3/3 stage booster, see my post of February 2, 2016.)  According to a March 2015 report, a two-stage non-intercept test was planned for the 3^rd quarter of FY 2018, so it seems likely that this test is being combined with the first non-intercept test of the RKV.[6]

FY 2019:

FTG-17 (3Q, FY 2019).  First intercept test of the new RKV.  The target is an ICBM-range missile with countermeasures.   If this test is successful, MDA plans to proceed with a competition for the procurement of 37 additional RKVs. [7]  This will also the first intercept test of the two-stage version of the 2/3 stage selectable GBI booster.[8]

FTG-17 (Image source: MDA)

FY 2020:

FTG-18 (2Q, FY 2020). Intercept test of RKV with 2/3 stage selectable booster against an ICBM-range target with countermeasures.  According to Admiral Syring, although this test will happen after the production decision on the RKV-equipped GBIs, it will occur before their deployment.[9]

FTG-18 (Image source: MDA)

FY 2021:

FTO-04 (3Q FY 2021).  This will be the first GMD test against two simultaneous targets.   In an operational test, two GBI interceptors (a CE-I and a CE-II) will attempt to intercept two targets with IRBM and ICBM ranges.[10]   At least the IRBM will include countermeasures.  FTO-04 is a BMDS system operational test that will also likely involve a mix of Aegis, Aegis Ashore, THAAD and/or Patriot systems.  The GMD portion of FTO-04 has formerly been referred to as FTG-13.

FTO-04 (Image source: MDA)

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[1] Vice Admiral James D. Syring, “Ballistic Missile Defense System Update,” presentation at the Center for Strategic  and International Studies, January 19, 2016.  Video available at: http://csis.org/event/ballistic-missile-defense-system-update-0.

[2] Date of this test from statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2016.  Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_SASC_SFS_MDA_VADM_Syring_13042016.pdf,

[3] Syring statement, 2016.

[4] DOT&E Annual Report 2015, p. 372.  Available at: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2015/pdf/bmds/2015gmd.pdf

[5] Jason Sherman, “MDA Proposes Revised $2 Billion, Five Year RKV Project to Execute New Acquisition Strategy,” Inside Defense SITREP, March 2, 2016.

[6] Scott Maocione, “MDA Puts $51 Million in Budget To Develop Two-stage Booster,” Inside Defense SITREP, March 12, 2015.

[7] Sherman, “MDA Proposes Revised.”

[8] Syring, CSIS presentation.

[9] Admiral Syring stated in the April 14, 2016 hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that: “For the redesigned Kill Vehicle, we have a non-intercept flight test and then an intercept flight test followed by a second intercept flight test in 2020 before those — that configuration would be fielded.”

[10] Amy Butler, “Pentagon Plans Three Ambitious GMD ‘Firsts’,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 18, 2014; prepared testimony of J. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2015.

In two previous posts, I made estimated projections forward in time of the number of U.S. Navy ballistic missile defense (BMD) capable ships and the number of SM-3 BMD interceptors.[1]  These projections reached two main conclusions: (1) The number of BMD capable ships would reach the upper seventies (77) by 2040; and (2) The number of SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (including possible more advanced version of the missile) would be in the hundreds, possibly 500-600 or more, by the mid-to-late 2030s.

Several developments since those posts were written illustrate the uncertain nature of such projections.  In February 2016, it was revealed that the Navy had decided to upgrade three additional Flight IIA Aegis destroyers to the full advanced BMD capability (under the previous plan these three ships would have had no SM-3 BMD capability).[2]  In addition, it is still unclear how long the five Aegis BMD cruisers will remain in service, although this makes no difference to the longer term projections..

Later in February it was reported that the Navy was reducing the number of SM-3 Block IB missiles it would procure from FY 2017 to FY 2020 from 52 per year to about 35 per year in part due to ongoing problems with the missile’s third stage booster.[3]  However, the impact of this reduction is likely to be more than mitigated by recently announced plans to extend the service life of Block IA interceptors from eight years to twelve.[4]    More significantly, an April 2016 GAO report stated the United States planned to procure 351 SM-3 Block IIA missiles.[5]  This number is above my low projection of about 280 missiles, but also well below my medium projection of about 520 missiles.  However, it is unclear what this 351 number really means, given that United States has apparently not yet even decided on how many Block IB interceptors it intends to buy.[6]  Nevertheless, it seems low, as it less than twice the 182 SM-3 Block IIA missiles the United States intends to buy just for the four ships and two Aegis Ashore sites in European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) system, leaving on average just 2 Block IIA missiles for the other 73 Aegis BMD ships currently requested by U.S. regional Combatant Commanders.[7]

Thus these recent developments do not significantly affect my long term projections: that by mid-to-late 1930s, the United States will likely have about 80 BMD capable ships and hundreds, possibly 500-600 or even more, of Block IIA (or more advanced) missiles.

Strategic Capabilities of SM-3 IIA Missiles

Several published analyses have argued that Block IIA missiles have little in the way of strategic capabilities, in particular, that they will have little or no capability to intercept Russian ICBMs launched toward the United States.[8]   However, these studies only consider Block IIA deployments as part of the EPAA system in Europe and its surrounding waters (such as the North Sea).  They do not consider the deployment scenarios in which the Block IIA interceptors would have potentially significant capabilities against intercontinental-range missiles – when the ships carrying the interceptors are deployed close to U.S. territory.

U.S. Navy ships equipped with Block IIA interceptors will be distributed globally.  For example, the four Aegis destroyers forward deployed to Europe as part of the EPAA are only 12% of the United States’ current 33 BMD capable ships, a figure that will fall to 10% by 2020 and ultimately to only 5% as more BMD capable ships become operational.  The majority of U.S. BMD capable ships are and will be based at U.S. ports.  Moreover, BMD ships can be rapidly deployed to new locations.  As stated in April in Congressional testimony about U.S. regional missile defenses: “Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which allow us to address crises as they emerge.”[9]  All of these ships can be supported by the global sensor network of United States’ Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that spans the entire northern hemisphere, as shown in Figure 1.  According to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), BMDS sensors are deployed in 20 of the world’s time zones.[10]

Figure 1. The land-based radar sensor network for the U.S. BMDS spans the northern hemisphere.  Aegis radars on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites are not shown.  Missile Defense Agency figure.[11]

In the discussion below, the capability of the Block IIA missiles to defend the United States against ICBMs is broken down into two aspects; coverage — the portion of U.S. territory the Block II missiles have the kinematic capability to attempt to defend; and kill capability – the ability of the Block IIA interceptor to actually home in on and destroy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warheads.

Coverage

It has long been known, although perhaps not as widely understood as it should be, that if Block IIA interceptors were deployed close to U.S. territory and supported by the BMDS system’s sensors, they could provide coverage of the entire United States.

Figure 2 below shows a rough coverage “footprint” of a SM-3 Block IIA-like interceptor (then known as the Navy Upper Tier interceptor) against an ICBM flying over the North Pole produced by myself and several colleagues in 1994.[12]  It shows that the contiguous 48 states could potentially be covered from a few off-shore launch sites.

Figure 2.  Rough footprints for SM-3 Block IIA-like interceptors deployed off the coasts of the United States.  The interceptor speed is 4.5 km/s, the speed typically assumed for the Block IIA.  Interceptors are assumed to be launched based on a then-planned (but never built) space-based tracking system.  If the launches were instead based on the current Upgraded Early Warning Radars (the orange pentagons in Figure 1), the footprints would likely be somewhat smaller in the forward (northern) direction, giving footprints more like that shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Unknown to us at the time, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) had already produced a similar figure.  Figure 3 below shows a SDIO chart from 1992 (which appears to have been publicly released in 2005).  It shows the coverage against an ICBM of a naval Block IIA-like interceptor, then known as the Navy Upper Tier interceptor.  Figure 3 shows the entire contiguous states could be covered from five ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) sites – four just offshore and one in the Great Lakes.  Today, basing a ship in the Great Lakes would not be necessary, as the central United States site (if needed) could be provided by an Aegis Ashore (AA) site similar to the ones already deployed in Romania and Hawaii and planned for Poland.

Figure 3.  1992 SDIO figure showing coverage of the United States by a Block IIA – like interceptor.  Source: Rear Admiral A. Brad Hicks, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System,” Washington Roundtable of Science and Public Policy, George C. Marshall Institute, December 19, 2005.  Available at: http://marshall.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Hicks-Aegis-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-BMD-System.pdf.

Figure 4 below shows a similar “footprint” for a single ship, explicitly with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, located off the U.S. East Coast.

Figure 4.  Coverage of the eastern half of the United States against an ICBM from a single ship just off the coast.  Source: Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Aegis Ashore: Navy Needs Relief from Land” www.breakingdefense.com, July 2, 2015, available at: http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/aegis-ashore-navy-needs-relief-from-land/.  The image is attributed to retired VADM J.D. Williams and is described as being based on analysis by M.I.T.’s Lincoln Laboratory.

Figure 5 below provides a different perspective on the coverage of U.S. territory by Block IIA interceptors by showing potential intercept geometries against Russian ICBMs.

Figure 5.  Intercept geometries for Block IIA-like interceptors against Russian ICBMs.  Image from: Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense, Federation of American Scientists Special Report Number 1, September, 2011, p. 24.  Online at: http://fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf. Block IIA interceptors will likely have a speed of about 4.5 km/s.

These above figures make it clear that the entire contiguous United States could be covered by no more than three or four ships equipped with Block IIA interceptors, perhaps supplemented by a single Aegis Ashore (AA) site.  An additional ship or AA site would be needed for Alaska; Hawaii already has an experimental AA site that could be converted to an operational site.  According to one estimate, the experimental AA site in Hawaii could be converted into an operational site for $41 million.[13]

Kill Capability

Given the ability of Block IIA interceptors to cover the country from a small number of launch sites, the only thing that could prevent them from having a potential capability (leaving aside for now the problem of countermeasures that plagues any exo-atmospheric defense) against Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be if the Block IIA kill vehicles were not capable of homing in on and hitting the ICBM warheads.[14]

ICBMs (missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 km) have higher burnout speeds than shorter-range missiles, and intercepting them will thus often involve higher closing speeds than against shorter-range missiles, in turn requiring more capable kill vehicles.  Official descriptions of the SM-3 Block IIA credit it with being able to intercept intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs, ranges between 3,000 and 5,500 km) and shorter range missiles and “some ICBMs.”[15]  However, there is little doubt that the Block IIA kill vehicles will be able to home in on and intercept ICBM warheads.

In February 2008, the United States used an SM-3 interceptor to destroy a malfunctioning satellite, specifically targeting a fuel tank on the satellite.[16]  The satellite was travelling at a speed of greater than 7.6 km/s, a speed comparable or greater than that of an ICBM.  Three years later, the United States demonstrated that an SM-3 missile can intercept an IRBM in a successful intercept test in April 2011.[17]

Both of these intercepts involved only a first-generation Block IA interceptor.  The Block IIA kill vehicle will be two generations in capability beyond the Block IA kill vehicle used in these intercepts.  Relative to the Block IA kill vehicle, the next-generation Block IB kill vehicle adds a two-color seeker with improved optics and an advanced signal processor.  The Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, “more flexible” throttleable divert and attitude control system (TDACS), which improves its divert capabilities.[18]  According to reports, the TDACS is able “to dynamically vary its thrust and operating time” and provides higher thrust levels using continuous thrust management to give a greater divert capability than does Block IA kill vehicle.[19]  The Block IIA interceptor will further improve on the Block IB kill vehicle by adding a “large diameter” kill vehicle with an “advanced discrimination seeker” and a “high divert DACS.”[20]  [Added 7/7/2016: Relative to the SM-3 Block IB, the SM-3 Block IIA has “more than doubled seeker sensitivity” and “more than tripled divert capability.” (FY 2017 President’s budget, MDA, RDT&E, vol. 2a, p. 2a-891)

Official figures make it clear that the Block IIA is expected to be able to intercept full-range ICBMs.  Figure 6 below is from a 2008 Missile Defense Agency slide which shows that the Block IIA is able to intercept ICBMs with a full ICBM range of about 10,000 km in the descending phase of their flights – precisely the scenario illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Figure 6.  MDA slide from 2008 showing Block IIA interceptors can intercept ICBMs with ranges of 10,000 km during the ascending and descending phases of their flights.  Source: Missile Defense Agency, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: Status, Integration and Interoperability,” May 6, 2008.  Online at: http://www.ndia.org/Resources/OnlineProceedings/Documents/8100/AegisBMD-StatusIntergrationandInteroperability.pdf.  Note that, as another figure in this briefing shows, in 2008 the Block IIA was expected to begin deployment in 2015.

A similar figure in a 2012 National Academy of Sciences Report shows the Block IIA being able to intercept an ICBM over an even greater fraction of its trajectory.[21]

The proposed plan to convert the Hawaii Aegis Ashore experimental site into an operational site also assumes an SM-3 capability against ICBMS, as Honolulu is about 7,000 km from North Korea, and thus could only be reached by an ICBM-range missile.

More generally, DOD and MDA officials have stated that they have at least considered the use of SM-3 interceptors as substitutes or supplements for the Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) of the current U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system.  In April 2013, in response to a question about a possible East Coast GBI interceptor site, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff General Martin Dempsey told Congress that: “The only thing I would add, Mr. Secretary and Congressman, is that the environmental impact study shouldn’t be taken to assume that we will, in fact, establish an East Coast missile field for the ground-based interceptor, because we have other options.  We have other options, to include sea-based.”[22]

Three months later, in response to similar question, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring told the Senate that: “As Chairman Dempsey has testified, that will be one of the capabilities that will be evaluated. The Aegis system, as you known, is a fantastic system.  We would have to get into a classified discussion in terms of what coverage and what capability that could provide in defense of the homeland, which I’d rather not go into here in an unclassified setting.  But, yes, sir, it will be a capability that we examine in conjunction with examining the third site.”[23]  Note that both Dempsey’s and Syring’s statements were made after the cancellation of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor program.

Ultimately, the GBI and the SM-3 Block II interceptors may even end up using the same kill vehicle.  The MDA is in the early stages of developing a Multiple-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV), which would enable deploying multiple, small kill vehicles on a single GBI interceptor beginning in the mid-2020s or later.  As figure 7 below illustrates, these same or similar MOKVs could also be deployed on SM-3 interceptors (although perhaps only one per missile).

Figure 7. The Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) of the U.S. GMD national missile defense system and SM-3 interceptors may eventually both use a similar or identical kill vehicle.  Slide from Richard Matlock (MDA Program Executive for Advanced Technology), presentation to 2013 Space and Missile Defense Symposium, August 15, 2013.  Available at: https://mostlymissiledefense.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/2013-08-15-matlock-advancedtechnology.pdf. 

Implications

For the United States and Russia (Soviet Union), any discussions of the consequences of the deployment of strategic-capable BMD systems have been largely hypothetical, since they have always taken place in the context of very large existing deployments of long-range ballistic missiles. The end of the Cold War, the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and the negotiation of the New START Treaty have so far not fundamentally changed this situation. Even after the implementation of New START, each country will retain nearly 1,500 nuclear ballistic missile warheads, dwarfing the 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) planned for the United States’ GMD national missile defense system by the end of 2017, and even the nearly 100 GBIs that the U.S. could end up deploying if it builds an additional interceptor launch site in the eastern United States.

However, the large-scale deployments of strategic-capable SM-3 Block IIAs (or successor missiles) could greatly change the balance between offensive warheads and strategic-capable interceptors.  By the late 2030s, the U.S. could have very roughly 350 – 650 strategic-capable interceptors either based in or near U.S. territory or capable of being relocated there on short notice.[24]  Although the United States might have no intention to ever relocate these interceptors in such a way, it seems very unlikely that it would be willing (or possibly even able) to provide Russia and China with any credible assurance that it would never undertake such a step – a step that could directly undermine their nuclear deterrents.

After New START goes into effect in February 2018, Russia will likely have about 1490 deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads (based on the limit of 1,550 accountable warheads minus about 60 bombers).  If we assume that about half of these warheads are survivable at any given time, then Russia would have about 750 survivable strategic ballistic missile warheads.  This number is roughly comparable to, although likely somewhat larger, than the number of strategic-capable ballistic missile interceptors the United States would likely have by the late 2030s.  Whether such a situation would be acceptable to Russia is unclear; at a minimum it would be much less acceptable than the current situation, which Russia is already complaining about.

Perhaps more significantly, even relatively modest future reductions below New START levels, say to a level of 1,000 strategic warheads, could then see the number of Russia’s survivable ICBM and SLBM warheads fall below the number of U.S. strategic-capable interceptors.  A direct comparison between the number of country’s strategic missile warheads and the number of adversary’s strategic-capable BMD interceptors may not be the best way for the country to assess the adequacy of its nuclear deterrent.  Nevertheless, the point at which the number of  survivable warheads falls below the number of interceptors seems likely to be  a significant symbolic barrier to further reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads.

On April 7, 2010, the day before the New Start Treaty was signed, Russia made a (non-binding) unilateral statement that, in its view, the Treaty “… may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative build-up in the missile defense capabilities of the United States.”[25] At that time, the United States had thirty deployed strategic interceptors – GBIs in Alaska and California.  That Russia felt it necessary to make such a statement despite the then lop-sided ratio of New START warheads to U.S. strategic-capable interceptors — at that time nearly fifty to one — does not bode well for it agreeing to further cuts in the face of expanding U.S. missile defenses that could bring the ratio its survivable warheads to U.S. strategic-capable interceptors close to or below one to one.

In addition, Russia is significantly modernized its strategic nuclear forces, and the number of missile warheads it is capable of deploying is expected to continue to grow at least into the mid-2020s, and it may well have to eliminate some missile warheads to get under the New START limits.[26] Thus Russia no longer has the incentive to agree to lower numbers simply to maintain parity with the United States in numbers of strategic warheads, an incentive that helped it agree with the New START limits.

The implications of U.S. SM-3 Block IIA deployments are even more severe with respect to China.  Today, the number of Chinese survivable nuclear warheads capable of reaching at least the U.S. West Coast is roughly comparable to the number of U.S. strategic-capable interceptors.[27] Although the number of Chinese strategic warheads is expected to slowly increase, this anticipated increase falls far short of keeping pace with the rapid increase in the number of U.S. strategic-capable warheads that will begin in the 2020s.

There are already indications that U.S. missile defense deployments are affecting Chinese decision making on their strategic nuclear forces. In 2015 the United States announced that China had begun to deploy MIRVed warheads (multiple, independently-targeted warheads) on some of its silo-based DF-5 ICBMs.[28] China has been capable of MIRVing its missiles for decades, but had refrained from doing so, and this recent development of MIRVs is widely viewed as being at least in part a response to the U.S. BMD program.[29] A second, road-mobile, MIRVed ICBM is also under development, and was first flight tested in August 2015.[30]  U.S. officials attribute at least part of China’s motivation for MIRVing to concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defenses.[31] In addition, in 2016 the U.S. Department of Defense stated that it expected the first deterrent patrol of a Chinese ballistic missile submarine to take place later that year.[32]  Chinese military officials have stated that the primary reason for their increased emphasis on sea-based missile forces was the expanding U.S. missile defense program.[33]  Thus the U.S. BMD program already appears to be influencing China to build up its land-based long-range nuclear ballistic missile forces faster than it otherwise would have.[34]  The much larger-scale deployment of Block IIA interceptors in the 2020s and 2030s can only be expected to lead to even greater buildups.  Indeed, unless China is willing to see its number of strategic retaliatory warheads reduced to a fraction of the number U.S. strategic-capable missile defense interceptors, its strategic nuclear forces will have to be several to many times their current size.

Many U.S. officials and analysts are already expressing great concern about new Chinese conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, the DF-21D and the DF-26C. These so-called “carrier killer” missiles are believed to be equipped with a maneuvering warhead with terminal guidance, and both are believed to be conventional variants of nuclear-armed missiles. The deployment of such missiles raises the prospect of an offense-defense competition as China deploys more regional missiles and the U.S. expands its missile defense capabilities in Asia. Such a competition could then feed back into Russian and Chinese strategic force concerns if it leads the United States to deploy significantly larger numbers of naval SM-3 Block II interceptors which could be rapidly redeployed to defend U.S. territory.

By 2017, the United States will have twelve Aegis ships based in Japan, seven of which will be BMD capable – nearly twice as many as the four BMD ships deployed as part of the EPAA.[35]  Moreover, three of these ships will then have the most capable “advanced” Baseline 9 Aegis BMD capability – compared to none in the EPAA. Japan currently has six Aegis destroyers, four of which are currently BMD-capable, with the other two expected to become BMD-capable by FY 2018 and 2019 respectively.[36]  Japan also plans to build two new Aegis ships, which would give it a total of eight BMD-capable ships.

While the United States does not intend its BMD systems as a counter to Russia and China’s strategic forces, neither does it seem to take Russian and Chinese concerns about missile defenses seriously. Unless this changes, the likely outcome is that the United States will simply continue to build up its missile defense system in spite of their objections until it provokes a strong reaction from one, or more likely both, countries. Some of the most obvious forms such a Russian reaction could take are refusing to go below New Start levels, refusing to extend the Treaty and building up its forces, or deploying its own national missile defense system. Moreover, by the time the reaction occurs, U.S. BMD deployments may be at or approaching a level that would preclude Russian reductions much below New Start levels for the indefinite future and thus would be a severe and likely long-lasting setback for any efforts to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Such reactions, and similar ones from China, would only reinforce the connection between strategic missile defenses and strategic offensive missile forces, and thereby raise the prospect of nuclear offense-defense competitions.

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[1] This post is based on part on a working paper for Cornell University’s Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies’ Project on A Stable Transition to a New Nuclear Order: George Lewis, “Prompt Global Strike Weapons and Missile Defenses: Implications for Reductions in Nuclear Weapons,” January 2016.  Online at: https://pacs.einaudi.cornell.edu/sites/pacs/files/Lewis.Prompt%20Global%20Strike%20Weapons%20and%20Missile%20Defenses.pdf.

[2] Sam LaGrone and Megan Eckstein, “FY 2017 Navy Budget Adds 3 More Aegis Combat System Modernizations Over Next Five Years,” USNI News, February 11, 2016.  Available at: http://news.usni.org/2016/02/11/fy-2017-navy-budget-adds-3-more-aegis-combat-system-modernizations-over-next-5-years.

[3] Jason Sherman, “MDA Scraps Plan for $1.8B Block Buy of Raytheon Missile, Slashes Procurement,” Inside Defense SITREP, February 22, 2016.

[4] MDA Director Vice Admiral James D. Syring, written statement, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2016, p. 12.  Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_HASC_SF_Admiral_Syring_14042016.pdf.

[5] U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery of Capabilities,” GAO-16-339R, April 18, 2016, p. 45 (slide 32).  Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676855.pdf.

[6] At the April 14, 2016 HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, MDA Director Vice Admiral Syring, discussing the number of Block IA and Block IB interceptors, stated that “I do not have an end inventory objective yet for Aegis.

[7] As discussed in my post of December 13, 2015, the number of Aegis BMD ships requested by U.S. Regional Combatant Commanders has increased from 42 in 2014 to 77 in 2016.  The United States is unlikely to have enough BMD ships to meet these requests until at least the late 2030s.

[8] Joan Johnson-Freese and Ralph Savelsberg, “Why Russia Keeps Moving the Football On European Missile Defense: Politics,” Breaking Defense, October 17, 2013.  Online at: http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/why-russia-keeps-moving-the-football-on-european-missile-defense-politics/.  Jaganath Sankaran, “Missile Defense Against Iran Without Threatening Russia,” Arms Control Today, November 2013.  Online at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_11/Missile-Defense-Against-Iran-Without-Threatening-Russia.

[9] Brian P. McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.  Written statement, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2016.  Available at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McKeon_04-13-16.pdf.

[10] James D. Matthewson Jr., “Missile Defense Agency, Small Business Programs Conference, Sensors Directorate Overview,” August 14, 2015.  Online at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/osbp_15conf_Sensors_Matthewson11.pdf.

[11] Matthewson Jr., “Sensors Directorate Overview.”

[12] Lisbeth Gronlund, George Lewis, Theodore Postol and David Wright, unpublished footprint, 1994.

[13] Andrea Shalal, “Exclusive: U.S. Weighs Making Hawaii Missile Test Site Operational – Sources,” Reuters, January 22, 2016.

[14] This conclusion would also apply to Russian and Chinese submarine launched ballistic missiles that were launched from close to their national territory.

[15] RDML Joe Horn, “Aegis BMD Overview to the National Defense Industrial Association,” July 13, 2010,   slide 13.  Available at: http://www.ndia.org/resources/onlineproceedings/documents/0100/0100-aegisbmdoverview-rdmlhorn.pdf.

[16] Thom Shankar, “U.S. Missile Strikes Spy Satellite from its Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008.

[17] U.S. Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-based Missile Defense Flight Test Results in a Successful Intercept,” News Release, April 15, 2011.  Available at: http://www.mda.mil/news/11news0007.html.

[18] MDA, “Second-Generation Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test,” News Release, May 9, 2012.

[19] Zachary M. Peterson, “Raytheon, ATK Hope To Start Advanced SDACS Flight Tests This Year,” Inside Missile Defense, August 30, 2006; “Raytheon and Aerojet demonstrate SM-3 Throttling Divert and Attitude Control System,” PR Newswire US, August 15, 2006.

[20] Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, p. 20.

[21] Figure 1-2 on page 27 of Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and System for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, National Research Council of the National Academies, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and System for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, 2012, shows SM-3 Block IIA missiles are able to intercept ICBMs over most of their descending trajectories. Available at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13189/making-sense-of-ballistic-missile-defense-an-assessment-of-concepts.

[22] Defense Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, April 16, 2013.

[23] Defense Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations Committee, July 17, 2013.

[24] The 350 figure is based on the GAO’s figure of 351 SM-3 Block IIAs + 44 GBIs – 24 to 48 Block IIAs deployed on land in Europe.  The 650 figure is based on my medium projection of 580 Block IIAs + 100 GBIs – 24 to 48 Block IIAs on land in Europe.  (Note: the environment impact materials produced by MDA for a possible East Coast deployment sites indicate up to 60 GBIs might be deployed at that site.)

[25] U.S. Department of Defense, “New Start: Article-by-Article Analysis Unilateral Statements,” no date. Available at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/NST/Art%20By%20Art/art_uni_statements_annex.htm.

[26] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June, 2015.  Online at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/3/84.full.pdf+html.

[27] The best publicly available estimate is that China currently has about 64 ICBM warheads capable of reaching at least as far as the U.S. West Coast, about half of which are deployed in vulnerable land-based silos. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 4 (2015), pp. 77-84.  Online at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf+html.

[28] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “China Making Some Missiles More Powerful,” New York Times, May 16, 2015. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/world/asia/china-making-some-missiles-more-powerful.html.

[29] Sanger and Broad, “China Making Some Missiles.”

[30] Statement of Admiral C. D. Haney, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Haney_03-19-15.pdf. Bill Gertz, “China Tests New Long-Range Missile with Two Guided Warheads,” Washington Free Beacon, August 18, 2015.

[31] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, April 2015, p. 31.  Online at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf.

[32] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 2016, p. 26.  Online at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf.

[33] Julian Borger, “China to send nuclear-armed submarines into Pacific amid tensions with US; Beijing risks stoking new arms race with move although military says expansion of the US missile defence has left it with no choice,” The Guardian, May 26, 2016.  Online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/china-send-nuclear-armed-submarines-into-pacific-us.

[34] The MIRVing of these missiles does not immediately allow China to greatly increase the number of its missile warheads, since the limited payloads of these missiles means that each one can carry at most only two or three warheads. See David Wright, “Groundless Claims about Chinese MIRVing,” All Things Nuclear blog, October 9, 2015. Available at: http://allthingsnuclear.org/category/missiles-missile-defense#.Vngz44-cGM8.

[35] The 11 current Aegis ships homeported in Japan are listed at: http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/PacificTheaterShips.aspx#.V08LwY-cGM8.  The USS Milius will be added in 2017.  The USS Barry, USS Benfold, and USS Milius have the advanced Baseline 9 BMD capability. The other BMD capable ships are the USS Curtis Wilbur, USS John S. McCain, USS Fitzgerald, and the USS Stethem.

[36] Statement of Brian P. McKeon, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2016.  Online at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McKeon_04-13-16.pdf.

SM-3 Block IIA Testing Chronology

SCD PTV-01 (October 2013): SM-3 Cooperative Development (SCD) Propulsion Test Vehicle (PTV)-01. A test of the Block IIA booster rocket and canister, reportedly successful, intended to demonstrate that The Block IIA could be launched from the Vertical Launching System used on U.S. Navy Aegis ships and at Aegis Ashore sites.

SCD CTV-01 (June 6, 2015): SCD Controlled Test Vehicle (CTV)-01.  First flight test of SM-3 Block IIA.  It was not an intercept test and no target was present.  The Missile Defense Agency stated that the test “successfully demonstrated flyout through nosecone deployment and third stage deployment.”[1]  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the test was delayed by about 5 months.[2]

SCD CTV-02 (December 8, 2015):  Second flight test of SM-3 Block IIA.  It was not an intercept test and no target was present.  According to the MDA, “The missile successfully demonstrated flyout through kinetic warhead ejection.”[3]  The test was originally scheduled for the 4^th quarter of FY 2015.  According to the GAO, the delay was due to “delays in hardware deliveries.”[4]

Contract Award (December 9, 2015): The Raytheon Company receives a $543 million contract to produce and deliver up to 17 SM-3 Block IIAs for testing and initial deployment.[5]

SFTM-01 (4Q, FY 2016): SCD Flight Test Standard Missile (FTM)-01.  First intercept test of SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.  This test was earlier scheduled for 3Q, FY 2016. Target will be a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM – range between 1,000 and 3,000 km).  The test will use Aegis BMD version 5.1 (the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) phase 3 version) with the baseline 9.C2 combat system (the “C” indicates an existing Aegis destroyer that has been upgraded to baseline 9, which enables it to conduct anti-air and anti-ballistic missile operations simultaneously).  This test will also be the first flight test for MDA’s new MRBM T1/T2 target missile.[6]

Cancelled Test (FY 2016)??: A May 2016 Senate report states that delays in deliveries of SM-3 Block IIA interceptors have resulted in “at least one missed flight test.”[7]  A May 2015 GAO report also indicates that there were to be two Block IIA intercepts in FY-2016 instead of the single test in this chronology.[8]

It is unclear (to me) exactly what this missing test is.  FY 2015 and earlier MDA budget documents show SFTM-1 consisting of two events – E1 and E2.  In the FY 2016 documents, only the E2 event remains, which apparently became the single SFTM-1 test in the FY 2017 budget documents and in this chronology.  However, the deleted SFTM-1 E1 event appears not to have been an intercept test but only a simulated intercept (no SM-3 to be launched) of an actual missile target.

SFTM-02 (2Q, FY2017): Second intercept test of a SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, also against a MRBM target.  Under current plans, this would be the last flight and intercept test under the U.S.-Japan SM-3 Cooperative Development Program.  This test was earlier scheduled for 1Q FY 2017.  According to the GAO, the Block IIA program has experienced “technical challenges and schedule delays, some of which are expected to continue to impact developmental efforts through 2017.”[9]

FTM-29 (1Q, FY 2018): Third intercept test of a SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.  It is intended as a launch-on-remote (using a TPY-2 radar) intercept of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM, range 3,000-5,500) km.  According to MDA Director Vice Admiral Syring, this test “will begin [the] transition to testing the SM-3 Block IIA within the U. S. BMDS architecture with the upgraded Aegis Baseline 9 weapon system and BMD 5.1, for at sea and ashore deployment.”[10]

SM-3 Block II Deployment (4Q, FY 2018): Current plans call for the SM-3 Block IIA to be deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in Poland and on one or more Aegis destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain by the end of calendar year 2018.

FTO-03 E1 (3Q FY 2018): Flight Test Operational-03, Event 1; FTO-03 E2 (1Q, FY 2019); FTO-03 E3 (?):  In 2014, MDA Director Syring stated that these three operational tests were scheduled for the SM-3 Block IIA (to be held in 3Q FY 2018, 3Q FY 2018 and 4Q FY 2018, respectively).[11]  A May 2015 GAO report also stated that there would be three SM-3 Block IIA “operational events” in FY 2018.[12]  However, the MDA’s FY 2017 budgetary materials show a 2Q delay for FTO-03 E2 and does not list FTO-03 E3 at all.

————————————————————————–

[1] Missile Defense Agency, “U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development Project Conducts Successful Flight Test of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA,” News Release, June 6, 2015.  Online at http://www.mda.mil/news/15news0006.html.

[2] Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affecting Delivery of Capabilities,” GAO-16-333R, April 28, 2016, p. 46.

[3] Missile Defense Agency, “U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development Project Conducts Successful Flight Test of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA,” News Release, December 8, 2015.  Online at http://www.mda.mil/news/15news0009.html.

[4] GAO-16-333R, p. 46.

[5] Raytheon Company, “Raytheon receives $543 million for SM-3 Block IIA production and delivery,” News Release, December 9, 2015.  Online at http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2015-12-09-Raytheon-receives-543-million-for-SM-3-Block-IIA-production-and-delivery.

[6] Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: “Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve Reporting on System Capabilities,” GAO-15-345, May 2015, p. 68.  Online at: http://gao.gov/assets/680/670048.pdf.

[7] “…since the previous budget request, programmed costs for manufacturing of the initial SM-3 Block IIA interceptors have increased 40 percent and costs for SM-3 Block IIA development have increased 29 percent.  Further, delivery of SM-3 Block IIA interceptors has been delayed over three fiscal quarters, resulting in at least one missed flight test.”    Senate Report 114-263, May 26, 2016, p.186. https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/srpt263/CRPT-114srpt263.pdf

[8] GAO-15-345, p. 53.

[9] GAO-16-333R, p. 46

[10] Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, Subcommittee of Strategic Forces, House Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2016.  Online at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_HASC_SF_Admiral_Syring_14042016.pdf.

[11] Written response by MDA Director Vice Admiral Syring to a question from Senator Mark Udall, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2014, p. 171.  Online at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91192/pdf/CHRG-113shrg91192.pdf.

[12] GAO-15-345, p. 53.

Flight tests of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system since developmental testing resumed in 2005 and planned future tests.

Figure 1. THAAD intercept tests since 2005. In April 2012, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation stated that “due to budget constraints within the agency, MDA had decided to slow the pace of THAAD testing to about one test every eighteen months.[1] 

FTT-01 (November 22, 2005:  First launch of an operationally-configured THAAD interceptor.[2]  The launch, conducted at the White Sands Test Range (WSMR), successfully demonstrated the operation of missile and kill vehicle, although no target was used and thus no intercept was attempted.  The THAAD TPY-2 radar does not appear to have participated in this test.

FTT-02 (May 11, 2006): Second flight test of operational THAAD interceptor.[3]  No actual target was used.  This was the first test to include all of the THAAD system components, including the TPY-2 radar.  The radar provided simulated target data to the THAAD fire control system.  Test was conducted at WSMR and was reported as successful.

FTT-03 (July 12, 2006):  First intercept attempt and first successful intercept using an operational interceptor.[4]  The target was a non-separating, short-range missile (a Hera missile) and the intercept took place in the high endoatmosphere.  It was an integrated system test in which the THAAD TPY-2 radar acquired and tracked the target and provided in-flight updates.  Test was conducted at WSMR.

FTT-04 (September 13, 2006): No test. This was to be an intercept test against a short-range separating target, but the target failed and was destroyed about two minutes after launch.  The target failure occurred before the THAAD interceptor could be launched, and so no interceptor launch took place.[5]  This was the last THAAD test held at WSMR.

FTT-06 (January 26, 2007): Successful intercept test of a non-separating short-range target.[6]  This was the first THAAD test conducted at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Hawaii.  The target was described as being a SCUD-Like missile and the intercept took place in the high-endoatmosphere.  This was the first test in which soldiers from a US Army unit that would eventually operate THAAD operated all of the THAAD equipment.

FTT-07 (April 5, 2007): THAAD successfully intercepted a short-range non-separating missile target at PMRF.[7]  The intercept took place at a mid-endoatmospheric altitude against a Scud-like target.  The intercept took place about two minutes after the interceptor was launched.

FTT-05 (June 26, 2007):  Non-intercept flight test at PMRF, and the lowest altitude test so far.[8]  The test was intended to test the performance of the missile and kill vehicle in the low endo-atmosphere, where greater (relative to earlier, higher-altitude tests) atmospheric dynamic pressure and heating occur.  There was no target present.   The test was reportedly successful.

FTT-08 (October 26, 2007):  A successful intercept test.[9]  This was the first exo-atmospheric intercept attempt using the operationally-configured THAAD interceptor.  The target was a short-range non-separating missile representing a Scud-like target.   The test was conducted at the PMRF in Hawaii.

FTT-09 (June 25, 2008): A successful intercept test at PMRF.[10]  The test target was a separating short-range missile launched from a C-17 aircraft.  This was the first successful intercept of a separating target.  According to the DOT&E, the target was a “simple, spin-stabilized, non-reorienting” reentry vehicle and the intercept took place in the low-endoatmosphere.[11]  (Another source describes the intercept  as taking place in the mid-endoatmosphere.[12])   The THAAD system was operated manually by soldiers using its semi-automatic mode.

FTT-10 (September 17, 2008): No test. A planned salvo intercept of two THAAD interceptors against a single target did not take place when the target missile failed.[13]  The target missile failed before either THAAD interceptor could be launched.

FTT-10a (March 18, 2009): A successful salvo intercept attempt at PMRF.[14]  Two THAAD interceptors were fired at a short-range separating target missile, with the first interceptor hitting the target warhead in the mid-endoatmosphere.  This test was a combined operational (the first for THAAD) and developmental test, and also involved an Aegis ship providing cuing information to the THAAD system.[15]

FTT-11 (December 11, 2009):  No test. Test did not occur due to the failure of the target missile motor to ignite after being dropped from a C-17 aircraft.[16]  This was to have been the first THAAD test against a “complex separating” short-range missile target.[17]  The target would have had “a relatively low infrared signature and radar cross section.”[18]  According to the DOT&E (2010 Annual Report) the objectives of this test were added to the future FTT-12 test.[19]  According to the GAO, this test’s objective of demonstrating the TPY-2 radar’s advanced discrimination capability was moved to FTT-12.[20]

FTT-14 (June 28, 2010):  Successful intercept of a short-range non-separating missile at PMRF.[21]  This test was moved forward (using a target planned for Airborne Laser testing) when target problems caused FTT-11 to fail and FTT-12 to be delayed.[22]   The intercept occurred in the low-endoatmosphere.  This was the lowest altitude intercept for THAAD so far.  According to the DOT&E, the intercept took place at “a high lead angle and in a high-dynamic-pressure environment.”[23]

FTT-12 (October 4, 2011): Two THAAD interceptors successfully intercepted two short-range missiles in “nearly simultaneous” engagements at PMRF.”[24]  This was the first operational test for THAAD.[25]  There does not appear to be any further information available on the nature of the target, but the transfer of objectives from FTT-11 suggests that at least one of the targets could have been  a separating, complex target.

FTT-13 (Cancelled):  This test, which was scheduled for 2012, would have been the first intercept test against a medium-range target.  However, the test was cancelled “because of budgetary concerns and test efficiency.”[26]  The planned target was described as “a complex separating medium range target with associated objects.[27]”

Flight Test Integrated-01 (FTI-01), (October 25, 2012):[28]  This test involved Patriot, Aegis and THAAD intercept attempts against three ballistic missile and two cruise missile targets.  Although the test was labeled as an integrated test, each of the defenses basically operated independently of each other.[29]  The test was conducted at the Kwajalein Atoll test site.  In the THAAD part of this test, THAAD successfully intercepted an Extended Long-Range Air Launch Target ((E-LRALT) medium-range missile.  This was the first intercept of a medium-range missile (1,000-3,000 km range) by THAAD.  The THAAD system was cued by a second TPY-2 radar operating in a forward-based mode.

Flight Test Operational-01 (FTO-01), (September 10, 2013):[30]  An integrated, operational test involving THAAD and Aegis BMD intercepts of two medium-range missile targets.  One of the medium-range missile targets was successfully intercepted by a THAAD interceptor.  A second THAAD interceptor was salvo launched along with an Aegis SM-3 Block IA interceptor at the second medium-range target.  The Aegis interceptor was fired first and successfully destroyed the target.  Both engagements were cued by a TPY-2 radar operating in a forward-based mode.

FTT-11a (cancelled): This test was initially scheduled for 3Q FY 2013, and subsequently delayed to 3Q FY 2015.[31]  It was to be an exo-atmospheric engagement of a complex separating target short-range ballistic missile.[32]  It does not appear FY 2015 or later budget documents, and it seems likely that it was replaced by the first intercept attempt of FTO-02 E2a.

Flight Test Operational-02 Event 2 (FTO-02 E2) (No Test, then Cancelled):   An attempt to hold this test on October 4, 2015 was postponed due to bad weather.  According to one source: “Thunderstorms, heavy rain, and high winds can pose a danger to airborne sensors and can also impact data collection asset [sic].”[33]  It was subsequently assessed as a “no test” due to deployment problems with its air-launched target.  The test was replanned and conducted as FTO-02 E2a on November 1, 2015.

Flight Test Operational-02 Event 2 (FTO-02 E2) (November 1, 2015): Two intercept attempts by THAAD, both reportedly successful.[34]  The first intercept attempt was on a short-range air-launched ballistic missile.  This was likely an exo-atmospheric intercept, since it was in part intended to provide a debris field background for a subsequent Aegis SM-3 Intercept attempt. The second target was a MRBM, and both an Aegis BM-3 Block IB TU interceptor and a THAAD interceptor were fired at it.  The SM-3 interceptor failed shortly after launch, but the THAAD interceptor successfully intercepted the target.

FTT-15 (3Q, FY 2017): Endo-atmospheric intercept of a medium-range target using Aegis cuing. [35]   First test of THAAD “against a complex target scene.”[36]  Also described as “THAAD endo-intercept of a complex separating Medium-Range Ballistic (MRBM) target with Associated Objects.”[37]

FTT-18 (3Q, 2017): First THAAD test against an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).[38]  (IRBM range = 3,000-5,500 km).  Test delayed from 4Q FY 2015 due to “testing prioritization,” even though THAAD has been deployed in Guam to counter North Korean IRBMs since April 2013.[39]

Flight Test Operational-03 E2 (FTO-03 E2) (1Q, FY 2019): Operational test.[40]

FTT-16 (3Q, 2020): Endo-atmospheric intercept of a unitary short-range missile with high reentry heating. [41]

FTT-21 (4Q, 2021):[42]

FTT-17 (delayed until after 2021 or cancelled): Intercept of a target with a range near the maximum for medium range targets.[43]  Also described as “THAAD Operational engagement of an IRBM with AOs using remote engagement (Aegis BMD) authorized.”[44]

——————————————————————

[1] Statement by J. Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Committee, April 25, 2012.

[2] “Successful THAAD Interceptor Launch Achieved,” MDA News Release, November 22, 2005.

[3] “Missile Defense Interceptor Completes Successful Developmental Flight Test,” MDA News Release, May 11, 2006.

[4] “Successful Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Intercept Flight Achieved,” MDA News Release, July 12, 2006.

[5] “Target Missile Malfunction Halts THAAD Flight Test in New Mexico,” MDA News Release, September 13, 2006.

[6] “Successful Missile Defense Intercept Test Takes Place Off Hawaii,” MDA News Release, January 27, 2007.

[7] “Successful Missile Defense Intercept Test Takes Place Off Hawaii,” MDA News Release, April 6, 2007

[8] “Missile Defense Agency Conducts Successful Interceptor “Fly-Out” Test,” MDA News Release, June 27, 2007.

[9] “Successful Missile Defense Intercept Test Takes Place Near Hawaii,” MDA News Release, October 27, 2007.

[10] “Successful Missile Defense Intercept Test Takes Place Off Hawaii,” MDA News Release, June 25, 2008.

[11] Director Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), 2008 Annual Report, p. 257.

[12] Colonel William L. Lamb, “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Program, Briefing Slides, 13^th Annual AUSA Tactical Missiles Conference, April 25, 2011, slide 6.

[13] “Missile Defense Test Conducted,” MDA News Release, September 17, 2008.

[14] “Successful Intercept in Missile Defense Flight Test,” MDA News Release, March 18, 2009.

[15] DOT&E, 2009 Annual Report, p. 249.

[16] Missile Defense Test Conducted,” MDA News Release, December 11, 2009.

[17] DOT&E, 2010 Annual Report,  p. 237.

[18] Statement by J. Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, April 15, 2010.

[19] DOT&E, 2010 Annual Report, p. 237.

[20] Governmental Accountability Office (GAO), GAO-11-372, p. 111.

[21] “THAAD System Intercepts Target in Successful Missile Defense Flight Test,” MDA New Release, June 29, 2010

[22] Statement by J. Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, Strategic Forces Committee, House Armed Services Committee, March 31, 2011.

[23] DOT&E, 2010 Annual Report, p . 237.

[24] “THAAD Weapon System Achieves Intercept of Two Targets at Pacific Missile Range Facility,” PR Newswire, October 5, 2011.

[25] GAO-11-372, p. 111; GAO-12-486, p.93.

[26] GAO-12-386, p. 89.

[27] Statement by J. Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, Strategic Forces Committee, House Armed Services Committee, March 31, 2011.

[28]“Ballistic Missile Defense System Engages Five Targets Simultaneously During Largest Missile Defense Test in History,” MDA News Release, October 25, 2012.

[29] Statement of DOT&E J. Michael Gilmore, Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

[30] “Successful Missile Defense Test Against Multiple Targets,” MDA News Release, September 10, 2013.

[31] Gilmore, 2011; Department of Defense, President’s Budget Submission (PB), Missile Defense Agency (MDA), FY 2012, RDT&E, p. 2-77; PB FY 2014, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-67

[32] PB FY 2013, MDA, RDT&E, p. 422

[33] Jason Sherman, “Bad Weather Prompts MDA to Postpone Major Operational Test,” Inside the Pentagon, October 2015.

[34] Missile Defense Agency, “Ballistic Missile Defense System Demonstrates Layered Defense While Conducting Multiple Engagements in Operational Test,” News Release, November 1, 2015; Jason Sherman, “New SM-3 Block IB Variant Fails First Flight Test,” Inside the Pentagon, November 5, 2015.

[35] Statement by J. Michael Gilmore, DOT&E, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Committee, April 25, 2012; PB, FY 2014, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-66,.  Date of test from PB FY2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-813.

[36] PB FY 2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-805.

[37] PB FY 2012, MDA, RDT&E, Vol. 2, p. 540.

[38] Date of test from PB FY2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-813.

[39] GAO-16-339, p. 56.  Original testing date from PB FY 2015, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-113

[40] Date of test from PB FY2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-813.

[41] Gilmore, 2013.  Date of test from PB FY2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-813.

[42] Date of test from PB FY2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-813.

[43] Gilmore, 2013.

[44] PB FY 2012, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-138.

A central element of the debate surrounding the recent decision by South Korea to allow the United States to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on its territory is the range of the THAAD’s radar. China argues that the THAAD radar will be able to look deep into its territory; supporters of the deployment counter that the radar will be configured so that its range will be limited.

The radar used with a THAAD battery is the X-band AN/TPY-2.  The TPY-2 radar has two configurations.  It can be configured as Terminal Mode (TM) radar, in which it operates as the fire control radar for a THAAD battery.  Alternatively, it can be set up as a Forward-Based Mode (FBM) radar, in which it relays tracking and discrimination data to a remote missile defense system, such as the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) system.  If THAAD is deployed to South Korea, The United States has stated that its TPY-2 radar would be in the shorter-range TM configuration.  Since in the TM mode, the radar reportedly only has a range of 600 km, supporters of the THAAD deployment argue that while its range is adequate to cover N. Korea, it cannot look deeply into China.  Critics of this argument point out that in the FBM mode the radar has a much greater range, and that the radar can be converted from TM to FBM (or vice versa) in only eight hours or less.  According to a U.S. Army manual, “The hardware used by the two modes is identical, but their controlling software, operating logic, and communications package are different.”[1]  In addition the radar is highly mobile: it can be transported by air and can be operational with four hours of reaching its deployment site.

Published figures for the range of a TPY-2 radar vary by nearly a factor of five.  For a radar, this is a huge discrepancy.  If all these published ranges were for the same target and same radar operating parameters, they would indicate a difference in radar capability of about 5⁴ = 625.  So clearly these claims must reflect very different assumptions about how the radar is used.

To provide a sense of how the range is affected by how the radar is operated, I will step through various claims about the TPY-2’s range, from lowest to highest.  Comparing these claims is complicated by the fact that many of them are not accompanied by much information on the conditions under which the range is achieved.  Nevertheless, the comparison shows that the widely varying ranges are self-consistent once differences in how the radar is operated and the nature of the target are taken into account.  At the same time, it also shows how claims about the radar’s range can be misleading if applied in the wrong context.

(1) Several hundred miles.  The shortest range claim I have seen is from the TPY-2’s manufacturer, the Raytheon Company, and is that a TPY-2 radar could “…track a home run from a ball park from several hundred miles away.”[2]  If we take several hundred to mean three hundred, then this range is about 480 km. [The home run would have to be hit very high – over 17,500 feet – to rise over the horizon at this range.]  A reflective sphere the size of a baseball (diameter = 2.9 inches) has a radar cross section (RCS) of about 0.004 m².  While this RCS certainly possible, it is lower than is usually used for a baseline number.  If we scale to a radar cross section of 0.01 m², we get a range of about 600 km.  This range is consistent with the terminal mode range cited in South Korean press reports.

(2) 600 km. This is the range cited in South Korean press reports for the range of the TPY-2 in the terminal mode.  In February 2015, the Chosun Ilbo cited a government official as saying the TM configuration had an effective range of 600 km.[3]  In April 2015, the Seoul Shinmum (in Korean) gave this range for the TM radar, citing a U.S. technical report.[4]

(3) 870 km.  This is the range estimate given in a post in this blog from September 21, 2012 (by George Lewis and Theodore Postol).  I will use this post as the baseline for the discussion because it contains values for of all the parameters used in the radar range calculation.  The link is: https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2012/09/21/ballistic-missile-defense-radar-range-calculations-for-the-antpy-2-x-band-and-nas-proposed-gbx-radars-september-21-2012/#more-420.

(4) 1,500 km.  A figure in the 2013 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report show a tracking range curve with radii of about 1,500 km for the TPY-2 radar.[5]  The NAS panel has stated that this 1,500 km range is conservative.[6]

(5) Greater than 1,732 km.  The NAS panel says a range of 1,732 km would be obtained using the Lewis and Postol parameters in point (3) except with the required S/N reduced from 20 to 12.4 and the dwell time increased from 0.1 s to 1.0 s.[7] They further say that if the actual classified values of the other parameters were used instead of the values in (3), the range would be even greater.

(6) 1,800-2,000 km.  The ranges given in the South Korean Press for the forward-based configuration of the TPY-2 radar (same sources as in item (2) above).

(7) Greater than 2,900 km. In 2008, Major General Patrick O’Reilly (then the Deputy Director of the MDA) stated that the TPY-2 had a range “greater than 1,800 miles” (1,800 miles = 2,900 km).[8]

(8) 3,000 km.  This range is shown in a figure published in the South Korean newspaper, based on a calculation by George Lewis and Theodore Postol.[9]  The figure is reproduced as Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. TPY-2 tracking geometries for a radar in South Korea for a launch point in China. 

How is such a wide span of ranges possible?   Because of different assumptions regarding the operating mode of the radar and the nature of the target.

Start with the 870 km range in point (3) as a baseline.  The key assumptions and parameters here are: a warhead target with a radar cross section (RCS) of 0.01 square meters; a radar dwell time (the amount of time the radar spends on each beam position) for each target of 0.1 seconds; and  a signal to noise (S/N) ratio for detection of S/N = 20.[10]  This result indicates that the radar could track 10 incoming targets at a range of 870 km making one measurement on each target every second, or alternatively 100 targets with a measurement every ten seconds.[11]  The assumption of 0.1 second for the dwell time is somewhat arbitrary and does not necessarily match what is used in the actual TM and FBM configurations (which is classified).

Now consider the ranges in points (1) and (2) above.  These clearly correlate to the terminal mode configuration of the radar, with a nominal range of 600 km.  Is this short-range range reasonable?  In the terminal mode, the targets will be either individual warheads or entire missiles descending toward their impact points (although in some cases, targets might be detected before they reach the peak of their trajectories).  Unless the targets are tumbling, then they will generally be viewed in close to a nose-on geometry, so that their RCS will likely be relatively low.   Thus the 0.01 square meter RCS assumed in the baseline seems appropriate, although it could be lower.  In this mode, operating as a fire control radar for a THAAD battery, the radar might have to deal with dozens or even a hundred or more simultaneous targets.  In addition the radar will also be required to carry out continuous surveillance (search) for new targets. Thus it would not be surprising that the range in this mode would be less than the estimate in (3), and 600 km seems plausible.

Now let’s look at the 1,500 and 1,732+ km ranges drawn from the NAS report in points (4) and (5).  The radar and target parameters used in the NAS report are classified.  However, from the discussion of point (5), it is apparent that most of the difference in range relative to the 870 km range in point (3) is due to a longer dwell time – in the case of the 1,732+ range a factor of ten increase in dwell time per target – which gives as factor of 1.78 times increase in range.  That is, the increase in range is obtained at the price of a ten-fold decrease in the number of targets that can be tracked or a ten-fold increase in the time between measurements on each target (or some combination of the two).  As with (3), these ranges do not take into account a requirement for the  the radar to conduct surveillance for new targets (for example, if the radar was receiving precise cues to new targets from other sensors so that surveillance was not necessary).

This longer dwell time per target might be similar to what the TPY-2 radar uses in its forward-based mode to get the 1,800-2,000 in point (6) above. In the forward-based mode, the radar is primarily focused on tracking smaller numbers of longer-range missile early in their flights and at longer ranges.  However, it seems likely that in the FBM mode the radar also has surveillance requirements, which would suggest a shorter range.  On the other hand, the description of the FBM configuration radar by both the MDA and its manufacturer emphasize that it is intended to track missiles during their boost phase.  At the TPY-2’s X-band frequency (approximately 10 GHz), the upper stages of ballistic missiles would be expected to have much larger radar cross sections than separated warheads.  For example, the 2003 American Physical Society Boost Phase Study used a radar cross section of 0.094 square meters for a solid-fuel missile as it rises over the horizon of a TPY-2 radar (and 0.45 square meters for a liquid-fuel missile). [12]  If such large radar cross sections are assumed (9.4 to 45 times larger than the 0.01 square meters assumed in point (3) for a warhead), ranges of 1,800 to 2,000 km could be achieved with dwell times less than those in used for the NAS’s ranges in points (4) and (5) even if the radar devoted half of its time to surveillance.

Finally, if one combines a boost phase tracking assumption (target radar cross section  =  0.1 square meters) with longer dwell times (0.1 s) and no surveillance requirement, ranges as great as the 2,900+  km cited by General  O’Reilly in (7) or the 3,000 km figure from Lewis and Postol in (8) are obtained.

The above discussion shows that while the United States’ argument that THAAD’s range while operating in its intended terminal mode is very limited is plausible, so is the Chinese claim that the radar is physically capable of observing missile flights deep within its territory.  While China would surely be able to monitor which mode the radar is operating in, there does not appear to be any technical or legal barrier to prevent it from being quickly converted from terminal to forward-based mode.

———————————————————————–

[1] Quotation from: Park Hyun, “Pentagon Document Confirms THAAD’s Eight-Hour Conversion Time,” June 3, 2015.  Available at: http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/694082.html.

[2] Raytheon Company, “Sharp Eyes for Missile Defense – Bus-size Radar Rolls Like a Truck, Sees Like a Hawk,” August 26, 2015,  Available at: http://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/an_tpy2_radar_behind_headlines.html.

[3] “U.S. Seeks Compromise Over Missile Defense System,” The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition), February 24, 2015.  Available at: http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/02/24/2015022400979.html.

[4] Cited in: “News Analysis: U.S. Defense Chief’s Visit to Seoul Adds Controversy to THAAD Deployment,” China.org.cn, April 9, 2015.

[5] National Research Council, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and System for U.S. Boost Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2012), p. 115.  Available at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13189.

[6] Letter sent to Congress by Members of NAS Panel, “Setting the Record Straight – NRC Study Entitled “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense,”” January 11, 2013 (including David Barton, “Attachment 1 – A Brief Rebuttal to Lewis and Postol Radar Claims,” (dated December 31, 2012)).

[7] NAS Panel, “Setting the Record Straight.”

[8] Alan Suderman, “Radar Array Placed in Juneau,” www.juneauempire.com, June 1, 2008.

[9] Park Hyun, “An/TPY-2 Radar Could Track any Chinese ICBMs as They Pass Over the Korean Peninsula,” The Hank Yoreh (English Edition), June 2, 2015. Available at: http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/693916.html.

[10] The other parameters are radar average power = 81,000 W, antenna aperture = 9.2 square meters, antenna gain = 103,000, radar system temperature = 400 K, radar system losses = 6.3.

[11] This also assumes a different beam position is needed for each target.

[12] Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense, July 2003, Vol. 2., p. 177.  Available at: http://journals.aps.org/rmp/pdf/10.1103/RevModPhys.76.S1.

Sea-Based Terminal

Most of the attention given the US Navy’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program focuses on its various versions of the SM-3 anti-missile interceptor.  These missiles, the SM-3 Block IA, the SM-3 Block IB and the forthcoming SM-3 Block IIA, intercept their targets above the atmosphere and are intended to provide coverage over large areas (particularly the Block IIA).  However, this post discusses the Missile Defense Agency’s and the Navy’s Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) program, which is developing and deploying lower-altitude, within-the atmosphere ballistic missile defense interceptors.

An SBT capability offers several possible benefits.  First, it provides a second layer of ballistic missile defense for Navy ships and nearby areas, thereby potentially increasing the overall effectiveness of the Aegis BMD system.  SBT interceptors operate in a completely different way than the SM-3 interceptors.  The SBT interceptors home in on their target using radar, maneuver using atmospheric forces, and kill with a high-explosive fragmentation warheads, while SM-3 interceptors use infrared homing, maneuver using rocket thruster (divert thrusters), and kill using direct high-speed collisions.  These differences in operating principles may make it less likely that a countermeasure (or other circumstance) that defeats an SM-3 interceptor can also defeat an SBT interceptor.  Second, SBT interceptors can potentially intercept shorter-range missiles, such as Scuds (or longer range missiles on depressed trajectories) that do not leave the atmosphere (that is, rise above about 100 km altitude) and thus cannot be intercepted by SM-3 interceptors.  Third, SBT interceptors are likely to be much less expensive, by a factor of three or more, than SM-3 interceptors.  Finally, SBT interceptors can also be used to intercept aircraft (and soon ships), allowing more efficient use of the limited number of vertical launch tubes on Navy ships.

SM-2 Block IV, Block IVA, and Block IV (modified)

In the 1990s, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Navy planned to develop a terminal phase ballistic missile defense system known as Navy Lower Tier.  (In parallel, BMDO was developing the Navy Upper Tier interceptor, which was renamed Navy Theater Wide, and eventually evolved into the current SM-3 Aegis BMD interceptors.)  This program, which was renamed Navy Area Defense in 1996, was based on a new version of the Navy’s existing extended-range air defense missile the SM-2 Block IV.  The SM-2 Block IV operates within the atmosphere, uses semi-active radar homing and has a high-explosive fragmentation warhead.

The new missile, to be known as the SM-2 Block IVA, would have had a new side-mounted infrared terminal seeker as well as modifications to the Block IV’s guidance system, fuzing system and warhead (see figure 1 below).  However, in December 2001, the Department of Defense cancelled the Navy Area Defense system, citing “poor performance and projected future cost and schedules” following a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach.[1]

Figure 1.  Modifications to the SM-2 Block IV to produce the SM-2 Block IVA.  Missile Defense Agency image (http://www.mda.mil/global/images/system/navy_tbmd/sm2-block-IVA.jpg)

Despite the cancellation of the Navy Area Defense Program, the Navy retained interest in developing a Sea-Based Terminal capability and considered, for example, the possibility of developing a sea-based version of the Patriot PAC-3 system.[2]  Ultimately, following a successful intercept test of a modified SM-2 Block IV interceptor against a short-range ballistic missile in 2006 (see list of SBT tests below), the MDA and the Navy decided to develop an interim sea-based terminal missile defense system by modifying existing SM-2 Block IV interceptors.  The modifications to the Block IV interceptors involved changes to the missile’s fuze and autopilot and were less extensive than the changes that would have been made to produce the cancelled SM-2 Block IVA missile.  At the time, the Navy had about 100 Block IV interceptors in inventory, and ultimately 75 were modified for ballistic missile defense (5 of which have subsequently been expended in tests). The modified SM-2 Block IV was first intercept tested (successfully) against a short-range ballistic missile target in May 2006 (Pacific Phoenix) and has had three other successful ballistic missile intercept tests since (one test involved two interceptors).

Deployment of the modified Block IV missiles began in 2008 on ships equipped with the basic Aegis BMD 3.6.1 system.  At the end of 2008, there were about 18 ships with this version of the Aegis system.  This number that would grow to about 24 in 2012 and then decline as 3.6 ships were upgraded to higher version of the Aegis BMD system.

The Block IV interceptor was only intended to provide an interim “gap-filler capability” until a new (then undefined) SBT interceptor could be deployed.[3]  Accordingly, and as a cost-saving move, ships that were upgraded to Aegis BMD 4.x and early versions of 5.x (Phase II of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)) would not be equipped for the Modified Block IV interceptors and thus would not have any SBT ballistic missile defense capability.  A sea-based terminal capability would then be restored with Aegis 5.2 as part of phase III of the EPAA using the new SBT interceptor.  However, a recent MDA slide now indicates that ships with either Aegis BMD 4.1 or 5.0 CU will be able to operate SBT interceptors.[4]

The SM-6 Interceptor

Ultimately, the Navy decided that the longer-term SBT interceptor would be based on its new SM-6 new extended-range air defense interceptor.  The SM-6 combines the airframe and propulsion system from the SM-2 Block IV interceptor with the active radar seeker of the advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) missile.  See figure 1 below.  Like the SM-2 Block IV, it operates within the atmosphere and uses a high explosive warhead.  As of 2013, the U.S. Navy planned to procure total of 1,800 SM-6 missiles by FY 2024[5]  The SM-6 was first deployed in December 2013 (on DDG-100) and the Navy has so far accepted deliveries of over 250 missiles.[6]

Figure 2.  SM-6 compared to SM-2 Block IV.  Image source: Laura DeSimone, “Aegis BMD; The Way Ahead,” MDA Briefing Slides, December 6, 2011 (available at: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011PEO/DeSimone.pdf )

The SM-6 has an over-the-horizon capability against aircraft using targeting data provided by other ships or by aircraft, such as the Navy’s E2-D Hawkeye airborne warning and control system (AWACS) airplane.  An upgraded version, the SM-6 Block IA, adds “guidance section hardware and software modifications,” including the incorporation of GPS guidance, to enable attacks on sea or land targets.[7]  In a January 2016 test, an SM-6 struck and sank a decommissioned U.S. Navy frigate.[8]  Current plans call for SM-6 missiles with an anti-ship capability to begin deployment in fall 2016.[9]

The SM-6 Dual I and Dual II Interceptors

The initial version of the SM-6 did not have a capability against ballistic missiles. The SM-6 is to be given a terminal-phase anti-ballistic missile capability in two phases.  The first phase, the SBT Increment 1, includes an upgraded missile known as the SM-6 Dual I.  A Dual I interceptor successfully intercepted a short-range (less than 1,000 km) ballistic missile target in a July 2015 test and its deployment is expected to begin in 2016.[10] This is to be followed in 2018-2019 by SBT Increment 2 which will include the Dual II version of the SM-6.  The SM-6 Dual interceptors will eventually supplant the modified Block IV interceptors as the Navy’s SBT interceptors.

There appears to be little publicly available information about how the Dual I interceptor differs from the baseline SM-6 or SM-6 Block I, or how the Dual II missile differs from the Dual I.  Press reports indicate that the Dual I has a more powerful processor and additional software.[11]  A Raytheon spokeswoman described the Dual I as containing both ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare software in the same missile.[12]

SBT Testing

The modified SM-2 Block IV has had four successful intercept tests against ballistic missile targets and the SM-6 Dual I had its first successful test in July 2015.  All of these tests were against short-range ballistic missile targets.  The next SM-6 Dual I test will be against a medium-range (1,000-2,000 km) ballistic missile.  The tests are summarized below:

Pacific Phoenix (May 24, 2006): A modified SM-2 Block IV launched from the cruiser Lake Erie successfully intercepted short-range ballistic missile in the terminal phase of its flight in a joint U.S. Navy and MDA test.[13]  This was the first sea-based intercept of a ballistic missile.  The cruiser was equipped with an interim Aegis missile defense capability known as “Linebacker.”[14]

Flight Test Standard Missile-14 (FTM-14) (June 5, 2008):  A short-range ballistic missile target was successfully intercepted in its terminal phase by two modified SM-2 Block IVs salvo fired by the cruiser Lake Erie which was equipped with  Aegis BMD 3.6.1.[15]  The intercept occurred at an altitude of about 12 miles.

Stellar Daggers (March 26, 2009): A short-range ballistic missile target was successfully intercepted by a modified SM-2 Block IV interceptor launched from the destroyer Benfold.[16]   The destroyer simultaneously intercepted a cruise missile target with an SM-2 Block IIIA interceptor.  The test was conducted by the U.S. Navy rather than by MDA.

Multi-Mission Warfare Event 1 (MMW E1) (July 29, 2015):  A SM-6 Dual I missile, launched from the destroyer John Paul Jones (Aegis BMD 5.0 CU, Aegis Baseline 9.C1), successfully intercepted short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).[17] This was the first flight and intercept test for the SM-6 Dual I.

In two separate tests on July 31 and August 1, SM-6 Dual I interceptors successfully intercepted cruise missile targets (although in the second test, the interceptor warhead was intentionally not detonated in order to be able to reuse the target).

Multi-Mission Warfare Event 2 (MMW E2) (July 30, 2015): A SM-2 Block IV missile, launched from the destroyer John Paul Jones (Aegis BMD 5.0 CU, Aegis Baseline 9.C1), successfully intercepted a SRBM.[18]

Flight Test Other-21 (FTX-21) (May 17, 2016): An Aegis destroyer (John Paul Jones) successfully tracked a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), including its reentry and subsequent flight within the atmosphere.[19]  This is the first time Aegis had tracked an MRBM within the atmosphere during reentry.  The plan for this test had originally included an intercept by an SM-6 Dual I, but for range safety reasons the intercept attempt was deferred until the FTM-27 test in late 2016.[20] Department of Defense budget documents describe the test as “SM-6 Dual I missile simulated engagement of a Medium Range Ballistic Missile.”[21]

FTM-27 (1Q, FY 2017):  Two SM-6 Dual I interceptors will be salvo fired against a MRBM target.

FTX-24 (4Q FY 2017):  Simulated Sea-Based Terminal (SM-6 Dual) intercept of separating short-range ballistic missile.[22]  Actual target, but no interceptor will be fired.

FTM-28 (3Q, 2018): SBT intercept test.[23]

FTM-31 (1Q FY 2019): SBT intercept test[24]

FTM-33 (1Q FY 2019): SBT intercept test[25]

FTM-32 (3Q FY 2019): SBT intercept test[26]

 —————————————————————-

[1] Department of Defense, “Navy Area Missile Defense Program Cancelled,” News Release, December 14, 2001.  Online at http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/PubsCats/PM/articles02/dodjf022.pdf.

[2] Malina Brown, “Navy Rebuilding Case for Terminal Missile Defense Capability,” Inside the Navy, April 19, 2004.

[3] John Liang, “Obering: ’Limited’ Sea-Based Aegis Terminal Competition RFP Out Soon,” Inside Missile Defense,

August 27, 2008.

[4] Figure 1 of Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL33745, May 26, 2016.  Figure shows a slide provided to the CRS by the Missile Defense Agency on March 25, 2016.

[5] Jason Sherman, “New Threat Analysis Prompts $3B increase in SM-6 Procurement Spending,” Inside the Navy, September 9, 2013.

[6] Lee Hudson, “Raytheon Exec: Standard Missile-6 Price Slashed by 32 Percent,” Inside the Navy, July 14, 2014; Raytheon Company, “SM-6 Shatters Engagement Distance Record,” News Release, March 7, 2016.

[7] Jason Sherman, “Navy, Raytheon Ready New Satellite-Guided, Standard Missile-6 Variant,” Inside the Pentagon, July 3, 2014.

[8] Sam LaGrone, “Navy Sinks Former Frigate USS Reuben James in Test of New Supersonic Anti-Surface Missile,” USNI News, March 7, 2016.

[9] Justin Doubleday, “Navy To Deploy Modified SM-6 with Anti-Ship Capability this Fall,” Inside Defense SITREP, March 10, 2016.

[10] According to MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring’s 2016 Congressional Prepared Statement, the SM-6 Dual I “will enter the fleet inventory this spring.” Online at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_HASC_SF_Admiral_Syring_14042016.pdf.

[11] Sydney J. Freeberg Jr., “SM-6 Can Now Kill Both Cruise AND Ballistic Missiles,” breakingdefense.com, August 4, 2015; Kyong M. Song, “Naval Interceptor Takes on both Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Aerospace America, September 2015, p. 6.

[12] Jason Sherman, “Aegis-Guided SM-6 Interceptor Shoots Down Ballistic Target,” Inside Missile Defense, August 4, 2015.

[13] Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-based Terminal Capability Successfully Completed,” News Release, May 24, 2006.

[14] Staff writers, “Aegis Destroys Ballistic Missile in Terminal Phase,” Space Daily, June 4, 2008.

[15] Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense Intercept,” News Release, June 5, 2008; Staff writers, “Aegis Destroys.”

[16] U.S. Third Fleet. “Navy Completes Air and Ballistic Missile Exercise,” News Release. March 27, 2009; “Raytheon Standard Missile-2 Demonstrates Sea-Based Terminal, Fleet Protection,” PR Newswire, March 27, 2009.

[17] Missile Defense Agency, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Successful Series of Intercept Flight Test Events,” News Release, August 3, 2015.

[18] MDA, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes.”

[19] Missile Defense Agency, “Aegis BMD System Completes Successful Tracking of Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Target,” News Release, May 17, 2016.

[20] Jason Sherman. “Aegis BMD Tracks Ballistic Missile Target Within Earth’s Atmosphere,” Inside the Pentagon, May 19, 2016.

[21] Department of Defense, President’s Budget (PB), FY 2017, MDA, RDT&E, p. 2a-656.

[22] PB FY 2017, pp. 2a-657, 2a-678, 2a-708.

[23] PB FY 2017, p. 2a-679.

[24] PB FY 2017, p. 2a-679.

[25] PB FY 2017, p. 2a-679.

[26] PB FY 2017, p. 2a-679.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to deploy a Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) system by about mid-2017. The SKA system, which MDA describes as an experiment, will consist of small sensor packages deployed on a number of commercial satellite hosts. It is intended to demonstrate a capability to rapidly determine whether or not an interceptor has hit and killed its intended warhead target.  Other than two Space News articles, the SKA system has received little public attention.[1]

MDA argues that a kill assessment capability can reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of a missile defense system by eliminating the need to fire additional interceptors at a target that has already been destroyed.  “The faster we can determine a threatening missile has been eliminated, the fewer the number of interceptors are need in the fight.”[2] The MDA goes as far as arguing that the SKA experiment “has the potential to change the economics of the defense of the American homeland from enemy ballistic missiles.[3]  This approach to reducing the number of interceptors fired — known as shoot-look-shoot – may or may not be possible depending on the timelines involved.  However, at a minimum, it is clear that this approach requires a rapid capability to assess the outcome of an intercept attempt.

Is There a Need for Additional Kill Assessment Capabilities?

The task of kill assessment is closely related to that of target discrimination.  Effective discrimination – the capability to identify the actual warhead from among other possible threatening objects such as deployment debris, rocket stages or decoys – is universally recognized as essential to the effective operation of a missile defense system.  And the current U.S. GMD national missile defense system is officially claimed to be very effective. But if a defense system is very effective at identifying the warhead from among other objects, shouldn’t it also be able subsequently to determine if the warhead has been hit and destroyed?  Why then is an additional kill assessment capability needed?

In principle, there are several scenarios in which a capability such as that provided by the experimental SKA system might have at least some utility.

One possibility is that the current discrimination capability may not be nearly as good as the current claims of high GMD effectiveness seem to imply.  The effectiveness of the GMD system is assessed against a defined official threat – all details of which are classified.  However, it is very likely that this official threat is quite simple, perhaps no more than a warhead accompanied by several objects quite different from the warhead.  At the time that the MDA stopped releasing information about the decoys is was using in tests, the only decoys it was using in these tests were spherical balloons quite different in size from the conical warhead target. Against such a simple defined threat, accurate and effective discrimination might be possible, and a high kill probability could then be achievable by firing multiple interceptors (to overcome the interceptor’s currently low reliability) at the identified target.

However, against even a slightly more difficult target set – for example a final booster stage sliced up using cutting cords into warhead-sized pieces with the warhead itself disguised so as not to appear conical – the defense could be confronted with a large number of targets, any one of which could be the actual warhead.  In this case, the GMD current discrimination sensors — the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar and the infrared seekers on its interceptor’s kill vehicles – may have little capability to pick out the real warhead before an intercept attempt is made. Even if the interceptor strikes an object, the radar may not be able to determine whether this object was the real warhead.  (In 2004, the Israeli defense company Rafael, arguing for an optical kill assessment system, possibly based in space, stated that the breakup of the Iraqi Scuds in the 1991 Gulf War formed clusters of debris such that “Identifying the warhead among these clusters is practically impossible [by radar], making effective warhead kill assessment practically impossible.”[4])   As discussed below, the experimental SKA system can make no contribution to picking out the target before the first intercept attempt.  However, there is at least the possibility that it might be able to contribute to an assessment of whether or not an intercept attempt destroyed an actual warhead.

As another scenario in which a SKA capability might be useful, consider an intercept attempt by the Aegis Ashore (AA) facility in Romania against an Iranian missile launch against a target in Western Europe.  In this scenario, the warhead itself might never be detectable by the AA radar given it is limited range.  Instead, interceptor(s) would be launched based on data from the forward-based TPY-2 X-band radar in Turkey (a process known as engage-on-remote).  However, the intercept attempt(s) could well take place outside of the field of view of the TPY-2 radar.  In this case, something like the SKA system might provide the only kill assessment capability other than that of the seeker on the interceptor.  However, whether or not enough time would remain to able to make use of such information in launching additional interceptors would be scenario dependent.

Aside from scenarios such as these, it is apparent that several kill assessment related issues have arisen in past tests of the GMD system.  In intercept test IFT-06 held on July 14, 2001, the primary radar observing the intercept attempt, the Ground-Based Radar – Prototype (GBR-P), incorrectly reported the outcome of the intercept attempt.   According to the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), “The only objective not satisfied in IFT-6 was real-time hit assessment by the GBR-P, which incorrectly reported a MISS.”[5]  In intercept test FTG-02, held on September 1, 2006, MDA reported the test as fully successful.  Several years later, however, DOT&E revealed that it had assessed the intercept attempt as “a hit but not a kill,” since it only achieved a “glancing blow” that would not have destroyed the target.[6]  In FTG-06, held on January 31, 2010, the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar that was tracking the target and guiding the interceptor shut down unexpectedly shortly before the intercept attempt due to “chuffing” of rocket motor fuel out of the interceptors final booster stage.[7]  The SBX, which was the only GMD system radar observing the intercept attempt (except for the California PAVE PAWS Upgraded Early Warning Radar, which observed part of the test in an off-line mode) was therefore unable to provide an immediate kill assessment of the intercept attempt, which failed due to a kill vehicle malfunction.

What Is The SKA System?

The FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act Stated that the MDA should develop “…options to achieve an improved kill assessment capability for the ground-based midcourse defense system that can be developed as soon as practicable with acceptable acquisition risk, with the objective of achieving initial operating capability by not later than December 31, 2019…”[8]

In April 2014, MDA started the SKA program using funds left over from the cancellation of the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS).  Each of the SKA sensor packages (see Figure 1 below) includes three single-pixel commercially-available photodiode detectors and has a mass of “approximately ten kilograms” (22 pounds) and can tilted around two axes.  The packages are being developed and built by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), which will also initially operate the SKA system before turning it over to the MDA.

Figure 1. The Space-based Kill Assessment sensor.  MDA image[9].

MDA has not stated which commercial satellites will host the SKA packages, although it has been speculated that they will be Iridium Next communication satellites.[10]  According to FY 2017 MDA budget documents, the SKA packages will be deployed using three launches in the 3^rd and 4^th quarters of FY 2017.  This is consistent with the current Iridium Next launch schedule, in which the first launch of ten satellites is scheduled for September 16, with the goal of completing the system (66 satellites + four on-orbit spares) with six additional ten-satellite launches by the end of 2017 (additional spares would be launched subsequently).[11]  Since the SKA packages will be included in three launches, they could be deployed on up to 30 satellites, although the actual number could be lower. [Added 08/10/2016: According to Admiral Syring response to a question, Senate Appropriations Committee on April 13, 2016, SKA packages will be deployed on 22 satellites.]

The Iridium Next satellites will be in in 780 km altitude near-polar (86.4 degree inclination) orbits, in six orbital planes of eleven satellites each.  Each satellite has space dedicated to hosted payloads, with up to 50 kg mass, 30x40x70 cm volume, and average power of up to 50 W (200 W peak), allocated for hosted payloads.[12] The roughly 10 kg SKA packages would seem to easily fit within these parameters.  Multiple hosted payloads can be accommodated on each satellite as long as they fit within the overall limits. The hosted payload can be mounted facing either directly downwards (nadir direction) or along the satellite’s velocity vector (ram direction).

What Can the SKA System Do?

Although the MDA describes the SKA as intended to “best leverage intellectual capital investment in the PTSS program,” the SKA system will use much simpler and less capable sensors. The Precision Tracking and Space Surveillance System (PTSS) would have deployed 9-12 satellites, each with a telescope equipped with cryo-cooled charge-coupled device focal plane arrays.  Each satellite would have been capable of tracking a ballistic missile and its warhead throughout almost it entire flight (although it would have required cueing for initial detection) using several different infrared (and possibly visible) spectral bands.  Its information could be used guide interceptors, and although its resolution would have been too poor for effective discrimination, it may have also provided some information useful for kill assessment.

In contrast, the passively cooled, single pixel SKA sensors will have little or no tracking capability.  Instead they will apparently rely on information provided by the missile defense command and control system about the location of the expected intercept point to position their sensors in advance to observe the visible and infrared light produced by the high-speed collision of the intercept.  Thus they certainly cannot provide any pre-intercept discrimination information.  According to MDA budget documents, the data from the SKA sensors will be used for “flash detection and analysis; hit/miss/kill/glancing blow assessment.”[13]

A 2010 paper by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), which is developing the SKA sensor packages, describes their “technology effort [that] led to the foundation of a technical approach to develop space-based kill assessment sensors.”[14]  They state that the kill assessment technologies they were developing needed to be able to answer questions such as: “Did the interceptor hit the target and did it hit the intended target?  What type of payload (for example, nuclear, high-explosive, chemical or biological) did the target contain? Did the interceptor render the payload non-lethal?”  This information was to be extracted from the visible and infrared light produced by the impact of the hit-to-kill interceptor, including both an impact flash as well as radiation emitted (and in the case of a sunlit impact, reflected) by the expanding cloud of impact debris. According to a U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) fact sheet on kill assessment, key kill assessment observables are “ “cloud” expansion rate, intensity-time history and spectral signatures.”[15] (Although since the SKA uses non-imaging sensors, it cannot directly measure the cloud size or expansion rate.)  The interpretation of this visible and infrared light would be based on extensive modeling (for example, using “Re-entry vehicle Intercept Signature Kill assessment” (RISK) models) as well as experimental observations.[16]

The authors of the 2010 APL paper state that APL has played a major role “in support of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Kill Assessment Technology Program, an ongoing effort begun in 2001 to develop critical kill assessment technologies,” including “preflight predictions and postflight analysis for a number of BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] intercept flight test missions during the past seven years.” According the SMDC fact sheet, data has been collected on Patriot, Aegis BMD and GMD intercept tests.  An example of such data is shown in Figure 2 below (from the APL paper).

                                     Figure 2.  Three infrared time-intensity profiles collected during an intercept test with non-imaging, single polarization sensors.[17]

It seems plausible (to me) that an SKA-type sensor could differentiate between a direct hit on a warhead and a hit on a light-weight decoy.  On the other hand, it less obvious that one could distinguish between an impact on a heavier decoy (such as a cut-up portion of a booster stage) and an impact (particularly a glancing one) on a warhead.

However, the MDA and the APL sound confident that the SKA system will work. MDA budget documents state that: “Nine years of testing using the “Kill Assessment Sensor Package” sensor on the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program indicated that the physics of the kill assessment problem was well understood and that expensive and risky technology development was not need for space-based kill assessment.  This sensor testing on the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program also showed that an electro-optical/infrared sensor was the optimal sensor to observe and intercept and record data in the frequency bands most advantageous for kill assessment”[18]  The APL researchers concluded that their “technology now provides the basis for designing and implementing kill assessment sensors. If implemented, such a kill assessment system will result in a savings on interceptors and will provide the situational awareness that will be required by senior leaders during operation of the BMDS.”[19]

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[1] Mike Gruss, “MDA Kill Assessment Sensors Would Be Commercially Hosted,” Spacenews.com, March 20, 2015. Online athttp://spacenews.com/mda-kill-assessment-sensors-would-be-commercially-hosted; Mike Gruss, “U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s Hosted Payload Delayed until mid-2017,” Spacenews.com, April 21, 2016. Online at http://spacenews.com/u-s-missile-defense-agencys-hosted-payload-delayed-until-mid-2017.

[2] Missile Defense Agency, “Frequently Asked Questions: Space-based Kill Assessment.”  Online at http://www.mda.mil/faqs/faq_ska.html.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2016 President’s Budget Submission,  Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E, Vol. 2a, February 2015, p. 2a-482.  Online at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/MDA_RDTE_MasterJustificationBook_Missile_Defense_Agency_PB_2016_1.pdf.

[4] “EO Sensors Could Provide ATBM Kill Assessment,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, April 2004.  Note that this scenario involves intercepts in the atmosphere, which should make both discrimination and kill assessment easier.  In the 1991 War, after a period of confusion, Patriot operators learned to target only the fastest falling object emerging from a missile breakup.  However, this still involved a salvo-firing strategy in which all the interceptors were launched before the first intercept attempt took place.

[5] Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “National Missile Defense (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense),” 2001 Annual Report, February 2002, p. VI-5.  Online at http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2001/pdf/dod/01nmd.pdf.

[6] See my blog post of October 18, 2012, “Ballistic Missile Defense:  A Significant Advance in Missile Defense Criticism Evasion Technology.”  Online at https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2012/10/19/ballistic-missile-defense-a-significant-advance-in-missile-defense-criticism-evasion-technology-october-18-2012/.

[7] Amy Butler, “Diverted Attention,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 12, 2010, p. 26.

[8] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Public Law 133-66, December 26, 2013, sec. 237.  Online at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ66/pdf/PLAW-113publ66.pdf.

[9] Image from MDA, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget Estimates – Overview.” Online at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy17.pdf.

[10] Gruss, “U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s.”

[11] Peter B. deSelding, “Iridium’s SpaceX Launch Slowed by Vandenberg Bottleneck,” Spacenews.com, June 15, 2016.  Online at http://spacenews.com/iridiums-spacex-launch-slowed-by-vandenberg-bottleneck.

[12] Robert E. Erlandson, Michael A. Kelly, Charles A. Hibbits, C.K. Kumar, Hugo Darlington, Lars Dyrud and Om P. Gupta, “Using Hosted Payloads on Iridium Next to Provide Global Warning of Volcanic Ash,” in Proc. SPIE 8371, Sensing Technologies for Global Health, Military Medicine, Disaster Response and Environmental Monitoring II, and Biometric Technology for Human Identification IX, May 01, 2012.

[13] FY 2016 President’s Budget, p. 2a-484

[14] Robert E. Erlandson, Jeff C. Taylor, Christopher H. Michaelis, Jennifer L. Edwards, Robert C. Brown, Pazhayannur K. Swaminathan, Cidambi K. Kumar, C. Bryon Hargis, Arnold C. Goldberg, Eric M. Klatt and Greggory L. O’Marr, “Development of Kill Assessment Technology for Space-Based Applications,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2010), pp. 289-297. Online at http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td2903/Erlandson.pdf.

[15] U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, “Kill Assessment Program,” fact sheet (undated).  Online at http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/archive/KillAssessment.pdf.

[16] Erlandson, et al., “Development of Kill Assessment,” pp. 291-293.

[17] Erlandson, et al., “Development of Kill Assessment,” p. 295.

[18] FY 2016 President’s Budget, p. 2a-481.

[19] Erlandson, et al., “Development of Kill Assessment,” p. 295.

The Missile Defense Agency plans to produce “in the 2025 time frame” an airborne laser capable of destroying ballistic missiles in their boost phase.[1]  As a start in looking at this program, I first have constructed the following chronology of MDA’s plans for laser boost-phase defense.

My focus here is on the output power (and weight required to achieve that power) achieved and planned.  I’ll consider other issues such as the airborne platform, costs, how the lasers operate, etc. in future posts.

Figure 1. The beam combiner of a fiber combining laser (FCL).  It seems likely that this is the system described under “2013” below, as it appears to combine 21 fibers.  Image Source: Missile Defense Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget Estimates: Overview,” online at: https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy17.pdf.

About 2011:  MDA began to invest in several electrically-driven laser technologies.  According to its FY 2012 budget documents, in FY 2011 the MDA planned to “Develop and experiment with diode-pumped gas lasers, fiber lasers, solid state and advanced high-power laser optics.”[2]  The two main lines of laser development that ultimately emerged from this were a Diode Pumped Alkali Laser System (DPALS) and a Fiber Combining Laser (FCL).  The DPALS research was based at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the FCL research at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and both have also been supported by DARPA.

By this time, it had long been clear that the Airborne Laser (ABL) program, with its large, complex and chemically hazardous Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) on a Boeing 747 airplane, would never produce a viable operational system.  The ABL was finally completely cancelled in 2012, after at least $5.3 billion had been spent on it.[3]  In February 2010 tests, the ABL shot down three ballistic missiles (both liquid and solid fueled) with its mega-watt class laser, although only at ranges of “tens of kilometers.”[4]

2012: The MDA stated that in 2012, it “Demonstrated the architectural feasibility of the Diode Pumped Alkali Laser System (DPALS) and the combined fiber lasers for high power applications.”[5]  The FCL prototype at Lincoln Laboratory, which “exploits a novel technique for combining the output of individual fiber lasers,” achieved a power output of 2.5 kW.[6]  The LLNL DPALS demonstrated a threefold increase in power and a 50% increase in efficiency.[7]

2013:   The FCL, coherently combining 21 separate fiber amplifiers, reached an output power of 17.5 kW with near perfect beam quality.[8]  The MDA described this power as a “world record” for such a laser.  The MDA also demonstrated a power output of 1.5 kW from a single, combinable fiber amplifier.[9]  The DPALS at Livermore achieved a peak power of 3.9 kW (also described as a world record) and a laser run time of four minutes.[10]

2014: The FCL exceeded 34 kW.[11]  The DPALS reached 5 kW, and its hardware was subsequently redesigned and assembled “for the next step in power scaling.”[12]

2015: Lincoln Laboratory’s FCL, now combining 42 fibers, reached 44 kW with near perfect beam quality.[13]  This version of the FCL was described as “room sized” and with a weight-to-power ratio of 40 kg/kW.[14] [For points of comparison, the Airborne Laser’s Size Weight and Power (SWaP) was 55 kg/kW, Admiral Syring has stated that at least 5 kg/kW is needed to have any chance of workable boost-phase weapon, and MDA’s SWaP goal is 2 kg/kW.[15]]  MDA’s program also demonstrated a 2.5 kW combinable single fiber amplifier and achieved “excellent” beam quality with a 101 fiber low-power scalability demonstration.[16]  The DPALS at Livermore reached 14 kW and an accumulated run time of greater than 100 minutes without degradation of any system components.[17]

2017: In 2017, Lincoln Laboratory will demonstrate a 30 kW low SWaP 7 kg/kW fully packaged FCL.[18]  The same year, Lawrence Livermore plans to demonstrate a 30 kW average power DPALS with a beam quality of 1.5 times the diffraction limit and plans to complete a preliminary design for a 120 kW system.

2018: In 2018, MDA plans to improve the FCL design to a 50 kW system in a 5 kg/kW package.[19]  MDA will also conduct multiple laser studies on high power scaling and technology readiness of industrial laser concepts for use in a down select in 2019.[20]

2019: In FY 2019, MDA plans to demonstrate a 120 kW DPALS.  An MDA slide suggests that this may achieve a SWaP of about 3 kg/kW (see figure 2).  In 2019, MDA will select one of either the DPALS, the FCL or one of the other industrial concepts for further development as a boost-phase weapon.

Figure 2.  MDA’s laser Size, Weight and Power plans.  Source:  Vice Admiral James Syring, “Ballistic Missile Defense System Update,” Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 20, 2016.  Video online at https://www.c-span.org/video/?403405-1/discussion-ballistic-missile-defense.

By 2021: MDA plans to conduct a low-powered flight demonstration by 2021 “to determine the feasibility of destroying enemy missiles in the boost phase of flight.”[21]

2022: By 2022 MDA plans to produce a prototype 300 kilowatt class laser using the technology selected in FY 2019.[22]

2025 time frame: In the 2025 time frame, MDA’s goal is “to integrate a compact, efficient, high power laser into a high altitude, long endurance aircraft capable of carrying that laser and destroying targets in the boost phase.”[23]

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[1] “In the 2025 time frame, our goal is to integrate a compact, efficient, high power laser into a high altitude, long endurance aircraft capable of carrying that laser and destroying targets in the boost-phase.”  Missile Defense Agency, “Advanced Technology,” Fact Sheet, July 28, 2016.  Online at https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/advsys.pdf.

[2] Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E, Defense Wide, Vol. 2, February 2011, p. 2-21.

[3] David Willman, “The Pentagon’s $10 Billion Bet Gone Bad,” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2015.  Online at http://graphics.latimes.com/missile-defense/.

[4] Missile Defense Agency, “Airborne Laser Test Bed Successful in Lethal Attempt,” News Release, February 11, 2011.  Online at  https://www.mda.mil/news/10news0002.html.  Vice Admiral James Syring, “Ballistic Missile Defense System Update,” Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 19, 2016.  Video online at https://www.csis.org/events/ballistic-missile-defense-system-update-1. Transcript online at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/160119_ballistic_transcript.pdf.

[5] Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E, Defense Wide, Vol. 2a, April 2013, p. 2a-27

[6] Statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, May 8, 2013. Online at: https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_syring_050813_HASC.pdf;  FY 2014 President’s Budget, p. 2a-27

[7] FY 2014 President’s Budget, p. 2a-27

[8] Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E, Defense Wide, Vol. 2a, March 2014, p.  2a-73

[9] FY 2015 Budget Estimates, p. 2a-73.

[10] FY 2015 Budget Estimates, p. 2a-73.

[11] Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E, Defense Wide, Vol. 2a, February 2015, p. 2a-34.

[12] FY 2016 President’s Budget, p. 2a-34; Statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2015. Online at https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_syring_031915_hasc.pdf.

[13] Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E, Defense Wide, Vol. 2a, February 2016, p. 2a-26;  Statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2016. Online at https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_HASC_SF_Admiral_Syring_14042016.pdf.

[14] FY 2017 President’s Budget, p. 2a-25.

[15] Syring, “Ballistic Missile Defense System Update,” January 19, 2016.

[16] FY 2017 President’s Budget, p. 2a-26.

[17] FY 2017 President’s Budget, p. 2a-26; Syring Statement, April 14, 2016.

[18] Syring Statement, April 14, 2016.

[19] FY 2017 President’s Budget, p. 2a-25.

[20]FY 2017 President’s Budget, p. 2a-26.

[21] Testimony of Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2016.

[22] FY 2017 President’s Budget, p. 2a-26.

[23] MDA, “Advanced Technology” factsheet.

On January 28, 2016 the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) conducted its most recent flight test of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system.  One of the key objectives of this test, designated CTV-02+, was to test a new alternate divert thruster (ADT) system.  Following the test, officials described it as completely successful.  However, in July 2016, The Los Angeles Times reported that, in fact, the ADT system failed in the test.  Following the Times report, MDA officials continued to insist that the test was completely successful.  So what’s going on here?  The 2016 Annual Report of the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, released to the public earlier this month, shows how, with some creative use of wording, both claims can be true.

The kill vehicle of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) uses four rocket divert thrusters to maneuver as it homes in on its target.  However, the divert thruster system used both in previous tests and on the currently deployed GBIs produces vibrations that can interfere with the kill vehicle guidance system.  These vibrations caused the failure of intercept test FTG-06a in December 2010.

Following the FTG-06a failure, deliveries of further GBIs was suspended until the problem that caused the failure could be identified and corrected.  Following the successful demonstration in intercept test FTG-06b in June 2014 of a repair to the guidance system to reduce the effect of the vibrations, deliveries of GBIs resumed.  However, these new GBIs still had the original divert system, and the vibrations produced by this system were still apparently enough of a concern that MDA decided to replace the original divert system in the last ten GBIs it planned to deploy.

These last ten GBIs to be deployed will be equipped with the new CE-II Block I kill vehicles, and will bring up the total number of deployed GBIs up to the total of 44 that MDA announced in 2013 would be deployed by the end of 2017.  These new kill vehicles will have the ADT system in place of the original divert system, and the most important objective of CTV-02+ was to demonstrate the effective performance of the ADT system before the first intercept test of the CE-II Block I kill vehicle.  This intercept test, designated FTG-15, was originally scheduled for the last quarter of calendar year 2016 but has not yet taken place.  The MDA has stated that it will not begin the deployment of the ten CE-II Block I interceptors until this test is successfully completed.

In CTV-02+, the kill vehicle did not attempt to intercept the target. Instead its modified CE-II kill vehicle was intended was intended to fly past it while making preplanned maneuvers to test the ADT system.  According to an MDA press release following the test: “Upon entering terminal phase, the kill vehicle initiated planned burn sequence to evaluate the alternate thruster diverters until fuel was exhausted, intentionally precluding an intercept.[1]

Following the test, all official sources indicated that the test had been a complete success.  The MDA press release went on to say that the test had succeeded in “successfully evaluating performance of alternate divert thrusters for the system’s Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle.”  In a  prepared Congressional statement from April 2016, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring stated that: “This past January we successfully executed GM CTV-02+, a non-intercept flight test involving the launch of a GBI from Vandenberg Air Force Base and an air-launched IRBM target over the Pacific Ocean. We were able to exercise fully the new Alternate Divert Thruster in the CE-II EKV in a flight environment…”[2]

However, a July 6, 2016 article by David Willman in The Los Angeles Times, based on interviews with several unidentified Pentagon scientists, reported that the ADT system actually had failed in the test.[3]  One of the scientists stated that “The mission wasn’t successful.” “Did the thruster perform as expected? No, it did not provide the control necessary for a lethal impact of an incoming threat.”  The scientists further stated that the fly-by distance from the target was twenty times greater than planned.

The day after the The Los Angeles Times article was published, the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) posted a report criticizing it.[4]  The MDAA report was largely based on a May 2016 classified MDA report to Congress and on additional information released by the MDA (the MDAA report did specify when and how this additional information was released).  According to the MDAA report, the classified MDA report stated that CTV-02+ had a 100% success rate on all of its primary objectives and 99% on its secondary objectives.  It also stated that one anomaly occurred, but that none of the test objectives were affected by it. The additional material released by MDA stated that “Performance data for all four thrusters has been evaluated and falls with expected parameters” and that the kill vehicle carried out “scripted burns as planned until the fuel was depleted.

Can these conflicting  reports be reconciled?

The 2016 Annual Report from the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation provides more specific information about CTV-02+ and in particular on the performance of the ADTs in the test.  It states that:

“The ADTs turned on and off as commanded and performed nominally.  One controller circuit board associated with one of the ADTs experienced a short and did not command the ADT to turn on for the latter part of the test.  This controller circuit board is contained within the GBI Guidance module and is not considered to be part of the ADT subsystem.”[5]

So this makes it clear that one of the ADTs did not fire as expected.  This would have caused the kill vehicle to deviate from its planned trajectory, consistent with the LA Times article.  However, the component that caused the failure was not considered by the MDA to be part of the new ADT system, and hence there was no failure of the ADT system.  Apparently the proper performance of the component that failed was not an objective of the test (unless it is the 1% secondary objective failure cited in the classified MDA report).  However, had this been an intercept test, it seems very likely that the failure would have caused a miss.

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[1] Missile Defense Agency, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense System Conducts Successful Flight Test,” News Release, January 28, 2016.  Online at: https://www.mda.mil/news/16news0002.html.

[2] Unclassified Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2016.  Online at: https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_HASC_SF_Admiral_Syring_14042016.pdf.

[3] David Willman, “A test of America’s homeland missile defense system failed. Why did the Pentagon call it a success?” The Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2016.  Online at: http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense/

[4] Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, “Veering Off,” July 7, 2016.  Online at: http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/veering-off/.

[5] Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD),” FY 2016 DOT&E Annual Report, December 2016, pp. 421-422.  Online at: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/pdf/bmds/2016gmd.pdf.